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Abstract
This dissertation aims to determine what should be the appropriate base ethical
limits of health care markets in the United States. I argue that because we do not value
health care goods and services as commodities, treating them as commodities available
for market sale can only be ethical when health care markets accord with at least the
principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care
goods and services.
I begin by establishing the theoretical foundation of my argument by expositing
three theories of commodification and ethical markets that critically examine the
relationship of goods to the market. Each theory shows how commodification often fails
to account for the non-market value(s) we attribute to many goods. I then apply these
theories to health care goods and services to show how they are not properly valued
merely as commodities, and to lay the foundation of my argument regarding the ethical
limits of health care markets. I then argue why honesty, respect for autonomy, and
increased access to essential health care goods and services should be considered the base
ethical limits of health care markets by examining how each ideally applies to both health
care and the market.
Lastly, I apply my argument to two health care markets: the pharmaceutical
industry and a possible legal organ market. For the former, I show how many of the
practices of the pharmaceutical industry violate what I argue should be the base ethical
limits of health care markets. For the latter, I show the extent to which a legal organ
market in the United States could or would violate these limits.
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Introduction
The currently existing marriage between health care and the market in the United
States is contentious. Markets – generally understood as a collective group of buyers and
sellers who engage in monetary transactions of commodified goods and services –
typically create competition among providers and are thusly considered an efficient and
effective means of generating a wide range of goods and services at various prices.
Theoretically, health care markets can provide individuals a greater number of choices
about which medical professionals they visit, what medicines they buy, and even which
medical procedures they wish to undergo.
Yet there are many who question the ethical validity of this marriage. Critics of
health care markets tend to argue that the ends of health care are incommensurable with
the ends of the market, and that market influences have an overall negative impact on the
delivery of health care goods and services. By most accounts, health care has intrinsic
value as a basic human need requiring intimate, fiduciary relationships between medical
professionals and patients. Within the market, however, goods and services merely have
instrument value, and are bought and sold to whomever is able and willing to pay for
them, while those who cannot afford goods and services must often forgo their purchase.
In a recent article of The Journal of the American Medical Association, Drs. Robert
Berenson and Christine Cassel argue, for example, that patients and health care
professionals ought to be cautious before fully embracing market-based competition
among health care providers because of the potential for lapses in professional ethical
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behavior that can result as a consequence.1 Norman Daniels, who has written extensively
on issues concerning just health care, has recently argued that market-friendly strategies
for promoting just health care have either failed or are currently failing.2 Edmund
Pellegrino stakes out an even stronger position against health care markets by arguing
that it is ethically wrong to ever treat health care as a commodity. According to
Pellegrino, “health and medical care are not, cannot be, and should not be commodities;
the ethical consequences of commodification are ethically unsustainable and deleterious
to patients, physicians, and society . . . health care is a universal human need and a
common good that a good society should provide in some measure to its citizens.”3
While I am sympathetic to the ethical concerns raised by critics of health care
markets, the current realities of the marriage between health care and the market in the
United States suggest that a divorce between the two is neither imminent nor practical.
The focus of this project is not, therefore, to argue for or against having health care
markets. Instead, this project aims to determine the appropriate ethical limits regarding
the market sale of health care goods and services in the United States. Specifically I argue
that because health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as
commodities, treating them as commodities that are bought and sold via health care
markets should be limited according to at least the principles of honesty, respect for
autonomy, and increaseed access to essential health care goods and services.

1

Berenson and Cassel, “Consumer-Driven Health Care May Not Be What Patients Need – Caveat
Emptor,” 321-323.
2
Daniels, “Broken Promises.”
3
Pellegrino, “The Commodification of Medical and Health Care,” 244.

2

In making this argument I do not presume that these are the only possible ethical
limits of health care markets or that by adhering to these limits, the commodification of a
health care good or service is necessarily ethical. For example, there could be other
concerns regarding medical appropriateness that might ethically prevent the sale of a
health care good or service even if the transaction did not violate the limits for which I
argue.
Also in making this argument, I do not intend or try to justify the continued use of
the current market-based heath care system in the United States. This is because it is
questionable whether or not this system is the best way for persons in the United States to
meet their health care needs, as it is seemingly failing to achieve the mass level of access
and distribution for which markets are typically valued. For example, empirical data
shows that the United States has both the highest per capita spending and the highest cost
as a percentage of gross domestic product for health care goods and services than any
other economically advanced nation.4 Yet there are approximately 50 million uninsured
United States citizens who are required to pay out-of-pocket for most or all of their health
care expenditures.5 As a result of these factors, there are now many social, political, and
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According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), health care
spending in the United States for 2009 was $7,290 per captia (adjusted purchasing power parity) and
accounted for 16% of its gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, this per captia spending is
$2,527 more than second ranked Norway, $2,873 more than third ranked Switzerland, and almost two
and half times more than the OECD average of $2,964. The United States GDP for health care
spending in 2009 is 5% higher than second ranked France, 5.2% higher than third ranked Switzerland,
5.6% higher than fourth ranked Germany, and more than 7.1% higher the OECD average of 8.9%. See;
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. “OECD Health Data 2009: How Does the
United States Compare,” http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/2/38980580.pdf. (accessed July 29, 2009).
National Coalition on Health Care, “Facts on Health Care Costs,” Health Insurance Costs,
http://www.nchc.org/facts/cost.shtml. (accessed July 29, 2009).
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ethical debates both challenging and urging reform to the United States’ current health
care system.6
Restricting my argument in this way is advantageous for at least two reasons.
First, I do not have to try to refute arguments that call into question the efficacy or
fairness of health care markets based on the practical problems with the United States’
current health care system. Second, my argument regarding the ethical limits of health
care markets can still be applicable even if there is a shift the United States away from a
predominately market-based health care system.
The rest of this chapter serves two purposes. First, I clarify some concepts I
frequently use throughout my argument such as health care goods and services,
commodity(-ies) and commodification, and health care markets. I then detail the scope of
the project by briefly outlining each of the following chapters.

6

Daniels, for example, has recently written a well-argued critique of the current market-based approach to
health care in the United States with respect to the demands of justice. Specifically, Daniels argues that
current business friendly strategies for managing health care markets in the United States, frustrate
rather than promote the goals of justice in meeting health care needs, particularly with the financing
and delivery of health care goods and services. The general promises of the market to foster
competition among health care providers, thereby theoretically lowering health care costs while
increasing access to various health care goods and services is, as Daniels carefully shows, a broken set
of promises. This is mostly because of how current business friendly strategies for managing health
care markets in the United States have failed to account for the unequal power that favors the supply
side of health care markets (i.e. health care providers) over the demand side (i.e. purchasers of health
care goods and services). As Daniels argues, the reasons why this unequal power between the supply
side and the demand side of health care markets is unfair is because it has resulted in health care costs
increasing instead of decreasing, while primarily placing the burden of paying for those increases on
those who need health care goods and services the most, but who are also least likely able to afford
them because of the correlations between having higher health care needs with a lower or decreasing
socio-economic status. In particular, there are five broken promises that Daniels addresses. These are:
1) increased health care competition will result in lower unit prices of health care goods and services,
2) competition among health care plans will lower the rate of increase of health care costs, 3) high
deductible health care plans will result in wiser health care purchases and lower health care costs, 4)
competition among drug plans outlined in the new Medicare drug benefit will slow increasing costs
and increase access to drugs for the elderly, and 5) the introduction of user fees and growth in private
sector health care will increase resources for under-funded health care systems in developing countries.
See; Daniels, “Broken Promises.”
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1. Clarifying the Basic Concepts of the Argument
This section sketches out what can be considered reasonable, generally agreed
upon understandings of the concepts I frequently refer to in my argument. My argument
focuses on imposing ethical constraints on the sale of health care goods and services. The
term “health care goods and services” should therefore not only be consistent with how
health care is regarded throughout typical medical literature, but also broad enough to
encompass the possible varieties of health care markets such as, for example, markets in
human transplant organs – in which would-be organ sellers are not likely to medically
benefit from the transaction. Attempting to meet both criteria, I broadly define “health
care goods and services” as goods and services that individuals use to help meet their
medical needs in preventing or combating disease, illness, or injury. Transplantation, for
example, is a service that combats a disease, such as kidney or heart disease, in the
recipient even if it does not medically benefit the donor.
To remain consistent with the market theories I exposit in chapter 1, “commodity”
or “commodities” refer to a good(s) or service(s) that has or could have an established
economic value. The process of establishing an economic value for a good(s) or
service(s) I refer to as “commodification.” When referring to health care goods and
services as commodities, I am thusly referring to the actual or potential economic value
of those goods and services.
Lastly, the term “health care markets” broadly refers to markets in which
individuals buy and sell commodified health care goods and services. Though by limiting
the scope of my argument to the United States, I also consider these to be free markets
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that are regulated but not controlled by the government. In market rhetoric these
transactions occur between buyers and sellers. However health care transactions are not
said to occur between buyers and sellers, but typically between patients and health care
providers such as physicians or institutions like hospitals, health insurance companies, or
the pharmaceutical industry at-large. This highlights an aspect of the problem of
incommensurability between health care and the market, and is one reason that I
specifically do not argue for health care markets. Arguing for health care markets
requires reconciling and ethically justifying thinking of and treating patients and health
care providers respectively as buyers and sellers of commodified health care goods and
services. Additionally, this understanding of health care markets may involve transactions
between buyers and sellers who are not traditionally thought of as patients or health care
providers. Take those who are wiling to sell their organs for profit for example. These
individuals lack the standard medical and professional qualities we attribute to most
health care providers, even though they directly provide the organs for sale, and so are
“sellers” of a health care good.
2. Chapter Outline
Although I present my argument as a single work, it is possible to view this
dissertation in two parts. Chapters 1-3 develop my argument that health care goods and
services are not properly valued merely as commodities, and that ethically treating them
as commodities requires imposing ethical limits on their market sale. Chapters 4 and 5
then apply my argument to two health care markets that have both recently garnered
substantial academic and public interest: the pharmaceutical industry, and a hypothetical
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legal organ market.
A. Chapter 1: Examining the Relationship of Goods to the Market
Chapter 1 critically examines the relationship of goods to the market by
expositing three theories of commodification and ethical markets. According to the first
theory, we can value goods in a number of ways, and that some goods are incomparably
valued higher than other goods. The second theory provides a pragmatic analysis that
shows how various goods are properly valued in terms of incomplete commodification –
in which persons characterize the sale of those goods both in terms of commodification
and noncommodification. The third theory argues that the commodification of goods for
market sale is unethical when this results in negative consequences that undermine the
values characteristic of liberal democracies. Together these theories help explain why
health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities, and
provide the conceptual space needed to argue for imposing ethical limits on the market
sale of health care goods and services.
B. Chapter 2: Arguing for the Principle of Increased Access to Essential Health Care
Goods and Services
Chapter 2 sets forth my argument in detail. Building on the view established in
chapter 1, this chapter aims to show why there ought to be increased access to essential
health care goods and services, and what it means for this normative principle to be an
ethical limit of health care markets. I begin by establishing three approaches that each
help justify the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services.
Then I attempt to clarify some of the qualities that should define essential health care
goods and services. As we shall see, how we come to characterize “essential health care
7

goods and services” will need to accord with the goal of this principle to balance wealth
creation and limited health care resources against the just distribution of those resources.
I conclude the chapter by drawing some conclusions about how this principle is an ethical
limit of health care markets. Although I detail the three approaches I use to justify this
principle in chapter 2, some preliminary remarks about each are helpful here.
The first is a market-based approach in which I argue that increased access to
essential health care goods and services is a matter of wealth creation. This argument
intends to show how increased access to essential health care goods and services is an
ideal of the market, even though free markets are not concerned with fairness or equity
regarding essential goods or services. The major drawback of this approach, though, is
that it is ultimately insufficient to sustain the normative claim that there ought to be
increased access to essential health care goods and services if it were not profitable to do
so.
To address this deficiency of the first approach, the next two approaches aim to
provide a moral basis for why there ought to be increased access to essential health care
goods and services. The first of these argues that there ought to be increased access to
essential health care goods and services grounded in a right to health care. The third
approach establishes an alternative view that even if persons are not entitled to essential
health care goods and services, we ought to still increase access to them because of how
we can understand health care as common to all persons within our society. In making
this argument I first consider how health care is common based on its development and
distribution, and then based on how it is a part of our shared human nature. To be clear,
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my intent is not to defend any one of these three approaches as better than another, but to
merely use these approaches to legitimize the principle of increased access to essential
health care goods and services as an ethical limit of health care markets.
C. Chapter 3: Arguing for the Principles of Honesty and Respect for Autonomy
In chapter 3, I move beyond the question of access to argue for why we ought to
also limit the market sale of health care goods and services according to the principles of
honesty and respect for autonomy. For each of these two principles I begin by providing a
theoretical framework, then argue for how each principle applies to both health care
relationships between medical professionals and patients, and to business transactions
between buyers and sellers. I conclude each discussion by addressing what it means for
both principles to be an ethical limit of health care markets. Some preliminary remarks
about both of these principles are helpful here.
There may be some who look at the principle of honesty and think that the need
for honesty in both health care and market transactions is so obvious that it deserves no
particular attention in theoretical discussions about health care markets. However, there
are many cases involving health care and the market where questions about honesty are at
the heart of an ethical dilemma – a physician working in a poor neighborhood debating
whether or not to recommend that patients purchase expensive drugs from foreign
countries at a cheaper cost; medical professionals debating, because of a patient’s ability
to pay, whether or not to recommend certain expensive treatments, even if those
treatments are more efficacious than cheaper alternatives; persons debating whether or
not to lie on insurance forms about known pre-existing conditions that can effect their
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scope and cost of coverage. Yet as I argue, even though the value of honesty in health
care and market transactions is not a foregone conclusion, to ethically treat health care
goods and services as commodities, establishing the principle of honesty is necessary;
otherwise health care is left vulnerable to the market notion of caveat emptor, which
seems unacceptable because of the seriousness of negative consequences that can result
from shifting the burden of responsibility for particular health care choices from medical
professionals and patients to patients alone.
The reason I argue that respect for autonomy should be considered an ethical limit
of health care markets is because of the particular role this principle plays in the success
of markets and in helping establish stronger relationships between patients and health
care professionals. As standard supply-and-demand economic theory goes, a successful
market is one that is able to generate high demand for particular goods and services by
providing for the widest range possible of consumer wants and needs. So it seems fair to
claim that markets can only be successful by respecting consumer autonomy because,
without consumers being able to freely choose what sorts of goods and services they are
willing to purchase, markets are unable to respond to consumers’ wants and needs
accordingly.7

7

Note, however, that “widest range possible” can still be limited with respect to providing for consumer
wants and needs. Successful markets require a balance between having a wide variety of goods and
services to choose from and having too many choices of goods and services – that is, while consumers
prefer having free access to a variety of goods and services, too many options can sometimes have the
opposite effect of causing consumers to become indecisive and simply choose to forgo purchasing a
good or service at all. However, I am not sure how this idea of a balance between just enough market
choices versus too many market choices effects my position because health care is not the standard sort
of market product. Yet my intuition is that the possible backlash from having too many choices with
respect to health care is not necessarily relevant because (a) health care typically constitutes a need
(versus just a want), and (b) most people, assuming it is a need for them and they can afford health care
goods and services, will not simply forgo purchasing it because they are faced with too many choices.
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In health care, the principle of respect for autonomy is important for two reasons.
First, respect for autonomy helps health care professionals and patients be more honest
with each other regarding things like their expectations of success for certain treatments,
or the satisfaction each party has with the quality of care either given or received.
Second, respect for autonomy helps prevent relationships between patients and health
care professionals from becoming overly paternalistic. While some paternalism in
medical practice is expected (and even appreciated), overly paternalistic relationships,
where health care professionals treat patients according only to what they [health care
professionals] believe is best, can actually hinder how well patients respond to certain
treatments. This is because health care professionals and patients sometimes differ about
what treatments qualify as “best.” When patients feel as though health care professionals
pushing certain treatments compromise their values and choices for how they live their
lives, the ability of patients to positively respond to those treatments diminishes. Respect
for autonomy helps correct this problem by giving patients the ability to work with health
care professionals to help determine what treatments are acceptable in accord with those
patients’ values and lifestyles.
D. Chapter 4: Is the Current Pharmaceutical Drug Market in the United States Ethical?
Chapter 4 applies my argument regarding the base ethical limits of health care
markets to the prescription drug market in the United States. As I show throughout
chapter 4, the general lack of interference by the United States government toward the
market sale of prescription drugs has helped the pharmaceutical industry become one of
the nation’s most profitable. For example, in 2008 the pharmaceutical industry was the
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most profitable of all American health care industries, and the third most profitable
industry overall, generating 19.3% profit from revenue.8 Still, regardless of the industry’s
profitability, pharmaceutical companies are often criticized for abusing their relationships
with those whom they most frequently interact, namely health care professionals and
patients. Chapter 4 analyzes five industry practices and shows how and why the current
pharmaceutical drug market in the United States is unethical because of how these
practices violate the principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, or increased access to
essential health care goods and services. I then conclude chapter 4 with six suggestions
for how the pharmaceutical industry could reform itself regarding how it violates these
limits.
a. Industry Interactions with Physicians
The first three practices I address in chapter 4 all deal with how pharmaceutical
companies typically interact with physicians. Physicians, as the ones responsible for
prescribing drugs to patients, are the cornerstones of prescription drug sales.
Pharmaceutical companies therefore have a vested interest in trying to convince
physicians to prescribe their drugs over those of their competitors. One standard industry
practice of pharmaceutical companies is to use representatives to market prescription
drugs to physicians under the guise of “medical education.” However, pharmaceutical
representatives are in many ways like traveling salespersons whose presentations are
intended to help boost product sales and company profits, and not necessarily to educate
physicians. Often pharmaceutical representatives provide objectively questionable

8

Fortune Magazine, “Our Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations: 2009 Top Industries, Most
Profitable.”

12

information or slant their presentations in favor of the drug being pitched. As I shall
show, biased drug presentations violate both the principles of honesty and respect for
autonomy.
The second practice I discuss is the use of industry-sponsored research to market
prescription

drugs

to

physicians.

Industry-sponsored

research

often

involves

pharmaceutical companies paying large sums of money to researchers and physicians to
publish and present research that favors a particular drug, while those companies conceal
themselves as the sources of funding. Like my argument regarding the use of
pharmaceutical representatives to give slanted drug presentations, I will show how the
use of industry-sponsored research violates both the principles of honesty and respect for
autonomy.
The third practice I address is gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to
physicians. Until recently, the pharmaceutical industry endorsed gift giving as a way
influence physicians’ prescribing practices – although the industry maintains the actual
purpose of gift giving is to offset physicians’ time listening to drug presentations. I show
that, because gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians does not intend to
benefit patients or physicians (as the gift recipients), this practice also violates the
principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.
b. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
One way for businesses to help increase their profits is by advertising what goods
or services are available for sale. So it makes sense for pharmaceutical companies in the
United States to advertise prescription drugs directly to consumers. The fourth industry
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practice I address is the direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs.
DTCA of prescription drugs has two basic forms: branded and non-branded. Nonbranded DTCA does not attempt to market any particular brand-name drug. Branded
DTCA, however, explicitly markets a particular drug by its brand name. While the former
is not typically regarded as ethically contentious, the latter is. My examination of DTCA
therefore focuses exclusively on branded forms of DTCA. Chapter 4 addresses two
primary concerns of DTCA: the questionable content of DTCA, and the lack of effective
regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on these two concerns, I
further argue in chapter 4 that there are several ways in which DTCA advertising violates
both the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.
c. Industry Pricing of Pharmaceutical Drugs
The final practice I address in chapter 4 is the industry pricing of pharmaceutical
drugs. What I show in chapter 4 is that the free market for pharmaceutical drugs in the
United States has resulted in higher spending on pharmaceutical drugs throughout the
United States than any other industrialized nation. A standard argument given by the
industry for why the United States pays a higher amount on pharmaceutical drugs is that
the willingness of American consumers to pay top dollar for pharmaceutical drugs is
necessary to ensure the industry’s ability to pay for future research and development of
new drugs. This is an argument that I show is false, while further arguing that the
industry pricing of pharmaceutical drugs violates the principles of honesty, respect for
autonomy, and the increased access to essential health care goods and services.
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E. Chapter 5: Is an Ethical Organ Market Possible?
Chapter 5 applies my argument for ethically treating health care goods and
services as commodities to a potential legal organ market. In the United States, the
number of persons needing organ transplants consistently exceeds the number of organ
donations. Of the various solutions for how best deal with this problem, the creation of a
legal organ market is one of the more contentious views currently being argued. Not only
is organ selling illegal in the United States (for both living and cadaver organs), but it is
also a practice that many consider prima facie immoral because of the perception that it
degrades the intrinsic value of organs as an essential feature of personhood.
Without arguing about the morality of organ selling, chapter 5 analyzes five
practical concerns that would likely accompany the establishment of a legal organ market
to show the extent to which a legal organ market may violate what I argue are the base
ethical limits of health care markets. To avoid any possible confusion, I assume that a
basic characteristic of all transplant organs is that they are necessary for anyone who
qualifies for an organ transplant. “Would-be sellers” refers to those who are or may be
willing to sell their organs for profit, and “would-be buyers” refers to those who are or
may be willing to purchase transplant organs.
a. Lying to Secure an Organ Sale
The first concern I address in chapter 5 is that the promise of profit could tempt
some would-be organ sellers who are of questionable health to lie about their health
status to avoid jeopardizing the sale. Although the current standards of organ donation in
the United States require carefully testing the health-quality of organs prior to
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transplanting them, we do not know if or how these standards might change in an organ
market. Moreover, even with organ testing, some unhealthy organs can go undetected. I
then argue how this concern could result in a legal organ market violating both the
principles of respect for autonomy and honesty. I further argue that lying to secure an
organ sale may or may not violate the principle of increased access essential to health
care goods and services.
b. A Legal Organ Market Poses a Health-risk to Would-be Sellers
A legal organ market presumably will be regulated to try to minimize the known
health-risks to both would-be organ sellers and buyers. Moreover, the health-risks of
organ transplantation in a regulated market are likely to be comparable to that of organ
donation. My focus regarding this concern is not the degree of health-risk to would-be
organ sellers, but what the existence of these health-risks may mean for a legal organ
market to function with respect to what I argue are the base ethical limits of health care
markets.
There are two cases I consider with respect to this concern. First is the case of
would-be organ sellers who are not given information about the known health-risks of
organ transplantation. In this case I argue that a legal organ market would violate both the
principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. I also consider how, if failing to provide
would-be sellers information about the known risks of organ transplantation caused an
overall decline in the numbers of organs sold via the market, this case could violate the
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services.
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I next consider the case of would-be organ sellers who are informed of the risks of
organ transplantation, but who are not provided additional means to help them understand
that information. Here I show how merely informing would-be sellers of the risks of
organ transplantation is sufficient to meet the principle of honesty. However, I also show
how this case would violate the principle of respect for autonomy because of the inability
for would-be organ sellers to fully incorporate this information into their decision-making
process, thereby undercutting their ability to act autonomously.
c. Economic Desperation as the Motive to Sell
Another concern I address regarding the creation of a legal organ market is that
economically desperate sellers, all things considered, genuinely oppose selling their
organs. However these persons are willing to sell their organs anyway to try to assuage
the bad effects of their economic desperation. Morally, the circumstance of being
motivated to sell an organ because of economic desperation is considered equivalent to
coercion. As I show in chapter 5, data coming from the Iranian model of paid organ
donation suggests that a legal organ market in the United States would likely attract a
substantially large number of sellers who are economically poor. I then argue how this
concern would violate the principle of respect for autonomy. Moreover, I address how
this concern appears to render a legal organ market prima facie unethical, because even
in a regulated market there may be cases in which would-be organ sellers are strictly
motivated by their economic desperation while not really wanting to sell their organs.
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d. Failure to Receive a Fair Price for Organs
A forth concern about the establishment of a legal organ market is that
economically desperate sellers may not receive a fair price for their organs. One reason
for this is that economic desperation creates an imbalance of power in the organ sale that
unfairly favors would-be buyers. Toward the end of chapter 1, we will see the underlying
justification for this point when I discuss how one characteristic of noxious markets is
that they create unequal power between market participants. A second reason for this
concern is that economically desperate sellers may be willing to accept a lower
commodified value for their organs because even a small amount of money would be
advantageous for them. I then give several reasons for how this concern could result in a
legal organ market violating both the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.
Furthermore I address how the notion of a “fair” price is not necessarily equal to the
potential maximal commodified value of transplant organs.
e. A Decrease in Donation Rates
The last concern I address regarding the establishment of a legal organ market in
the United States is that it would decrease organ donation rates. Those who oppose organ
selling generally find it repugnant partly because it is thought to devalue the cultural and
social significance of organ donation as a form of altruism. By placing a commodified
value on organs, there seemingly will be fewer opportunities for individuals to donate
their organs, while possibly causing some other individuals to no longer be willing to
donate their organs. There is some empirical evidence that appears to justify this concern;
namely that once a commodified value is placed on transfusable blood, those who are
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altruistically motivated to donate transfusable blood are less likely to donate. I then argue
how a decrease in organ donation rates could result in a legal organ market violating both
the principles of increased access to essential health care goods and services and respect
for autonomy. I conclude this section with a discussion about how, even if a legal organ
market resulted in decreased donation rates, it may still be able to sufficiently meet the
overall demand for transplant organs.
F. Conclusion
This final chapter of the dissertation serves three purposes. First, I summarize my
argument that treating health care goods and services as commodities via health care
markets can only be ethical when their sale accords with at least the principles of honesty,
respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care goods and services.
Second, I briefly address a residual question with my argument: what might be an
appropriate response for when treating health care goods or services as commodities
violates the ethical limits of health care markets for which I argue. Third, I broach several
possibilities for future research on this topic. These include: further addressing what the
appropriate responses might be for when the sale of health care goods and services
violate the ethical limits of health care markets; addressing whether or not there are any
health care goods or services that should never be for sale; what might be the appropriate
ethical limit(s) of a right to health care; the effects my argument might have on other
types of non-medical markets; and how my argument might apply to the international
production and delivery of health care goods and services.
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Chapter One: Examining the Relationship of Goods to the Market
In this chapter I critically examine the relationship of goods to the market. When
goods are commodified, their price attempts to represent their value based on what
individuals are willing to pay for them. But, as we shall see in this chapter, it is debatable
that certain goods can be appropriately valued merely as commodities.
My goal in this chapter is not to argue against the market as a means by which we
can appropriately value some commodified goods. Instead, my goal is to show that health
care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities. To accomplish
this goal, I exposit thee theories of commodification and ethical markets that show how
and why the value of certain is goods is not properly captured in their commodification.
Together, these three theories provide me the conceptual space needed to argue that
health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities. However,
each of these three theories say very little about the particular issue at-hand regarding the
commodification of health care goods and services, leaving ample room for me to fully
develop my view in the following chapters that treating health care goods and services as
commodities requires imposing ethical limits on their sale. The three theories I exposit in
this chapter are those of Anderson in Value in Ethics and Economics, Radin in Contested
Commodities, and Satz in “Noxious Markets: Why Should Some Things Not be for
Sale?”
1. Anderson and the Plurality of Values
Anderson questions the degree to which markets, as mechanisms for satisfying
people’s wants, should influence how we value goods. For Anderson, a good widely
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refers to a multiplicity of things that individuals can value in some way including
physical objects, services, or ideas. Markets may be able to determine the quantitative
value(s) of a good, such as how much one is willing to pay for that good, but they cannot
determine the qualitative value(s) of a good, such as the love or caring individuals (ought
to) feel from receiving a good as a gift.9 According to Anderson, goods are pluralistic in
that, “they differ not only in how much we should value them, but in how we should
value them.”10 Anderson then argues that there are some goods we should value in ways
that cannot be expressed via market valuation, and that to properly value those goods,
their production, distribution, and use should occur in non-market, social spheres.11
In developing her theory, Anderson examines three ways in which people relate to
goods: in terms of experiencing values, by how we value or care about goods, and by
forming and justifying value judgments. Experiencing values is, for Anderson, to value
something as good or bad with respect to the particular response(s) it elicits from us. For
example, I may laugh at a joke while others do not. This is not because the joke itself
necessitates a particular response, but because I find the joke funny while others do not.
However this is not the only way individuals relate to goods because it is possible to
value goods without directly encountering or experiencing them. No one, for example,
needs to directly encounter or experience extreme poverty to know that extreme poverty
is, for the most part, an unfavorable condition for humans to live in.12
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To relate to goods by valuing or caring about them is to, “have a complex of
positive attitudes towards it, governed by distinct standards of perception, emotion,
deliberation, desire, and conduct.”13 This is different than our evaluative experiences of a
good because this notion is based on how we value the good itself, not the response the
good elicits from us. For example, an adult may deeply care about or value a painting by
a young child because the adult is happy that the child is being expressively creative,
regardless of whether the adult considers the actual painting good or not.
Lastly, we can relate to goods by way of value judgments. This is different than
relating to goods either by our evaluative experiences, or by valuing or caring about
them. For example, I can value a Rembrandt painting for the exquisite effort put into
creating it, and for the particular emotive feeling I get by viewing a Rembrandt painting,
but I can also judge that it is proper to appreciate a Rembrandt painting as an aesthetic
contribution to the world of art. Relating to goods via value judgments is to therefore
judge the value of a good based on criteria that is independent of our personal
experiences or attitudes about those goods. As Anderson puts it, “to judge that something
is good is to judge that it is properly valued. And to judge that it is bad is to judge that it
is properly disvalued,” such that for the proposition, ““x is F,” where F is a respect in
which something is judged to be genuinely valuable, entails that x meets a particular
standard F, and that x merits valuation in virtue of meeting F.”14 This is to say, for
instance, that because we think of aesthetic works of art as having inherent value, a
Rembrandt painting is valuable by virtue of the fact that it is an aesthetic work of art.
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From these three ways in which individuals relate to goods, Anderson argues that
there are two ways in which goods are plural. First, given the ways in which we relate to
goods, goods are plural in that we can sensibly value them in multiple ways. Second,
goods are plural in that the normative standards by which we judge their value(s) are
diverse. Anderson further notes that the first sense in which goods are plural is more
basic than the second because,
[The first] explains why the second is true: we need a plurality of
standards to make sense of the plurality of emotional responses and
attitudes we have to things. The things that sensibly elicit delight are not
generally the same things that merit respect and admiration. Our capacity
for articulating our attitudes depend upon our understandings of our
attitudes, which are informed by norms for valuation.15
What Anderson appears to mean by this is that, to sensibly value goods in
multiple ways there must be multiple normative standards by which individuals judge the
value(s) of those goods. Without normative standards by which individuals judge the
value(s) of goods, individuals could not develop, express, or justify their reasons for how
and why they subjectively value goods in the ways they do. Because individuals judge
the value(s) of goods according to normative standards, Anderson claims that an essential
quality of normative standards is that they are fundamentally social in that they are
recognized and endorsed by others.16
Anderson then discusses how, because goods can be properly valued in different
ways, goods differ in kind. One way goods differ in kind is by the modes of valuation
used to judge them. For example, we can value goods by how we use, appreciate, or
admire them. We can also appropriately value goods by how we personally relate to
15
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them; individuals can treasure gifts, show gratitude toward teachers, love family
members, and express loyalty to friends.17
Goods also differ in kind by the social, normative standards individuals use to
judge their value(s). To explain this point Anderson gives the example of a classical
music concert. Properly valuing such concerts involves obeying particular customs and
norms – men and women are expected to “dress-up” for the occasion, the audience is to
withhold their applause until a movement is finished, and criticism during the
performance is strictly forbidden.18 By contrast, properly valuing a rock music concert
means following a different (perhaps even opposite) set of social customs and norms –
audiences are expected to show appreciation for the music by constant, loud cheering,
and generally engaging in rowdy behavior for the duration of the show.
With this pluralistic notion of goods in mind, Anderson then argues how some
goods are incomparably valued higher than others. Claiming that some goods are
incomparably valued higher than others means, for Anderson, that the worth of those
goods, “are not candidates for the same mode of valuation.”19 As Anderson further
explains, goods can be valued higher than others, “if the things concerning it [i.e. the
higher valued goods] make deeper, qualitatively more significant demands on the
attitudes, deliberations, and actions of the valuer.”20
Consider, for example, the difference between the experiences of seeing a concert
in person versus hearing a recording of that concert. On Anderson’s view, these two
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experiences cannot be judged by the same set of normative standards because the former
is properly valued in multiple and diverse ways that the latter is not. The former
experience involves making value judgments that are based on one’s aural and visual
assessment of the live concert, and via the interactions that audiences members have
between each other, and the interactions that occur between the performers and audience.
One, however, cannot make such value judgments just by hearing a recording of the
concert – that is, the mode of valuation for the latter experience is based solely on one’s
aural assessment of the quality of the recording. Moreover, since the former experience is
properly valued in ways that the latter cannot be valued, it is justifiable to claim on
Anderson’s view that the experience of seeing a concert in person has an incomparable
higher value than the experience of hearing a recording of that concert.
At this point, we can begin to connect Anderson’s theory of value to health care
goods and services. Although Anderson does not specifically apply her theory to health
care goods and services we can still see how, on her view, they ought to be considered as
having higher value than many other kinds of commodified goods. Individuals can value
goods like furniture, clothing, or electronics for things such as their aesthetic qualities, for
their functionality, or their cost. Yet there are few ways that individuals can value these
kinds of goods that have the same sort of deeply personal impact on one’s attitudes,
emotional responses, and judgments as health care goods and services. That is, the modes
of valuation for health care goods and services often require individuals to consider
aspects of those goods and services that are not expected or necessary to properly value
many other kinds of commodities. Properly valuing a pharmaceutical drug, for example,

25

involves considerations like: the ability of the drug to address an underlying medical
condition; whether or not, and to what degree, the drug may interact with other
medications in ways that can affect one’s health; the potential side effects of taking the
drug; or the possible consequences to one’s health by not taking the drug. However one
can properly value goods like furniture, clothing, or electronics without ever needing to
consider something like how purchasing or not purchasing those goods could negatively
affect one’s health.
While Anderson’s theory of commodification helps us see why health care goods
and services ought to be valued higher than many other kinds of commodities, it does not
clearly address my concern about the ethical limits of health care markets. I now explain
how Anderson’s view, while indicating that the values we attribute health care goods and
services are not properly accounted for in their commodification, is insufficient to deal
with how we should regard their commodification for market sale.
A. A Problem Applying Anderson’s Theory to Health Care Markets
We have already seen how Anderson argues that people are able to value different
goods in different ways. It is because people are able to value different goods in different
ways that Anderson further argues for a, “robust system of social sphere differentiation
that requires sharper limits on the scope of the market.”21 The reason why Anderson
argues that sphere differentiation requires market limits is that, without market limits
people would be unable to properly value certain goods according to the normative
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standards embodied and governed by non-market social spheres. Here Anderson points
out that her use of sphere differentiation is similar to Walzer’s.22
Walzer, being primarily concerned with the relationship of goods to distributive
justice, notes that goods concerned with distributive justice are social goods and, as such,
are valued in different ways.23 He further notes that it is the intrinsic social meaning(s) of
goods, and not the value of the good-in-itself, that determine the criteria by which goods
ought to be distributed. That is, “If we understand what it is [i.e. the good in question],
what it means to those for whom it is a good, we understand how, by whom, and for what
reasons it ought to be distributed.”24 For example, it is considered prima facie unethical
to buy political votes in liberal democracies because there is a general social commitment
to chose political leaders for their abilities to meet the demands of the offices for which
they running, and not simply because they are wealthy. This is similar to simony,
prostitution, and bribery, things Walzer notes, “describe the sale and purchase of goods
that, given certain understandings of their meanings, ought never to be sold or
purchased.”25
So for Walzer, it is the social meanings of goods that determine the appropriate
spheres by which those goods are distributed. The market is the inappropriate sphere for
distributing political votes. Likewise, goods rightly distributed via markets should not be
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sold on the basis of one’s political affiliation – as markets, commonly understood, is
“open to all comers.”26
Anderson agrees with Walzer that shared social meanings help justify the
plurality of goods. However Anderson differs from Walzer in that, for Walzer, shared
social meanings of goods is the only means of justification he discusses for understanding
the plurality of goods, whereas for Anderson, justifying the plurality of goods expands
beyond just shared social meanings to include individuals’ conceptions of value
(assuming they are rational).27
Given the idea that some goods are properly valued in non-market spheres,
Anderson argues that it is proper to value goods as commodities only when their
production and exchange accord with market norms. When the production and exchange
of goods do not accord with market norms – that is, when the normative standards by
which individuals properly value goods are embodied in non-market spheres – Anderson
then claims, “we shouldn’t treat [those goods] as commodities but rather locate them in
non-market spheres.”28 Furthermore, Anderson argues that when market norms governing
the production and exchange of goods undermine important ideals necessary for
individuals to properly value goods, such as freedom or autonomy, the state may
legitimately remove the production and exchange of those goods from the market.29
According to Anderson, market norms have five standard features: they are
impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and orientated toward “exit” rather than
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“voice.”30 Markets are impersonal and egoistic in that each party to a market transaction
views the other as a mere means to satisfy one’s own ends (which are usually developed
and defined independently of the relationship), while leaving each party free to pursue
their individual interests without having to consider or care for the interests of the other
party(-ies). Markets are exclusive in that the benefits of a good are wholly transferred
from sellers to buyers, and that the ability for individuals to benefit from a good are
generally limited by the buyer’s ability to pay for it. Markets are want-regarding in that it
is standard for markets to respond to demand for goods without care or concern for the
reasons individuals have for wanting them. Markets are orientated toward “exit” rather
than “voice” in that often, “The customer has no voice, no right to directly participate in
the design of the product or to determine how it is marketed,” and that “voice” for goods
or services embodied in sellers may be alienated from them (such as when workers lack
due process rights to get explanations for managerial decisions that affect their
employment).31
However, as we shall see in greater detail in chapters 2 and 3, how individuals
typically value health care goods and services are not only different from these five
features of market norms, but are in many ways opposed to them. Health care
relationships are often valued for being intimate and fiduciary, not impersonal or egoistic.
Many argue that health care is not exclusive, but a right of all persons, and that access to
health care goods and services should not be limited based on one’s ability to pay. The
delivery of health care goods and services is also not want-regarding because it is
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typically based on need, not just want – for example, health care professionals are not
obligated to provide health care goods and services to patients if they believe doing so
would be medically inappropriate. Health care relationships also aim to uphold “voice”
over “exit” – ideally, health care professionals and patients are expected discuss
treatment options that both parties find acceptable and that best accord with patients’
values and lifestyles.
On one hand, Anderson’s view of market limits seems to justify removing the
production and exchange of health care goods and services from the market altogether.
This is for two reasons. First, because individuals tend to value health care goods and
services in ways that appear opposite of the standard features of market norms, her view
advocates that we should not, therefore, treat health care goods and services as
commodities. Second, the ability for individuals to properly value health care goods and
services is, in some sense, undermined when their production and exchange is governed
by market norms. The reason for this is because, again, the ways individuals tend to value
health care goods and services appear opposite to what Anderson argues are standard
features of market norms.
On the other hand, Anderson’s view of market limits also seemingly justifies
continuing to allow the production and exchange of health care goods and services to
occur within market spheres. As she points out, her view regarding market limits calls for
sphere differentiation, not complete sphere segregation.32 In order to respect the
conditions of freedom and autonomy – conditions that are prima facie necessary for
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individuals to properly value goods – individuals must be free to commodify goods or
services either that they own or that are embodied in their persons.
For example, Anderson argues that achieving excellence in a profession is a full
time activity. So while doctors and other professionals are valued in accord with how
well they meet the standards of their chosen professions, they must be paid for their
work, otherwise only those who are independently wealthy could afford to practice a
profession. When professionals sell their services to the general public via the market,
they can enhance their freedom and autonomy by setting the terms of sale for their
services that buyers are then free to either accept or decline.33
Herein lies a problem with applying Anderson’s theory of value specifically to the
commodification of health care goods and services. On her view, in order to respect the
freedom and autonomy of patients and health care professionals as willing buyers and
sellers of health care goods and services, it is necessary and appropriate to allow patients
and health care professionals to treat health care goods and services as commodities. At
the same time, however, Anderson’s view also suggests that because health care goods
and services are not valued merely as commodities, and are not properly valued within
the market sphere, it is inappropriate to treat health care goods and services as
commodities, and that their production and exchange ought to occur in non-market
spheres.
Some may try to counter-argue that Anderson is able to rectify this problem when
she claims that sphere differentiation is sustainable, “only if market norms do not wholly
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govern exchanges of money for professional products or services.”34 However an attempt
to rectify the problem in this way is insufficient. This is because the problem I have
highlighted with applying her view to the market sale of health care goods and services is
not the degree to which we ought to treat health care goods and services as commodities
governed by market norms, but that according to Anderson’s theory we get two opposing
views that show how we can and cannot justify treating health care goods and services as
commodities.
Anderson’s theory shows us that we ought to value health care goods and services
as a higher kind of good than many other commodities; implying that, at the very least,
they are improperly valued merely as commodities. However, her theory does not provide
a good basis for arguing what the ethical limits of health care markets ought to be
because her theory justifies two opposing views regarding the commodification of health
care goods and services.
I now turn to show how, on Radin’s view, the commodification of health care
goods and services can be thought of in terms of incomplete commodification and how
health care goods and services have noncommodifiable value(s).
2. Radin and Incomplete Commodification
Unlike Anderson, who provides a theoretical analysis for how and why some
goods are inappropriately valued within market spheres, Radin takes a pragmatic
approach for analyzing the social meanings of various market transactions as they relate
to one’s personhood. In particular, she focuses on market transactions involving
“contested commodities” – goods that could be commodified, yet are typically valued in
34
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noncommodifiable ways. Specifically Radin argues that when market transactions
involving contested commodities occur, it is possible to understand how the commodified
aspects of those transactions coexist with the noncommodifiable ways individuals
typically value the goods being sold by thinking of the transaction in terms of incomplete
commodification. “Incomplete commodification” is, for Radin, the concept by which
individuals perceive market transactions of contested commodities both in terms of
commodification and noncommodification.35
Radin argues for incomplete commodification because she does not see how
standard theories regarding market limits – namely (Becker’s and Posner’s) universal
commodification (in which everything desired or valued is theoretically subject to
commodification and market transfer), (Marx’s) universal noncommodification (in which
markets should be abolished altogether), and (Walzer’s) compartmentalization (in which
goods are partitioned into social spheres) – are sufficient to address how individuals
actually perceive transaction(s) involving contested commodities.36 These theories
regarding market limits see goods as either commodifiable or noncommodifiable. Radin
argues this is problematic because it oversimplifies and overlooks the complexities of
trying to commodify goods, “that we have previously valued in a noneconomic way[s].”37
By discussing Radin’s argument for incomplete commodification and how she relates the
concept to work and social justice, we are able to see how her view justifies thinking
about the commodification of health care goods and services in terms of incomplete
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commodification, and how, under her view, health care goods and services have
noncommodifiable value(s).
A. Applying Incomplete Commodification to Health Care Goods and Services
Radin’s argument for incomplete commodification addresses how commodified
and noncommodified understandings can coexist in market transactions involving
contested commodities. For Radin there are at least two states of affairs that explain how
viewing a market transaction in terms of incomplete commodification is possible. The
first state of affairs is what Radin calls “contested concepts.” Contested concepts are
concepts that often generate conflicting understandings when they are externally applied
to various things. For example, “personhood” is a contested concept when we attempt to
apply it to fetuses, as some argue that fetuses can be regarded as persons while others
argue they cannot.38 Given that concepts generally do not apply in the same way to all
things, it seems possible that this description would allow us to claim that all concepts are
“contested concepts” in some regard. However Radin’s use of “contested concepts” is
narrowed only to describe concepts that can create conflicting understandings once they
are applied to market transactions. So for Radin, understanding incomplete
commodification via contested concepts occurs, “when a commodified understanding (for
some people) coexists with a noncommodified understanding (for others).”39
The second state of affairs Radin discusses for how individuals can view market
transactions in terms of incomplete commodification is that of internally conflicted (or
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plural) meanings.40 This is similar to Anderson’s view that persons can value goods in
multiple and diverse ways. When incomplete commodification occurs via internally
conflicted meanings, persons characterize the market transaction of a good in seemingly
opposing or conflicting ways that prevent them from understanding the transaction fully
in terms of either commodification or noncommodification. An example of this would be
when individuals value a good like an artwork or family heirloom as priceless, yet have
that good appraised to determine its monetary value for insurance purposes.41
Either one of these two states of affairs can apply to the commodification of
health care goods and services. As I discuss at the beginning of the Introduction, there are
those who caution against health care markets because they see the ends of health care as
incommensurable with the ends of the market. Under the first state of affairs, the
commodification of health care goods and services can be understood in terms of
incomplete commodification because there are some who disagree with the idea that it is
ethically possible to treat health care goods and services as commodities.
We have also seen how Anderson’s theory of value implies that health care goods
and services ought to be valued higher than many other kinds of commodities, because
the former involves a deeper, more reflective set of considerations on the part of the
valuer. Regarding the second state of affairs, the commodification of health care goods
and services can be understood in terms of incomplete commodification because of how
their commodification can generate an internal conflict of meaning with respect to the
noncommodifiable ways individuals typically value them.
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I now turn to discuss how Radin relates incomplete commodification to work and
social justice. Although she too does not specifically discuss health care goods and
services, her arguments can be used to show how, under her view, health care goods and
services have noncommodifiable value(s).
B. Arguing for the Noncommodifiable Value(s) of Health Care Goods and Services under
Radin’s View
a. Relating Incomplete Commodification to Work
Radin notes that the work people do often requires some form of human
interaction between workers who provide goods and services to others, and buyers or
recipients of those goods and services. Yet the levels and degrees of these interactions
between workers and recipients vary. When the interactions are less personal, it is easier
to perceive them more in terms of commodification as simple pay-for-service exchanges.
However, as the relationships between workers and recipients becomes more personal,
and workers take greater care in meeting the needs of recipients, the interactions between
them are also perceived in various noncommodifiable ways.42 According to Radin, when
the interactions between workers and recipients can be perceived in noncommodifiable
ways, their relationship can be understood in terms of incomplete commodification. She
further explains this latter point by stating,
Incomplete commodification can describe a situation in which things are
sold but the interaction between the participants in the transaction cannot
be fully or perspicuously described as the sale of things. If many kinds
42

Ibid., 104-106. Here Radin distinguishes between work and labor. “Work” in an ideal, noncommodified
and nonmarket aspect, is that which individuals would continue to do if all their necessities were
monetarily accounted for by other means, whereas “labor” is work that is stripped bare of its
noncommodified human-element and is thought of purely in terms of commodification. Under this
distinction, workers conceive of their work as a part of themselves, whereas laborers typically
disassociate their lives from their work.
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sales retain a personal aspect even though money changes hands, those
interactions are not fully described as the sale of commodities. They
exhibit internally plural meanings. There is an irreducibly non-market or
nonmonetized aspect of the human interaction going on between seller and
recipient, even though a sale is taking place at the same time.43
This view of how incomplete commodification relates to work can apply to health
care goods and services in how they are exchanged via the relationships between health
care professionals and patients. The proverbial health care relationship is often perceived
as a special kind of relationship that typically involves more than mere pay-for-service
exchanges between health care professionals and patients. Relationships between health
care professionals and patients are often characterized as being personal, intimate, and
fiduciary. Even when these relationships are contrived and seemingly impersonal – say
when they are the result of health insurance plans that limit patients’ options for choosing
which health care professionals they visit – these relationships still require basic elements
like trust and honesty if they are to succeed in providing patients with the various health
care goods and services they need. As such, there are noncommodifiable ways in which
can we perceive the interactions between health care professionals and patients that
prevent us from thinking of the sale of health care goods and services completely in terms
of commodification.
b. Relating Incomplete Commodification to Social Justice
Radin criticizes various community based and individual based social justice
theories that rely on market ideals to describe fair patterns of just distribution for goods.
According to Radin,
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Whether we are theorizing about justice for the community or for
individuals, the still-prevalent liberal metaphor of social contract seems
itself to perpetuate market rhetoric. Modern contractualists do not always
mean the language of contract to imply monetary exchange or implicit
monetizability of all individual and social value. Yet contract is the
linchpin of the commodified conceptual scheme, and in the liberal
tradition the contract metaphor must draw its power from the normative
power of promises to exchange commodities.44
Radin considers social justice theories that rely on market ideals to conceive of
the relationships between people and other people, and between people and things, just as
a matter of need fulfillment via some understanding of commodification. She claims that
under such theories, goods are considered fungible items that merely have instrumental
worth, while people are seen as self-contained individuals striving to meet their own
ends.45 The reason Radin considers social justice theories that rely on market ideals
problematic is that they to fail to account for the noncommodifiable ways that people
both socially connect to one another, and relate or connect various goods to their own
personhood. For example, Radin discusses how housing is culturally significant for
proper self-development, and not just to protect or provide individuals with security or
welfare.
She further argues that social justice is also about recognizing how human
interaction with others is valuable in-itself, and that satisfying one’s own ends requires
communal interdependence and solidarity.46 When social justice is conceived of in this
way, Radin claims it reflects the concept of incomplete commodification because it takes
the commodified understanding(s) of need fulfillment as being coupled with the
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noncommodifiable ways that persons value their relationships to others and view goods
as aspects of their personhood.
By how Radin relates incomplete commodification to social justice there are at
least two ways in which health care goods and services can be regarded as having
noncommodifiable value. The first is with respect to the personal meanings individuals
can attach to various health care goods and services. Certainly health care goods and
services have some sort of instrumental value for those who acquire and use them.
However, there are many instances in which individuals do not simply value health care
goods and services for their instrumental worth. For example, organ transplantation does
not just help organ recipients regain their health, it also helps them regain aspects of their
personhood that may have been compromised prior to the transplant such as, perhaps, the
ability to perform certain activities or functions relating to their work or hobbies. Under
Radin’s view of how incomplete commodification relates to social justice, we can see
that health care goods services have noncommodifiable value with respect to the personal
meanings and significance individuals can attribute to them, and because of how they are
often valued in connection with human flourishing (which Radin understands as a
component of social justice47).
Second, how individuals acquire some health care goods and services is reflective
of Radin’s point regarding the integral interconnectivity of persons. Organ donation, for
example, is both literally and metaphorically a type of gift exchange, and represents a
situation in which the organ recipient’s health is closely tied to the willing generosity of
the donor to provide a transplant organ. These types of situations in which one’s health is
47
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closely tied to the work or generosity of others cannot be viewed as a mere instrumental
exchange of goods or services for sake of meeting one’s medical needs. To view these
kinds of exchanges strictly in those terms would devalue how each party may view their
relationship to the other or the nonmarket significance each party may attach to the
transaction (like when the transaction is the result of an altruistic motive).
C. Concluding Remarks on Radin Regarding the Commodification of Health Care Goods
and Service for Market Sale
Ultimately Radin’s view shows us two things regarding the commodification of
health care goods and services. First, because of the different non-market,
noncommodifiable ways individuals can think about and value health care goods and
services, their commodification is not properly understood in terms of universal
commodification (in which all aspects of health care transactions would be open to
commodification and market

transfer), but

instead in

terms

of incomplete

commodification (in which only some aspects of health care transactions can be ethically
open to commodification and market transfer). Second, we can see how, under Radin’s
view, health care goods and services have noncommodifiable value with respect to work
and social justice – particularly for how individuals can relate the acquisition and use of
health care goods and services to their relationships with others and to their own
personhood.
Note however that Radin does not, nor attempts to, argue that goods that are
incompletely commodified ought to be removed from the market. This, again, is because
Radin is offering a pragmatic analysis regarding the sale of contested commodities, not a
theoretical argument for what should or should or should not be for sale. So while
40

Radin’s view shows that we do not simply value health care goods and services merely
for their instrumental worth, her view also does not clearly indicate what sorts of ethical
limits might be needed for the sale of health care goods and services to respect the
noncommodifiable ways individuals can value them.
Next I analyze Satz’s argument for democratic egalitarianism to show the conditions
under which markets are noxious, and why noxious markets in certain goods ought to be
regulated.
3. Satz and Democratic Egalitarianism
Satz aims to analyze the relationship between the market sale of commodified
goods that historically have not been commodified, such as genetic material or organs,
and the values closely connected with democratic institutions.48 Satz develops what she
calls the “democratic egalitarian approach” as a way to understand this relationship. For
Satz, the democratic egalitarian approach both draws from and is an alternative to four
contemporary approaches regarding commodification that all address, to some degree,
questions regarding the appropriate limits of the market. These four approaches are:
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-

the economic approach: in which regulation of transactions should only
occur when and where markets fail to be efficient. This approach allows
for nonregulated, voluntary contracts “between two agents that does not
have negative externalities on uninvolved outsiders.”

-

the ‘distributive equality’ approach: that accepts the legitimacy of relying
on markets as a primary means of distribution except for those goods
involving our basic rights or liberties. Here markets are used only to
achieve an egalitarian distribution.

Satz, “Noxious Markets,” 11-13.
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-

the social meanings approach: in which the appropriateness of treating
goods as commodities available for market sale depends on the socially
shared meaning or value of those goods.

-

the perfectionist approach: in which treating certain goods as commodities
available for market sale can, “undermine the conditions for our best
flourishing as human beings” in the sense that, “we thrive when certain
goods closely connected to our ‘personhood’ cannot be bought or sold on
the market.”49
The reason Satz does not fully endorse any one of these approaches is that she

considers them to be either too narrowly focused on just the values of efficiency and
equitable distribution, or “are too controversial and too a priori to be the basis of a theory
of market regulation.”50 Satz’s democratic egalitarian approach concurs with and utilizes
the ideas of both the social meanings and perfectionist approaches that a plurality of
values helps guide our understanding of market regulation. Yet she claims the values
reflected in the democratic egalitarian approach are more closely associated with the
economic and ‘distributive equality’ approaches; values she claims are characteristic of
democratic institutions.51 In particular, the values Satz takes as central to the democratic
egalitarian approach are liberty, the equal standing of citizens, and accountability.52
Satz acknowledges that democratic egalitarian values may sometimes conflict
with one another, and that this will sometimes require making tradeoffs with respect to
those values. However, for Satz, resolving these conflicts and determining which
tradeoffs are ethically appropriate is not a matter of philosophical determinism, but a
matter of democratic politics – that is, the democratic egalitarian approach, “stresses the
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need to consider institutional alternatives to the market and to make comparative
judgments—[as] there is a limit to what purely philosophical approaches can tell us to do
in abstraction from the context and the facts.”53 This is not to say that democratic
reasoning cannot be philosophically informed, only that a pure philosophical analysis of
commodification cannot account for all contextual factors regarding the appropriate
limits of the market. This aspect of Satz’s argument highlights a deficiency in the four
contemporary approaches she builds her view on – none of the other approaches by
themselves, “has very much to say about the role of politics in allowing people to
formulate, voice, deliberate, and decide about how to order conflicting values in the
context of setting the limits to the market.”54
When the commodification of goods for market sale violates one or more
democratic egalitarian values, Satz claims that those markets are noxious.55 According to
Satz, there are three ways to characterize noxious markets. Markets can be considered
noxious either when they result in extreme outcomes, “that depress people below the
level of what they need to function as citizens (or even as human beings);” when they
allow for some participants to exercise unequal and unaccountable power over others; or
when they undermine values and procedures necessary to support liberal democracies.56 I
now turn to elaborate what Satz means by each of these features of noxious markets and
to show how her discussion of noxious markets relates to the commodification of health
care goods and services.
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A. Relating Noxious Markets to the Commodification and Market Sale of Health Care
Goods and Services
The first characteristic of noxious markets is that they can lead to extreme,
negative outcomes. Satz’s understanding of extreme outcomes is primarily based on Ravi
Kanbur’s from his article, “On Obnoxious Markets.” According to Kanbur, the threshold
of extreme outcomes for markets is a matter of degree with respect to the context. For
example, if a billionaire and a middle-class worker who earns a hundred thousand dollars
a year both lose a hundred thousand dollars in the stock market, the negative impact on
the billionaire is not likely to be viewed as an extreme outcome, whereas the negative
impact on the middle class worker may be devastating to the degree that it can be thought
of as an extreme outcome. And while Kanbur acknowledges this is an “untidy” way to
think about extreme outcomes, he further claims that, “a good starting point is that if the
outcome renders a family or an individual destitute, below some context-specific poverty
line, say, that is an extreme outcome.”57 Satz slightly differs from Kanbur regarding this
last point. For her, understanding when an outcome is “extreme” is not a question of
whether or not the outcome causes a family or individual to be destitute, but whether or
not the outcome violates democratic egalitarian values.58
Satz claims that noxious markets that cause extreme outcomes can be especially
bad, “when the goods that these markets are distributing are ones that people urgently
need, as in the case of life-saving drugs or healthcare.”59 She further claims that the
reason for this is because, “People whose basic needs have not been met – people who
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lack adequate food, education, or medical care – cannot participate in political life or civil
society on a footing of equality with others.”60 This is an ambiguous claim and one that
Satz does not attempt to argue for or explain. In particular, it is unclear what it means to
meet one’s basic needs, and how meeting one’s basic needs correlates to one’s equal
political or social participation with others. Moreover, with respect to healthcare, if a
large number of people lack the same basic access to healthcare or medical care – such as
the nearly 50 million uninsured United States citizens – wouldn’t those individuals be on
equal, not different, footing in their ability to participate in political life or civil society?
However despite Satz’s ambiguity here, the underlying force of her point appears to be
that noxious markets that produce extreme outcomes are particularly troublesome for
goods that prima facie appear necessary for individuals to ideally function as members of
democratic institutions.
Satz then argues that when the market sale of goods people urgently need cause
extreme outcomes, the appropriate response is not necessarily to ban their sale. This is
because banning the sale of these types of goods can also have bad effects like the
creation of black markets, or an inefficient provision of a needed good.61 Instead Satz
claims the appropriate response is to partially decommodify the market sale of needed
goods. Under the idea of partial decommodification, a needed good could still be
commodified for market sale, but a minimal level of provision would be guaranteed to all
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(although Satz does not specify what that minimum level would be, or how it would be
determined). The reason Satz argues for partial decommodification is not just because it
is a way to ensure access of needed goods to all, but also because it expresses the
importance a society places on these goods. As Satz claims regarding this point,
A decent society will not only protect its members from poverty, but also
from some specific forms of disenfranchisement: ensuring access to
medical care and legal assistance, education, and nutrition… [So] In
refusing to completely commodify goods like healthcare or life-saving
drugs, a society expresses its recognition of the importance of these
goods.62
The second way Satz argues markets can be noxious is when some participants
are able to exercise unequal and unaccountable power over others. Satz claims this is
possible because among other socially influential aspects of markets, “they can also
structure the exercise of power and limit the scope of democratic accountability.”63 Satz
further claims this is particularly true in cases when markets are not perfectly competitive
and there are already socio-economic inequalities between the participants.64
To illustrate this point, Satz gives the example the grain market in Bangladesh, in
which a recent famine increased the cost of rice beyond what the poor could pay to
purchase it. The rich landowners however were not affected by this cost increase, partly
because they were often given rice as payment by their tenets for use of their land. The
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poor were not only made more vulnerable to extreme outcomes by the increased cost for
rice, but also became much more dependent on rich landowners. Although Satz does not
explain what she means by “more vulnerable to extreme outcomes,” it seems as though,
given that Satz takes “extreme outcomes” to be outcomes that violate democratic
egalitarian values, she is referring to the unlikelihood in this case that the poor were able
to engage in a market relationship with the rich landowners that expressed respect for
democratic egalitarian values. She thusly concludes that the grain market at that time in
Bangladesh was noxious because of its effect on the power stratification between the rich
and poor.65
Similar to when markets can result in extreme outcomes, Satz does necessarily
think the appropriate response is to ban markets that allow some persons to exercise
unequal power over others. According to Satz, this is because banning such markets will
not address what are often the underlying inequalities that exist between the market
participants. She states, “For example, if the problem with selling kidneys is (as some
claim) the ‘desperateness’ of the exchange, banning the sale will by itself do nothing to
relieve the desperate conditions that prompt it.”66 This also is not to say, nor suggest, that
regulating these kinds of noxious markets is sufficient to overcome what are often the
underlying inequalities between the participants. Regulation of organ markets would not,
using Satz’s example, be able to address what many see as a moral problem that sellers
are more likely be economically disadvantaged than buyers, and that this underlying
inequality is tantamount to the poor being exploited for their organs for the sole benefit of
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the wealthy. However, given the limit of Satz’s argument to the scope of the market,
regulating these kinds of noxious markets as opposed to banning them could at least
prevent potential abuses of power within those markets as a way to try to mitigate the
severity of any underlying inequality between the participants.
The last way Satz argues markets can be noxious is when they undermine the
crucial values and procedures of liberal democracies. The reason Satz considers this
aspect of noxious markets a problem is because, “The regulative idea of democracy is
that citizens are equals engaged in a common cooperative project of governing
themselves together.”67 As such, all citizens of a liberal democracy ought to have equal
standing in deciding the governing laws and procedures of that particular democratic
institution.68 Although there seems room here to criticize how well this ideal can be
implemented within different democratic institutions, Satz’s point is only that the
freedom granted to citizens in liberal democracies is meaningless if they are without the
goods necessary, “to participate effectively in the project of self-government.”69
To ensure access to goods that individuals need to participate in liberal
democracies, Satz argues that a case can be made for regulating or banning markets in
those goods. According to Satz, these goods fit into three categories: (i) political goods
like voting rights, (ii) goods, like education, that are required for effective participation in
liberal democracies, and (iii) goods that, “foster the development of people likely to
support democratic institutions and function effectively in a democratic environment.”70
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We have already seen with respect to noxious markets and extreme outcomes that
Satz considers healthcare, like education, a basic need for individuals to ideally function
as members of democratic institutions. So on her view healthcare would be considered a
good within the second category. As Satz notes when discussing how markets in these
kinds of goods can lead to extreme outcomes, a total ban on markets in these goods could
have worse effects than if they were regulated. Her concern here, though, is not just that
unregulated markets in these kinds of goods can cause those markets to be noxious by
leading to extreme outcomes, but that they could also be noxious by limiting access to
these goods just to those with the resources to afford them. Satz provides further
explanation of this latter point when she applies her view to unregulated organ markets.
According to Satz, the problem with unregulated organ markets undermining the values
of liberal democracies is that,
Unregulated organ markets would conflict with widely held ideas about
fairness, to the extent that they allowed the rich to purchase the gift of life
while others without resources could not. As a social practice, they would
confer privileges to the wealthy that send the message that their urgent
needs are more important than those of others.71
There are two particular points we can draw out of what Satz says regarding
noxious markets and how they relate to the commodification of health care goods and
services. First, Satz considers healthcare a need that should be provided to all persons in
at least some basic form. So whatever health care goods and services would qualify for
what she considers “healthcare,” they are not valued under her view merely as
commodities, but as necessities for people to effectively participate in democratic
institutions. Second, Satz is characterizing the features markets exhibit when they either
71

Ibid., 35.

49

exceed the threshold of democratic egalitarian values, or exacerbate underlying
inequalities between market participants. However, she also acknowledges that the
features of different markets raise different moral concerns relative to the kinds of
relationships that exist within those markets.72 So while Satz explains why it is necessary
to regulate markets, her view also leaves room to argue what the specific limits of
different kinds of markets should be.
4. Conclusion
So far I have discussed how the views of Anderson, Radin, and Satz justify the
idea that health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities.
However, I have also shown that none of these views gives a clear indication of what it
means to ethically treat health care goods and services as commodities that are bought
and sold via health care markets. Anderson’s view is the only one under which we might
consider it unethical to treat health care goods and services as commodities because they
are not properly valued according to market norms. The problem, though, is that this
point contradicts another aspect of her view justifying the idea that respecting the
conditions of freedom and autonomy – conditions necessary to properly value goods –
would require allowing individuals to willingly treat health care goods and services as
commodities. Radin’s view shows that health care goods and services can be thought of
in terms of incomplete commodification, but she does not specify what ethical limits
should be placed on the market sale of incompletely commodified goods. On Satz’s view
we see that she regards healthcare as a necessary good that persons need to fully
participate in democratic institutions, but that banning markets in this kind of good would
72
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likely cause more harmful effects than if such markets were regulated. Yet Satz does not
further argue why “healthcare” is required to participate in liberal democracies, what
sorts of goods and services she thinks would fall within the bounds of “healthcare,” or
how we ought to regulate “healthcare” markets.
This analysis about how health care goods and services are not properly valued
merely as commodities clears the way and establishes the need for developing a
theoretical account of how it may be possible to ethically treat health care goods and
services as commodities. Over the next two chapters I attempt to develop such an
account. In the next chapter I build on the view that health care is a special kind of good
that cannot be valued merely as a commodity to argue for why there ought to be
increased access to essential health care goods and services and how this principle is an
ethical limit of health care markets. In detailing this aspect of my argument, I attempt to
specify the goal of increasing access to essential health care goods and services by
articulating what is and is not included under this principle.
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Chapter Two: Arguing for the Principle of Increased Access to Essential
Health Care Good and Services
None of the theories of ethical markets used to show how health care goods and
services are improperly valued as commodities consequently shows that they should also
be removed from the market. Anderson argues that goods should not be treated as
commodities when their production and distribution fall outside market norms. However
I have also shown why this argument is insufficient for removing the production and
delivery of health care goods and services from the market, since it contradicts an
important aspect of her view regarding the ability of individuals to properly value goods.
I now turn to explore how it may be possible to ethically treat health care goods and
services as commodities.
There are two main reasons why I argue for the principles of honesty, respect for
autonomy, and increased access to essential health care goods and services as the base
ethical limits of health care markets. First, each of these appear to reflect some of the
ways individuals can value health care goods and services, or the transactions by which
those goods and services are exchanged, beyond their mere commodification. Second, as
we shall in greater detail over the next two chapters, each of these principles play an
important role in governing what we can think of as the ideal for both interactions
between health care professionals and patients, and market transactions between buyers
and sellers.
This chapter attempts to bridge the view established in chapter 1 to my argument
regarding the base ethical limits of health care markets. Specifically I aim to show why
there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services, and what it
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means for this normative principle to be an ethical limit of health care markets. In making
this argument I examine three approaches that, together, help justify the principle of
increased access to essential health care goods and services. The first of these is a marketbased approach, in which increased access can be thought of in terms of wealth creation.
Then, after noting a problem with this view to ensure access to essential health care
goods and services, I provide two moral-based approaches that argue for increased access
on the basis of a possible right to health care, and on the basis that health care is common
to all persons within our society. I then attempt to clarify some of the qualities that should
define essential health care goods and services. I conclude by discussing what it means
for the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services to be an
ethical limit of health care markets.
1. A Market Approach for Increased Access
At first glance, attempting to develop a market-based argument for increased
access to essential health care goods and services may seem odd. This is because, on one
hand, most arguments regarding access to essential health care goods and services center
on the idea that health care is a basic human need that all persons are entitled to in some
fashion as a matter of justice or fairness. On the other hand, markets, historically, have
not been used to generate fair or just access to goods or services. Markets typically
require persons to forgo purchasing commodities they cannot afford, even if the
commodity is also socially recognized as a need, such as health care. This section
attempts to reconcile these two opposing views to show that even though markets are not
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concerned with fair access, the value of health care goods and services as commodities
justifies increasing access to them.
One type of market system that seems naturally inclined toward increasing access
to essential health care goods and services is social welfare capitalism. Under this system,
the focus of the market shifts away from the traditional goals of wealth creation and the
attainment of private property, toward protecting and improving the welfare of all
participants within the market. Theoretically, it is possible to accomplish this shift in
market ideology by having the government fulfill its duty to citizens by increasing its role
from merely stabilizing and correcting potential market failures via regulation to actually
controlling the market.73 The benefit of using social welfare capitalism to argue for
increased access to essential health care goods and services is that it recognizes and
emphasizes meeting the needs of market participants to enhance their overall well being
as tied to economic growth. Despite its promise, though, I reject using social welfare
capitalism in this project as a basis to justify a market approach for increasing access to
essential health care goods and services.
As Cooley notes, a transition to social welfare capitalism would be a paradigm
shift that replaces current market ideology.74 Using social welfare capitalism to ground a
market approach to justify the principle access to essential health care goods and services
would therefore be impractical for my overall argument. This is because my theoretical
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discussion of the market up to this point and hereafter focuses on a free market system
that the government regulates, not a market system that the government controls.
Moreover my goal in this project has never been to argue for what kind of market system
is best to ethically manage the production and delivery of health care goods and services.
A second reason why I reject using social welfare capitalism here is that this is not the
kind of market system discussed by Anderson, Radin, or Satz (although Satz theory of
Democratic Egalitarianism appears similar), and is not the kind of market system that
current health care markets, like the pharmaceutical industry, operate under. So while
social welfare capitalism may be useful for analyzing the ethical limits of future health
care markets, it is not necessarily helpful for analyzing the ethical limits of current health
care markets. However, it is possible to ground a market approach for increasing access
to essential health care goods and services using the current free market system.
A standard feature of free markets is to generate as much monetary value as
possible for shareholders. So even though questions about the fair access and distribution
of health care goods and services typically fall outside market concerns, free markets
ought to still focus on increasing access to essential health care goods and services as a
matter of wealth creation. The reason for this is grounded in basic economic theory of
supply and demand. According to this theory, markets function best when the amount of
a good supplied equals the demand for that good, whereas the ability of markets to
maximize wealth creation is not optimal when either the supply or demand for a good
outweighs the other. When goods or services have continuous or increasing demand
markets in those goods or services will therefore function to try to meet that demand.
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Health care, we know, is one institution that has seen steady increases in demand
for goods and services since at least the 1960s when public sector financing of health care
was introduced with Medicaid and Medicare. Using America’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) as an indictor of consumer demand, the demand for health care has increased its
share of America’s GDP from 5% in 1960 to 12% in 1990. Additionally, increasing
demand led to an annual average of 11% economic growth in health care from 1960 to
1990 (3 percent above the average growth of the United States’ economy during that
time). Even as the demand for health care steadily dropped throughout the 1990s – due
mostly to an increase in managed care systems that saw consumers having to pay higher
premiums and deductibles for both private and employer-sponsored health insurance –
annual growth in health care still increased at a rate of approximately 5.5%.75
The recent economic recession has also slowed the growth in demand for health
care goods and services – particularly for those paid out-of-pocket. However, according
to the 2008 summary of health care spending by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, health care spending was still projected to increase by 2.1% between 2008 and
2009, and increase to 4.8% between 2009 and 2010. The report also highlighted several
projected spending increases between 2008 and 2009 correlating with increased demand
for particular health care goods and services. For example, prescription drug spending
was projected to increase from 3.2% in 2008 to 5.2% in 2009, largely due to an increased
use of anti-viral drugs associated with H1N1 virus. Also, hospital and physician and
clinical services spending growth was expected to increase, respectively, from 4.5% and
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5% in 2008 to 5.9% and 6.3% in 2009, driven largely by increased demand for services to
treat H1N1 virus.76
We need to be clear, though, what we mean here by “demand.” When talking
about the demand for essential goods and services, “demand” refers to the effective
demand – i.e., the want of a good or service coupled with the ability to pay for it. If goods
or services cost too much for persons to afford, the demand for them can decrease, which
can then negatively impact profits stemming from the sale of those goods and services.
So built into this market approach for justifying increased access to essential health care
goods and services is the necessity of the marketplace to keep costs for essential health
care goods and services affordable to the degree that their cost does not negatively affect
the ability of the market in those goods and services to remain profitable. This is a point
that I will return to in the chapter on the pharmaceutical industry when I analyze and
refute the claim that high pharmaceutical drug prices in the United States ultimately
improve access to prescription drugs.
There is, however, a concern with this approach being able to fully ground the
normative principle that there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods
and services. As long as markets in essential health care goods and services remain
profitable, basing the principle of increased access on the concept of wealth creation
works. Hypothetically, though, if markets in essential health care goods and services
were not profitable, there would no longer be a reason to increase access to them as a
matter of wealth creation. The specific problem with this approach is that it only
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recognizes the commodifiable value of essential health care goods and services, while
failing to account for how they are necessary for meeting persons’ health care needs. To
help overcome this problem with the market-based approach, I next argue for two moralbased approaches in which increased access to essential health care goods and services
can be grounded either in terms a right to health care or the idea that health care is
common to all persons within our society.
2. A Right-to-Health Care Approach for Increased Access
One way to defend increased access to essential health care goods and services
beyond the profitability of health care markets is via a right to health care. This is
because a primary function (if not the primary function) of arguments for a right to health
care is to justify some form of universal access to health care. However, the intent of this
section is not to argue for a right to health care per se. Instead the focus of this section is
to show how there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and
services based on the plausibility of a right to health care. There are two accounts of a
right to health care that I use to ground this approach: Daniels’ argument for a right to
health care on the basis of equal opportunity, and Buchanan’s pluralistic account for a
right to a decent minimum of health care.77 Before addressing these two views, though, it
will be helpful to first briefly sketch what we mean by a “right” to health care.
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A. Clarifying the Concept of a Right to Health Care
Buchanan notes four basic features of valid rights claims. First, “To say that a
person A has a right to something X, is . . . to say that A is entitled to X, that X is due to
him or her.”78 Furthermore, claiming that person A has a right to X is stricter than
claiming that X is either morally good or desired by person A. Second, rights warrant
enforceability via sanctions or even coercion by some governing body, and that the
failure of one’s rights to be enforced is itself an injustice. Third, rights trump utility
maximization in the sense that, “[I]f A has a right to X, then the mere fact that infringing
A’s right would maximize overall utility or even A’s utility is not itself a sufficient
reason for infringing it.”79 Fourth, universal rights, such as a right to health care, apply to
all persons.
The third feature requires an important clarification. Utility maximization may
not be sufficient to infringe upon or override one’s rights, but this is not to say that rights
are therefore unlimited or that utility maximization cannot be a reason for limiting certain
rights. The fulfillment of any right is limited according to the resources available to meet
or enforce it. For example, having a right to health care does not thusly entitle all persons
to an open-ended array of health care benefits. This is because, as Dougherty explains,
Such an unbound obligation would conflict with other obligations
individuals have, including obligations to themselves, and would lead to a
view of persons as merely resources for satisfying others’ needs with no
space left for personal self-determination . . . Moreover, such an openended health care obligation would mean the inability to fund other
important public resources.80
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Although Dougherty does not further specify what he means by an unbound obligation to
provide health care conflicting with other obligations to oneself and others, his wording
here suggests a Kantian line of thinking. Specifically, Dougherty seems to be implying
that an unbound obligation to provide health care would violate Kant’s famously argued
view that all persons have an obligation to treat themselves and others as ends and never
merely as a means to an end.81 However since Dougherty does not argue for this point it
is unclear that this is his intention, and it is unclear how exactly an unbound obligation to
provide health care would actually lead to viewing “persons as merely resources for
satisfying others’ needs . . .” Still, the idea that a right to health care must be limited
according to available resources is one consideration I address later in the chapter when I
attempt to clarify some of the qualities of essential health care goods and services.
Rights are also often classified as positive or negative. Negative rights are those
that, apart from enforcement, require others to abstain or refrain from action against the
right’s possessor. A negative right to health care therefore refers to the requirement of
others not to impede on one’s ability to attain health care. Positive rights are those that,
beyond enforcement, may require others to act on behalf of the right’s possessor in order
for that person fully attain what is due to him or her. A positive right to health care
therefore refers to the obligation others to help individuals attain whatever form of health
care is due to him or her. Health care is generally considered to be a positive right, since
one’s ability to attain health care typically requires more than just the noninterference of

81

See; Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:428-4:429; and Kant, The Metaphysics of
Morals, 6:385 and 6:395. Pagination for all references to these two works is from the Academy
editions volume 4 for the Groundwork and volume 6 for the Metaphysics of Morals.

60

others. To remain consistent with Daniels and Buchanan, I also treat the right to health
care as a positive right.
B. Establishing a Right to Health Care
Daniels states that attempts to justify a right to health care extend beyond legal
positivism – which claims that rights only exist when embodied by laws – toward a moral
right.82 This is because, as he further claims with respect to a right to health care, “Legal
entitlements, most people believe, should reflect what society is morally obliged to
provide by way of medical services.”83 According to Daniels, it is possible to base a right
to health care on the concept of equal opportunity. He argues that disease and disability
restrict the normal range of opportunities available to persons within a given society to
construct reasonable “life-plans” for themselves, and so, because health care helps people
function as close to normal as possible (given their talents and skills), persons are entitled
to a fair allocation of health care resources to preserve the range opportunities closed off
to them as a result of disease or disability.84 There are, however, some concerns regarding
Daniels’ argument.
One concern is that Daniels’ notion of a normal opportunity range makes it hard
to asses what sorts of essential health care goods services ought to be included under the
principle of increased access. On one hand, Daniels claims that a “normal opportunity
range” is that which allows persons to pursue reasonable life-plans. However there are a
number of reasonable life plans available to persons within our society that, if we
provided the health care resources necessary for all persons to pursue them as part of a
82
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normal opportunity range, would theoretically lead to a massive depletion of those
resources.85 Basing a right to health care on a right to a normal opportunity range also
runs the risk of being circular. While the goal of health care under Daniels’ argument is
to ensure a normal opportunity range, what constitutes a normal opportunity range within
society is partly determined by the quality of health care available within that society.
This is problematic is because, as Buchanan notes,
[A] principle which requires only that resources be allocated so as to
assure that everyone attains the normal opportunity range would be
inadequate in situations in which the normal opportunity range was
unacceptably narrow due to a failure to allocate sufficient resources for
health care.86
Buchanan then claims that Daniels’ argument must be supplemented with a principle
requiring the maximization of the normal opportunity range.87 So, on the other hand, this
latter point regarding Daniels’ notion of the normal opportunity range could consequently
result in having to be too narrow or strict about the kinds of health care goods and
services included under the principle of increased access.
Another concern about Daniels’ view is that its scope is objectionable. Preserving
one’s ability to attain a normal opportunity range is undoubtedly a good reason why there
ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services. However, as we
shall see in the next section, there are other, more primary reasons why we should be
concerned about the attainment of health care. That is, the attainment of health care is
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good even when it does not necessarily preserve or increase one’s range of
opportunities.88
Partly in response to the general concerns of Daniels’ view, Buchanan develops
an alternative argument that does not look to justify a prima facie universal right to health
care, but, instead, aims to show how a pluralistic strategy is enough to do the work of
supposed a universal right to health care. For the sake of space, I only briefly summarize
the main points of Buchanan’s argument. Also, the full purpose of Buchanan’s argument
is to develop an obligation of state enforced beneficence regarding the right to a decent
minimum of health care. He does this primarily to counter-argue the libertarian view that
persons are not entitled to health care because such a right would be tantamount to an
unjust distribution of resources. However I abstain from discussing this aspect of
Buchanan’s argument because merely establishing the plausibility of a right to a decent
minimum of health care does not also require showing how enforcing that right is fair or
just.
First Buchanan argues that, at the least, there three ways we can defend a
specialized right to health care – i.e., a right that only applies to certain individuals or
groups. These ways are: 1) arguing that groups like Native Americans or African
Americans are due core health care benefits to rectify past injustices that either directly or
indirectly resulted in health detriments within those groups; 2) by arguing that those who,
through some form of employment, have been either unjustly harmed or unjustly exposed
to health risks, are entitled to core health care benefits as a matter of just compensation;
and 3) by arguing that core health care benefits are due to those whose exceptional
88
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sacrifices for society have resulted in adverse health, such as when military personnel are
wounded during combat.89 Second, Buchanan argues that our society already accepts
expending public resources to attain public health measures such as sanitation and
immunization from potentially harmful, communicable diseases, and that because of this,
there is an extended moral obligation, “to achieve some standard of equal protection from
the harms these measures are designed to prevent.”90 Third, Buchanan argues that a right
to health care can also be defended via non-moral, prudential reasoning.

For example,

basic health care measures not only help protect persons from various health related
harms, but they also improve the health of some persons, thereby potentially improving
the overall quality of society, such as by helping to create a stronger workforce.91
Buchanan’s argument for a right to health care is more practical than theoretical.
This helps him avoid the same kinds of ambiguities that can arise from using concepts
like “normal opportunity range.” The point, however, is not to debate the strength of
Buchanan’s and Daniels’ arguments compared to each other. Whether or not Buchanan’s
argument or Daniels’ argument is ultimately more justifiable than the other, both provide
seemingly plausible ways for understanding how there can be a right to health care.
Furthermore, the combined weight of these arguments for a right to health care is enough
to lay the groundwork for why, apart from wealth creation, there ought to be increased
access to essential health care goods and services.
The underlying force of Daniels’ argument for a right to health care is the
preservation of normal species functioning to ensure a normal opportunity range. Based
89
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on this, there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services
whenever a lack of access to these things inhibits persons’ functioning in a way that
threatens or jeopardizes their ability to be within the normal opportunity range. However,
even if we reject this conclusion because of the ambiguity of the normal opportunity
range, Buchanan’s understanding of a right to health care gives us other reasons why
there should still be increased access to essential health care goods and services.
Buchanan’s argument for a right to health care focuses on the attainment of basic health
care either as some form of restitution to particular groups or individuals, or as something
that serves the overall benefit of the general public. So based on this view, there are at
least two reasons why there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods
and services. First, increasing access to essential health care goods and services would be
necessary whenever a lack of access resulted in a failure to provide particular groups or
individuals some basic form of health care due to them as a matter of just compensation.
Second, there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services
when a lack of access fails to protect particular groups or individuals from health
detriments that our society already expends resources to prevent among the general
public.
This approach toward justifying the principle of increased access to essential
health care goods and services works so long as we accept the validity of arguments for a
right to health care. Yet there are some who may reject such arguments on the grounds
that fulfilling a universal right to health care would involve the collection and
redistribution of resources that is intuitively unfair either to those who are better off and
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can afford paying for private health care measures, or for those who are relatively healthy
and who may contribute much more to fund basic public health care measures than they
will realistically use. So it is likely that those who reject arguments for a right to health
care will remain unconvinced that this approach is able to legitimately ground the
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services. As I argue next,
though, it is possible to justify the principle of increased access to essential health care
goods and services even if there is no right to health care.
3. A Common-View Approach for Increased Access
I argue in chapter 1 that health care goods and services are not properly valued
merely as commodities. In making this argument, there is an unstated presumption that
health care should be used for the betterment of society because it is common to all
persons within society. This is particularly evident on Satz’s view when I merely take as
given her claim that healthcare is a need of citizens to effectively participate in
democratic institutions. But I have yet to address what it means, or may mean, for health
care to be a common good of all persons within society. That is my goal in this section.
Specifically, I aim to provide two possible explanations for how health care is common to
all persons within our society, and why this helps justify increased access to essential
health care goods and services as a result.
A. Health Care as Common based on its Development and Distribution
One way that health care can be understood as common to all persons within our
society is that its development and distribution is fundamentally social. As Pellegrino
argues, medical knowledge develops and is transmitted via the participation and sanction
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of the general public, making it a good to which the members of society have a
substantial claim. First, medical knowledge has developed over centuries of clinical
observations and controlled experiments that often respond to previous medical research,
is widely accessible to health care professionals and the public, and has frequently relied
on the participation of the general public as human research subjects. Moreover, medical
knowledge that comes from research and experimentation is largely paid for via public
agencies and institutions or private philanthropies to which most of the general public
contributes either by paying taxes or donating funds.92
Second, the acquisition and transmission of medical knowledge “is ethically
possible only with society’s sanction.”93 Often the kinds of activities that are legally
permitted within medical communities are punishable crimes outside of them. Such
activities are permitted within medical communities, however, because they intend to
provide a broad social benefit. There are several examples of this. Our society has laws
governing the treatment of deceased bodies, and maintains a standard that we ought to
revere and show respect for deceased persons. Yet our society also allows for medical
practioners to perform autopsies, dissections, and other kinds of experiments on cadavers
to help advance medical knowledge of human bodies. We also have laws that aim to
protect individuals’ privacy and private information. However, for the sake of providing
students advanced “hands-on” medical training, medical teaching hospitals grant students
the right to ask patients and their families private and often personal questions about
patients’ health. Students in these settings are also given a wide range of open access to
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patients’ medical records. Our society also has laws that prevent the production and
distribution of various kinds of drugs; yet we permit pharmaceutical companies to
conduct controlled experiments in which human subjects are given various doses of drugs
that, at that stage, still present a high level of known and unknown risk to them.
Furthermore, most persons – even those with medical knowledge and training –
are incapable of meeting their medical needs without the assistance of others. As
Galarneau explains, the attainment of health care has many complex interpersonal and
institutional dimensions. Care giving typically involves some sort of face-to-face
interaction between medical professionals and patients. These interactions often occur in
community based clinics, offices, or hospitals, each with unique procedures or protocols.
They can be shaped or influenced by the personal relationships (or lackthereof) between
medical professionals and patients, or be subject to institutional influences stemming
from organizations such as pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, or local
community groups. The interactions between medical professionals and patients are also
governed by professional and legal standards, and may also require according with
specific local community practices.94
However there is a problem regarding this latter point for showing how health
care is common to all persons within our society. Although the distribution of health care
is fundamentally social, involving multiple, dynamic relationships between individuals,
communities, and institutions, this particular line of reasoning falls short of showing how
health care is common to all persons within our society because the argument fails to
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establish how health care generally constitutes a need of all persons. However, as I show
next, essential forms of health care can be seen as needs of all persons.
B. Health Care as Common based on Shared Human Nature
Another way to understand health care as common to all persons is that it is
thought to be an integral part of our shared human nature both practically and
symbolically or emotionally. In a symbolic or emotional sense, there are particular lifeevents involving health care that all persons experience and that have deep social
significance both on individual and community levels. As noted in the 1983 report of the
President’s Commission on Bioethics,
Beyond its practical importance, the involvement of health care with the
most significant and awesome events of life – birth, illness, and death –
adds a symbolic aspect to health care: it is special because it signifies not
only mutual empathy and caring but the mysterious aspects of curing and
healing.95
In a practical sense, humans are finite, relatively fragile, and susceptible to
disease, illness, and injury. Regardless of the numerous ways that individuals can be
distinct from one another, such as in educational or socioeconomic status, all persons will
eventually suffer the effects of poor or declining health, directly and also indirectly when
ill health affects our loved ones.96 Particularly for individuals and families, ill health is a
disruptive force that inhibits flourishing. According to Pellegrino, for example,
Chronic illness, pain, discomfort, or disability can constrain the most
determined and best-adjusted person. For most people, it is difficult or
impossible to do the things they want to do or enjoy when they are
affected by illness. Health is a fundamental requirement for the fulfillment
of the human potential and freedom to act and direct one’s life. To lack
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health and to need treatment is to be in a diminished state of human
existence – a state quite unlike other deprivations [that] can be borne if
one is healthy.97
This is not to say either that a diminished state of health (brought about by
conditions such as chronic pain, illness, or disability) prevents human flourishing, or that
health care is the only good necessary for human flourishing. We can imagine how some
persons may reassess their life goals in light of ill health to set and accomplish new life
goals they may not have otherwise considered or tried to accomplish. For example, some
persons who are terminally ill will use their illness as a reason to travel, write their
memoirs, participate in community health projects, or work to amend or deepen their
personal relationships with others. There are also other goods besides health that are
closely tied with being human such as happiness, wealth, friendship, or work.
Pellegrino’s point, though, is that ill health makes the fulfillment of one’s goals more
difficult to achieve, and either compromises or makes impossible one’s ability to attain
other goods also associated with human flourishing.98
C. How the Common-View Approach Further Justifies Increased Access to Essential
Health Care Goods and Services
Based on these two ways for how health care is common to all persons, there are
at least three moral reasons why there ought to be increased access to essential health
care goods and services. First, we ought increase access to essential health care goods and
services as a matter of respect for persons. Within a Kantian framework, for example,
persons ought to be respected because they have dignity stemming from their capacity to
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rationally govern their actions.99 Yet it is reasonable to think that when one’s basic needs
are not met, one’s ability to self-govern is not only more difficult but can also be
compromised – a point that will become more evident in the next chapter when I examine
the principle of respect for autonomy as an ethical limit of health care markets. In a
Kantian sense, then, showing proper respect for persons requires working to make sure
that individuals’ basic needs are met. Again, health care constitutes a basic need of
persons both in that all persons are susceptible to the effects of ill health, and also
because a lack of health care can impede the attainment of others goods we consider
necessary for human flourishing. So at a minimum, respect for persons also justifies
increased access to essential health care goods and services for persons who lack access
to basic health care needs.
Second, we ought to also increase access to health care goods and services as a
matter of fairness. Since all persons within society can claim to have a stake in the
development and distribution of health care, it would be unfair to prevent any person
within our society access to essential health care goods and services. Although this reason
is not without exception, because health constitutes a need of all persons any counter
arguments to this point would seemingly have to demonstrate how prima facie unfair or
unjust distributions of essential health care goods and services – in which some persons
are guaranteed access while others are required to forgo access – would be ethically
permissible.
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Third, we ought to increase access to essential health care goods and services as a
matter of utility. All the members of society contribute to and benefit from the advances
in medical knowledge. By increasing access to essential health care goods and services
we can expand on the intended benefits of medical knowledge by helping society’s
individual members better meet their health care needs and presumably improve their
overall health. Furthermore, increasing access to health care goods and services can
provide additional benefits to society as a whole. For example, increasing access to
essential health care goods and services will likely require developing new or expanding
currently existing health care institutions that, as Galarneau explains,
[A]re integral to the institutional fabric of local community life and thus
have the potential to improve community infrastructure by providing
employment, training, and leadership opportunities. They also support
other social institutions by helping to keep individual community
members healthy and capable of participating in them as workers,
students, and political citizens.100
Lastly, beyond these moral reasons, there is a practical reason to justify increased
access to essential health care goods and services. Health care is part of many basic
human life events. Our society in particular has grown accustom to associating the
provision(s) of health care with events at the beginning and end of life, and also for a
wide array of injuries and illnesses. I take as uncontroversial the idea health care goods
and services are the primary means by which individuals meet their health care needs
during these events. In this sense, then, there ought to be increased access to essential
health care goods and services to ensure that persons experiencing these kinds of basic
life events are able to meet their health care needs.
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Up to this point, I have examined three approaches for why there ought to be
increased access to essential health care goods and services. I now turn to clarify what
qualities should define essential health care goods and services.
4. Clarifying “Essential Health Care Goods and Services”
In this section I do not attempt to argue for what specific health care goods or
services are, or should be, included under this principle of increased access. There are
two reasons for this. First, attempting to specify which particular goods and services we
should increase access to is not something we can infer simply by showing why there
ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services. Second,
attempting to argue for which specific health care goods and services fall under this
principle would be too laborious for this work. What I attempt instead is to clarify some
of the qualities of essential health care goods and services. To do this, we first need to
solidify our understanding of what these three approaches tell us about the goal for the
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services.
A. Solidifying the Goal of Increased Access
From the three approaches I discuss, the goal for the principle of increased access
to essential health care goods and services becomes clearer: to balance (although not
necessarily equally) wealth creation and limited health care resources against the just
distribution of those resources. Wealth creation can justify enormous increases in access
to any health care resource so long as there is a demand for it. Furthermore wealth
creation, or at least the promise of profit, can spur medical breakthroughs or
improvements to currently existing health care goods and services. However, if wealth
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creation were to be the primary motive for increasing access to essential health care
goods and services, we could then claim that when applied as an ethical limit of health
care markets, any health care market that increases its profits is functioning ethically even
if it does not actually increase access to essential health care goods and services. An
example of this that I discuss more thoroughly in the chapter on pharmaceutical drugs is
Azidothymidine (AZT). When the Food and Drug Administration approved AZT for
market distribution, it was the first and only anti-HIV drug. This allowed the drug’s
developer, Burroughs Wellcome, to corner the market in anti-HIV drugs even though
many people who needed AZT were denied access to it because they could not afford its
high price. So a problem with focusing too much on wealth creation is the counterintuitive nature that this might not actually ensure access to essential health care goods
and services. We also have reasons why we should increase access to essential health
care goods and services apart from wealth creation.
Understanding health care as common to all persons within our society as well as
arguments for a right to health care also justify increasing access to essential health care
goods and services. Furthermore, based on these reasons, we see that we should increase
access to essential health care goods and services when persons lack access to these
things. These reasons thusly appear able to counter-balance the potential problem of
wealth creation such that when this principle of increased access is applied to health care
markets, we can claim that these markets function ethically when they increase profits
and do not prevent or inhibit persons from access to needed health care goods or services.
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However we must also be careful regarding these other reasons for justifying this
principle of increased access. If we give too much weight to these other reasons without
further qualifying “essential health care goods and services,” we run the risk of
potentially overextending this principle when applied to health care markets. For
example, someone could take a strong interpretation of this principle to say that it
justifies increasing access to all health care goods or services that are capable of meeting
persons’ health care needs. Not only is it widely understood that we have limited health
care resources that would make fulfilling such a strong interpretation of this principle
impractical, but it would also be unjust to use our limited public funds to try to increase
access to this degree, since this would result in diverting those funds from other
important public resources like education or our transportation infrastructure.
So keeping in mind that the goal of increased access to essential health care goods
and services is to balance wealth creation and limited resources against the just
distribution of those resources, we can now begin to see some of the qualities that should
define our understanding of essential health care goods and services.
B. Characteristics of Essential Health Care Goods and Services
Based on the three approaches I have used to show why there ought to be
increased access to essential health care goods and services, there are at least three
qualities that should characterize these goods and services. First and foremost, we should
consider essential health care goods and services to be goods and services that help
individuals address their medical needs. Admittedly this is somewhat redundant given
that from the onset I narrowed my understand of health care goods and services as those
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things that help individuals meet their medical needs in preventing or combating disease,
illness, or injury. From Daniels’ argument for a right to health care, we can also
understand medical need as something that prohibits us from a normal state of
functioning relative to social standards.
While this quality for understanding essential health care goods and services is
fairly uncontroversial this does not mean, however, that health care goods and services
that do not help address a medical need should necessarily be inaccessible for persons
who want them. For example, cosmetic plastic surgery (as opposed to reconstructive
plastic surgery) does not typically provide a medical benefit to patients. So in general it
should not be considered essential health care that falls within the purview of this
principle for increased access. However, as long as providing a non-essential health care
good or services does not create an overall inability for persons to attain health care
goods and services that are primarily used to meet persons’ medical needs, those goods
and services should also remain available. If we were to try further justifying this latter
point, we could either argue for the legitimate interests of businesses – which in this case
would include the providers of these non-essential goods and services – to meet the
demand for these goods and services as a matter of wealth creation, or by arguing that as
a matter of self-determination, health care providers should be free to provide nonessential health care goods and services to willing patients so long as this neither resulted
in gross negligence on the part of the health care provider, nor any foreseeable long-term
harm to patients.
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A second quality of essential health care goods and services is that they should be
cost-effective. Specifically, from the aspect of balancing wealth creation against just
distribution of health care resources, cost-effectiveness is the ability of markets in the
essential health care goods and services to remain profitable, while working to ensure that
persons who need those goods and services can afford access to them. Determining how
best to establish the cost-effectiveness of essential health care goods and services falls
outside the scope of this work. However there are some strategies currently employed
within our society – usually with high, but still varying degrees of success – to maintain
both the profitability of and access to essential health care goods and services, such as
both public and privately funded health insurance programs, or manufacturer discounts
(particularly for pharmaceutical drugs).
Third, because we are talking about goods and services that we should increase
access to and that ought to meet a medical need, what we consider to be essential health
care goods and services should also be system relative. The idea of system relativity is
frequently used in discussions about health care rights, with Daniels using this particular
term to delimit entitlements under a right to health care.101 However the term generally
refers to our ability to help individuals meet their medical needs in connection with the
availability of resources within our current health care system. System relativity therefore
has a wider range of applicability than just health care entitlements.
Since the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services
must account for limited health care resources, it is reasonable to assume that the goods
and services in question should be as efficacious as possible. So when medical needs are
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fairly common and have widely-used, standardized treatments, what qualifies as
“essential” in those cases will not include experimental or unproven treatments whose
efficacious nature is questionable. If, however, the medical need is relatively uncommon,
the scope of what is considered “essential” for treating that need might have to be wider
and possibly include treatments with questionable effectiveness. Understanding what
qualifies as essential health care goods and services under the notion of system relativity
should also consider the consequences of non-treatment for a medical need. It may be the
case, for example, that initially disqualifying non-standard, highly costly health care
goods or services from being considered “essential” could result in a greater, long-term
drain on health care resources such that we may want to consider them “essential”
nonetheless. For instance, gastric bypass surgery is more effective for helping morbidly
obese persons lose weight than either drug therapy or life style changes in one’s diet and
exercise.102 But it is also an expensive treatment that raises some safety concerns, and
that a number of insurance companies do not cover.103 However, given the increasing
rates of obesity in the United States104 and the annual health care expenditures for
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medical costs associated with treating obese persons105, it might be that we will
eventually want to consider increasing access to gastric bypass surgery as an essential
health care good for helping reduce obesity in the United States.
5. Conclusion
Throughout this chapter we have seen why there ought to be increased access to
essential health care goods and services, as well as some of the qualities necessary for
this principle to be effective in practice. At this point we can begin to see what it means,
or may mean, for this principle to be an ethical limit of health care markets. Claiming that
the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services is an ethical
limit of health care markets refers to the requirement of these markets to provide fairly
distributed, cost-effective access to essential health care goods and services. Health care
markets are within this limit when they function in ways that do not prevent persons from
accessing health care goods and services necessary to effectively treat their medical
needs. They violate this limit when some sort of unfair distribution of essential health
care goods or services prevents persons from being able to effectively treat their medical
needs.
It is important to note, though, that the principle of increased access to essential
health care goods and services would not apply to all health care markets. The force of
this limit largely stems from how we understand essential health care goods and services
as those things that are effective in treating a medical need. So for markets in health care
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goods or services that do not aim to treat an underlying medical need, such as with
cosmetic plastic surgery, concerns about increasing access to these goods or services in
fair or cost-effective ways would not apply. Furthermore, it is also possible that the
approaches used to justify this principle could be modified to apply to other markets in
essential goods, like food.
Lastly, based on the notion of system relativity, what we consider to be essential
health care goods and services will fluctuate according to multiple, variable factors. For
example, new epidemics and other natural events will change our individual and
community health care needs; new medical technologies or improvements to currently
existing medical technologies will change the standards for how we treat our medical
needs; changes in our social and political spectrum will affect the production and
distribution of whatever we consider to be essential health care goods and services. As
these factors become known, they will have a foreseeable effect on how this principle
limits health care markets.
Next, I move beyond showing why there ought to be increased access to essential
health care goods and services to argue for why health care markets should also be
limited according to the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.
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Chapter Three: Arguing for the Principles of Honesty and
Respect for Autonomy
While I have shown why there should be increased access to essential health care
goods and services, ethically treating health care goods and services as commodities
requires more than just this. One of the underlying reasons addressed in chapter 1 for why
health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities is that their
distribution occurs via health care relationships that are not strictly governed by market
norms. Even though the principle of increased access is partly justified on the basis of the
relationships between health care providers and patients, this principle does not tell us
anything about the character of those relationships. Since the relationships matter in how
we value health care goods and services, we should, in order to ethically treat them as
commodities, account for the relationships by which they are primarily exchanged,
namely the relationships between health care professionals and patients.
My aim in this chapter is to establish additional ethical limits for health care
markets that accord with the market distribution of commodities and are based on the
relationships between health care professionals and patients. Specifically I argue that
health care markets should be limited according to the principles of honesty and respect
for autonomy. As I show in this chapter, these two principles ideally govern both the
market transactions between buyers and sellers, and the interactions between health care
professionals and patients. For each principle, I first provide a theoretical framework and
then argue for how each applies to the relationships between health care professionals
and patients and market transactions between buyers and sellers. I then conclude my
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discussion of each principle by addressing what it means for these principles to be ethical
limits of health care markets.
1. Honesty
Initially it is somewhat difficult to see why honesty should be considered an
ethical limit of health care markets. There are at least two reasons for this. First, although
honesty is now considered an important aspect of the relationship between health care
professionals, patients, and a patient’s family or surrogate(s), it is not always clear how
far this principle extends within these relationships. For example, do physicians violate
the principle of honesty if they do not disclose to patients how often they entertain
pharmaceutical representatives who often provide physicians with biased information
about new drugs on the market? Second, deception within business is fairly common as a
means of securing an economic advantage over competitors, thereby making my claim
that honesty is an important principle for governing market transactions appear
oxymoronic, or worse, simply false. Furthermore, deception can sometimes be considered
morally permissible within business, such as when replying to certain questions during a
negotiation.
An example of business related deception in health care is the marketing of the
well-known antihistamine, Claritin. In Hooked, Brody notes how Claritin is, “the most
profitable antihistamine of all time, with annual sales of more than two billion dollars”106
(p. 18). Part of what makes Claritin so popular is that direct-to-consumer advertisements
for the drug claim it is a non-sedating medication – something many other antihistamines
cannot claim. But according to Brody, 30-40% of those taking prescription Claritin fail to
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receive any benefit from the drug. This is troubling considering that, in addition to this
relatively high percentage, the cost of prescription Claritin (in 2001) was about eighty to
eighty-five dollars a month (compared to less than ten dollars a month for the generic
form, Chlor-Trimeton).107
The initial data on Claritin submitted to the FDA in 1987 shows that in small, 10milligram doses, Claritin is non-sedating. Yet this data also shows that the reported
effectiveness for test subjects taking the 10-milligram doses of Claritin is only about 10%
higher then the reported effectiveness for test subjects taking just placebos. However in
other data sets where larger doses of Claritin were taken by test subjects, Claritin is
shown to be highly effective but also much more likely to cause drowsiness.108
Hoping to get Claritin approved as a “non-sedating” drug, the company that
produces Claritin, Schering-Plough, made sure no data was submitted to the FDA for
amounts more than 10 milligrams – meaning that prescription Claritin could not actually
be sold in the higher, more effective doses. But in its direct-to-consumer advertisements
for Claritin, Schering-Plough has used both data sets to justify the dual claims that
Claritin is non-sedating and highly effective, and that, because of this unique
combination, Claritin is a special antihistamine.109
To argue for honesty as an ethical limit of health care markets, I thusly need to
provide a thorough yet succinct defense of the principle of honesty.
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A. A Theoretical Account of Honesty
I begin with the basic and widely accepted assumption that honesty involves
telling the truth while avoiding intentional lying, deceiving, or promise breaking in our
communications with others. Note that this is an unqualified assumption that has not been
molded or shaped to fit any particular view of honesty. As I will argue shortly, how we
understand the ethical nature of honesty should require us to consider the context of the
situation in which questions of honesty arise. Later I will argue that even within health
care relationships, there are some kinds of information disclosures that health care
professionals and patients do not need to be fully honest about with each other. At this
point, though, I merely wish to briefly address the question: why should we be honest,
especially in light of examples like Claritin in which dishonesty can be quite profitable
and goes unpunished?
Kant, whose views on lying are regularly interpreted as being quite rigid, gives us
two primary reasons why we should not lie. First, he argues that we are obligated to act in
ways that could apply universally, and that we are obligated not to act in ways that cannot
apply universally. For Kant, persons cannot be morally obligated to lie because if lying
were universally permitted, our abilities to effectively engage in meaningful
communication with others would cease since we would have no reason to trust one
another.110 Second, Kant also argues that we should always treat all persons as ends and
never merely as means to an end, and that the reason for this is because all persons have
inherent moral worth. According to this argument, we can never be morally obligated to
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lie because if we were, this would permit us to use others solely for our benefit in a way
that fails to appreciate their dignity as moral beings. Kant extends this point further by
also arguing that even if it intends to benefit another person, an intentional lie would still
be immoral because the person committing the lie knows the truth, and so uses himself or
herself merely as a means bring about some discretionary end.111
However even if we reject the moral foundation of these arguments, there is an
underlying practicality to Kant’s view that remains for why we should be honest. On
Kant’s view, we should be honest lest we run the risk of not being able to trust one
another. While Kant uses to this notion to argue that acting morally involves developing
maxims for action that apply universally, the idea that we should be honest as means of
fostering trust between persons is also a prudential reason, since a lack of trust would
render communication between persons worthless. This reasoning holds true even for the
egoist who may believe that acts of lying, deception, or promise breaking are morally
permissible in order to advance one’s self-interests, as acting in one’s self-interest also
requires being able to consistently trust others.
Still arguing for why we should be honest does not seem to get us very far. Most
persons prima facie accept that we should be honest. But arguing that we should be
honest does not necessarily tell us what it means to be honest. So before turning to
address how the principle of honesty specifically applies to both health care and business,
more should be said about the context in which questions of honesty arise.
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a. Limits of Honesty
Part of the reason that I focus on Kant’s arguments against lying is because they
establish what is often considered an inflexible moral requirement. For Kant, lying is
never moral. Some of Kant’s statements about the wrongness of lying seem so strict and
excessive that, according to noted Kant scholar Alan Wood, “most Kantians who have
dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming that
they do not (or need not) follow from Kant’s own principles.”112
If the prohibition against lying is as strict as Kant presumably argues it is, this
might not only mean we are morally obligated to always tell the truth without any further
qualifications, but this would also seemingly conflict with other widely-held morals of
the medical profession such as the moral and legal obligation to maintain patient privacy.
Under standard interpretations of Kant’s views on lying, a doctor, for example, would be
morally obligated to honestly disclose a patient’s medical information to anybody who
asked for it – a clear violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996. These kinds of examples are perhaps why many Kantians presumably distance
themselves from Kant’s views on lying – on the face of it his stance against lying seems
too strict to be practical.
However Wood argues that such interpretations of Kant’s views on lying are
wrong. According to Wood, Kant recognizes at least two distinguishable limits for when
making intentionally false statements is not immoral. First, Wood argues, the duty not to
lie only extends to falsifications that would undermine the rights of others when applied
universally. But if a falsification does not undermine the rights of others when applied
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universally, then the falsification does not violate Kant’s duty not to lie (here the term
“right” refers to duties of right, which is Kant’s notion of obligations we have toward
others).113 Second, in dealing with the view that lying is also immoral because it violates
a duty to oneself (by treating oneself as a mere means), Wood argues that for Kant, the
purpose of duties to oneself is to maintain self-respect. Making a falsification that aims to
protect one’s self-respect does not, Wood therefore argues, violate the intent of duties to
oneself (even though, Wood also notes, making falsifications prima facie violates what
Kant explicitly says about why we should not lie in regard to the obligation to treat
ourselves as ends).114
Presuming Wood is correct, his analysis of Kant’s views on lying shows that even
for Kant honesty is not absolute; false statements can be permitted under certain
conditions. Alan Strudler makes similar points in his recent analysis of the relationship
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between deception, manipulation, and trust. For Strudler, there are times when making
false or deceptive statements can be considered moral.
Strudler argues for two basic kinds of deception: deception that does and does not
result in breeches of trust. In making this argument, he carefully shows that all that is
needed to deceive or manipulate someone is for the deceiver to establish credibility that
the persons being deceived then appeal to in their decision to believe the deceiver. There
is no necessary connection between creditability and trust; we can distrust persons and
still believe the information they tell us is credible because they either have external
evidence to substantiate their claims, or we rationalize that if they are lying to us they
will suffer negative consequences.115 Deception that results in breeches of trust occurs
when the deceiver solicits the trust of the person(s) being deceived and uses that trust to
manipulate them. This is because, Strudler further argues, soliciting one’s trust conveys,
[T]hat you can rely on my goodwill, that is, my intention to act for your
sake and not simply for my advantage. I manipulate you, because in ways
that I willfully hide from you, I cause you to have a false belief about
whether I have goodwill toward you, and then exploit that belief in order
to get you to behave as I wish.116
For Strudler, simple deception – i.e., deception not resulting in breeches of trust –
can be morally permissible if the person being deceived has no discernable right to the
information he or she is being deceived about. What determines if deception in such
cases is morally permissible is whether or not it is a matter of self-defense, that is, when
the deception is the only means to prevent an otherwise unavoidable harm to the
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deceiver. Strudler illustrates this point using a standard negotiation process in which
being fully honest would undermine the deceiver’s ability to remain competitive in the
negotiation, thereby compromising the underlying fairness of the process and constituting
an economic harm for the deceiver. However Strudler also notes that if the perceived
harm is avoidable, the self-defense argument does not hold.117 The self-defense argument
also would not work in cases of deception involving breeches of trust. I could not, for
example, solicit your trust with the intent of manipulating you while also maintaining that
the deception is necessary to prevent a perceived harm to myself (on Strudler’s account
this would amount to engaging in an avoidable preemptive attack rather than unavoidable
self-defense).
Strudler then argues deception that involves breeches of trust is always wrong
when used for any kind of economic gain. This is because of how a solicitation of trust
invites persons to rely on the truth of the information they receive. There is, however, an
exception to this in which deception that involves a breech of trust can be morally
permissible. Deception that involves a breech of trust can be moral if and only if it is used
against a substantial wrong.118 However while it is possible for cases like this to occur in
a medical setting, this particular exception to honesty in which breeches of trust are
morally justified to prevent some other moral wrong is not presumably applicable to
establishing honesty as an ethical limit of health care markets.
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From both the arguments of Wood and Strudler, it is reasonable to conclude that
we should amend our initial assumption about honesty. Originally I claimed that honesty
involves telling the truth while avoiding intentional lying, deception, or promise
breaking. This is still true for most kinds of communication between persons. However,
there are times when it is necessary, or at least when it is permissible, for us not to be
fully honest. We do not have to be fully honest when persons’ rights are not violated, or
when telling the truth would leave us susceptible to some sort of unavoidable harm. This
is an important qualification that will become more apparent particularly in the next
section regarding honesty in health care relationships. As I argue next, patients have a
legitimate expectation they will be told the truth about information pertinent to their
medical care, but not to information that is irrelevant to their care.
B. Honesty in Health Care Relationships
One reason that we should consider honesty an ethical limit of health care markets
nnnmnnm ,,jj,,j,ujpatients. O’Neill, for example, discusses how honesty is necessary for
establishing trustworthiness in health care relationships, while the lack of honesty (which
she

also

discusses

primarily

in

terms

of

deception)

creates

an

aura

of

untrustworthiness.119 Beauchamp and Childress also view honesty as an important aspect
of health care relationships. While they do not consider honesty to be one of the four
main principles of biomedical ethics, they treat it as an essential rule for professionalpatient relationships to act in accord with those moral principles.120 For them honesty
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within health care, “refers to comprehensive, accurate, and objective transmission of
information, as well as to the way the professional fosters the patient’s or subject’s
understanding.”121 Furthermore, the arguments they give in support of honesty as a
principle of health care relationships mirror the arguments I noted in the previous section
for why we should be honest. Specifically, they argue,
[O]bligations of veracity are based on respect owed to others. Even if
consent is not at issue, the obligation to respect others’ autonomy supports
obligations of veracity in many contexts. Second, obligations of veracity
are connected to obligations of fidelity, promise-keeping, and contract.
When we communicate with others, we implicitly promise that we will
speak truthfully and that we will not deceive listeners . . . Third,
relationships between health professionals and patients and subjects
depends on trust, and adherence to rules of veracity is essential to foster
trust.122
These two views of honesty help us gain a better idea of its importance within
health care relationships. Honesty is necessary for health care professionals and patients
to establish and maintain fiduciary relationships with one another. However, even if we
were to reject the idea health care relationships require trust between health care
professionals and patients we can still claim that because of the nature of their
relationship they should, at the very least, be truthful with one another as a matter of
mutual respect. Yet even though honesty plays an essential role in health care
relationships, there is still an open question about what kinds of information health care
professionals and patients should be honest about and to what degree?
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When patients and health care professionals enter into a relationship with one
another it is usually because patients have a medical need they want health care
professionals to help treat. Generally the reason for this is that health care professionals
have medical knowledge and training the patient presumably does not. By entering into
this relationship patients therefore rely on health care professionals to use their medical
expertise in caring for the patient(s). Because of the nature of the relationship between
health care professionals and patients, in which the health care professional is charged
with caring for the well being of the patient and the patient relies on the medical expertise
of the health care professional, they owe it to each other to provide truthful disclosures
regarding medical information about the patient’s treatment. Furthermore, when patients
receive treatment from medical professionals, this does not typically occur via a standard
negotiation process: physicians do not try to discern what patients are willing to pay for
treatment and then offer their services based on that amount, and patients do not try to
find what medical goods or services physicians are willing to offer for a particular price
and then try use that knowledge to try to gain a certain level of medical care. So it is not
the case that health care professionals and patients could morally deceive one another
about medical information relevant to patient care on the basis of either Wood’s
interpretation of when Kant believes making false statements is permissible under duties
or right, or Strudler’s notion of simple deception that is permissible with regard to selfdefense. However, even though patients and health care professionals should be honest
with each other about information relevant to the patients’ care, and are not permitted to
deceive one another about this information, this does not mean that patients and health
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care professionals are therefore morally obligated to be honest and not deceive each other
about all informational disclosures.
Nothing about the relationship between health care professionals and patients
implies that either one is entitled to honest disclosures about information that is irrelevant
to patient treatment. Although what specifically qualifies as relevant versus irrelevant
information regarding patient treatment is context dependent – needing to account for
patients’ medical needs, what the standard treatments are for addressing those needs, and
the availability of those treatments – Beauchamp and Childress give us an idea of the
general sorts of information relevant to patient treatment. For them, relevant information
is information about a patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, and available treatment options.123
Reasonably, then, we can imagine that irrelevant information is information that does not
knowingly impact the quality of patient care, such as personal information unrelated to
the patients’ underlying medical condition or treatment options. Since disclosures of
irrelevant information fall outside the range health care relationships, there is no reason to
think that patients or health care professionals have a right to know that information, and
so it would be permissible for them not to be fully honest about information that is
irrelevant to the medical care of the patient.
Admittedly, there are still tough cases regarding honesty in health care
relationships that may eventually need to be settled. However I am unsure at this point
what effect these cases might have on honesty as an ethical limit of health care markets.
For instance, nothing here accounts for the role of families in health care relationships.
Yet they are often an important aspect of patient treatment. Are they “owed” anything
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regarding honest disclosures by either health care professionals or patients? We may be
tempted to say ‘yes,’ but if so, are there differences in degree, that is, are there things we
expect health care professionals and patients to be fully honest about with each other, but
perhaps less honest about, maybe even slightly deceptive, with families? There seems to
be at least one case in this concern might occur. Imagine a person who has been
noticeably ill. After completing several medical tests, a physician tells the person that he
or she has an inoperable and untreatable illness. Soon after receiving this information,
one of the person’s family members ask what the doctors think is wrong. Surely the
person could tell the family member he or she has an inoperable and untreatable illness;
we might even wish to argue the person is morally obligated to tell the family the truth
based on the account of honesty I have given here. Yet, I can also image the person
wanting to deflect the family member’s question or simply lie about the seriousness of
the illness. Here an appeal to the family member’s right to know the truth as someone
vested in the care of the sick person might not suffice since this seems to conflict with the
sick person’s right to privacy. This case might even be further complicated if we know
the family is paying for the person’s medical care, since they presumably have a right to
know the truth about what they are paying. However debating about the degree to which
honesty should occur within health care relationships does not usurp my argument
honesty helps buttress successful health care relationships and that honesty should thusly
be considered an ethical limit of health care markets.
Here we have seen how honesty is an important aspect of health care
relationships. Yet I have also tried to show that, while health care professionals and
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patients should be honest with one another about medically relevant information and
should not deceive each other about that information, they are not required to be honest
about all kinds of information disclosures – particularly regarding information that is
medically irrelevant. As I argue next, we should also consider honesty an ethical limit of
health care markets based on it role within business.
C. Honesty in Business
As I noted at the beginning of my analysis on honesty, Schering-Plough’s use of
conflicting test data to advertise Claritin helped the drug become the most profitable
antihistamines on the market. This and other similar examples in which intentional acts of
lying or deception are used to maximize profits seem to debunk my attempt to show how
honesty is a governing principle of ideal market transactions and why honesty should
therefore be an ethical limit of health care markets. The idea that business ought to
primarily be concerned with maximizing profits is perhaps best epitomized in the
writings of economist Milton Friedman. According to Friedman, the only [social]
responsibility of a business is to use its resources to maximize profits so long as the
business acts “within the rules of the game.”124 This seems to imply that if the overall
culture of business accepts violating ethical principles for the sake of maximizing profits,
then such acts are permissible.
However there are good reasons to reject the idea that honesty, and ethical
principles in general, fall outside the realm of business. First, while Friedman claims
businesses must operate “within the rules of the game,” he further stipulates that this
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means business must engage, “in open and free competition, without deception or
fraud”125 So even if Friedman is correct that the only obligation of business is to
maximize profits, there is an understanding that this obligation still requires adhering to
the principle of honesty because it is via this principle that those engaged in market
transactions are able to consistently trust one another. This point is similar to that of
Donaldson and Dunfee who, in laying the foundations of Integrative Social Contracts
Theory, state that,
Rational contractors will understand that successful economic
communities and systems require a foundation of ethical behavior. At a
minimum, business done efficiently often requires a certain level of
trustworthiness… in order for capital markets to operate efficiently, many
transactions must be done on the basis of oral promises buttressed by
fundamental honesty.126
Note that Donaldson and Dunfee claim the minimum standard for successful economies
is trust established through honesty.
Yet, like with honesty in health care relationships, we do not need to accept the
link between trust and honesty to argue for why there should be honesty within business.
Bowie, for example, argues that there should be honesty in business based on Kant’s
notion of treating others as ends and never merely as means. Bowie considers trust an
essential for business relationships if a business is to achieve its various ends.127 Still,
Bowie argues, businesses should be honest with each other not simply to develop trust,
but also because this what is morally required of businesses to show respect for the
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dignity of their stakeholders, namely their employees.128 This point about showing
respect for stakeholders segues into my next reason for why we ought to reject the idea
that business operates outside the realm of ethics, a reason that applies not just to
honesty, but ethical principles in general.
In his recent work on Stakeholder theory, Freeman describes how the Dominate
model of business – in which business is a hierarchy that works toward creating as much
monetary value as possible for shareholders – is ethically problematic because of how it
appears to authorize any action that benefits shareholders whether that action is ethical or
not. The Dominate model, Freeman argues, relies on the Separation fallacy that claims
business decisions have no ethical content while ethical considerations are inapplicable to
business. After giving several open ended questions that illustrate how business decisions
are tied to ethical considerations, Freeman then argues that a better business model is one
that centers on the Integration thesis, which is the idea that most business decisions
involve some ethical considerations, and that most ethical considerations are applicable to
business in some way (this is consistent with my view that other ethical principles could
also possibly limit health care markets).129 Ultimately Freeman’s point is that because a
business relies on multiple individuals and groups that affect and can be affected by the
business (i.e. stakeholders), the ability and the right of a business to create monetary
value is not something that can occur in ignorance or isolation of ethical principles or
guidelines.
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Stakeholder theory, and particularly Freeman’s point about business decisions
being integrally tied to ethical considerations, represents a shift in thinking about ethics
and business that has not traditionally existed. When discussing the principle of honesty
with respect to health care, I argued that honesty is considered a necessary component for
fostering fiduciary health care relationships. Traditionally, though, the reason for honesty
in business has not been to establish or maintain fiduciary relationships in market
transactions, but to try to overcome the essence of distrust that often exists between
market transactors to help sustain efficient, successful economies. That is, honesty in
business has primarily been used as a practical and convenient tool to conduct successful
market transactions, and not as a normative basis for how people and businesses ought to
interact with one another. Yet assuming the ethical justifications for Stakeholder theory
show how this shift in thinking about the relationship between ethics and business is bona
fide130, honesty in business should not be seen as merely serving a practical or utilitarian
function, but also as a guiding principle for ideal market transactions.
There is, however, an apparent problem with tying the principle of honesty to
business. On one hand I am arguing that honesty, although not to any specified degree, is
a necessary component of business. On the other hand we have seen in the example of
Schering-Plough and Claritin how acting dishonestly in business can be very profitable.
Furthermore, Schering-Plough has yet to be held accountable for their deceptive
marketing of Claritin.
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Donaldson and Dunfee offer one reply to this problem. Accord to them, those
who fail to be honest and trustworthy will, over time, likely be identified, exposed, and
with respect to market transactions, “thus lose out on attractive opportunities.”131 Despite
that this reply makes those who engage in dishonest business practices appear naïve to
the wrongness of their actions, examples such as Enron executives being charged with
fraud and the company filing for bankruptcy, Martha Stewart being accused and found
guilty of insider trading and, most recently, Bernard Madoff pleading guilty to and
receiving a 150-year prison sentence for orchestrating an elaborate, multi-billion dollar
Ponzi scheme all illustrate Donaldson’s and Dunfee’s point. So the problem seemingly
becomes less paradoxical if we recognize and accept the idea that dishonesty in business
could end up costing companies like Schering-Plough billions of dollars – much in the
same way that in December, 2004, after minimizing potential cardiovascular risks in its
marketing of Vioxx (an anti-arthritis, Cox-2 inhibitor drug), Merck lost $33 billion (33%
of the company’s total market capitalization) and had a 60% drop in the value of its
shares following its recall of Vioxx for increasing the incidence of heart attack in those
taking the drug.132
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Still, it is unlikely that any reply can sufficiently resolve this problem in its
entirety. This is because there is no way to guarantee that deceptive or fraudulent
business practices will ever be exposed or punished in a way that is either significant or
will dissuade those who are willing to commit such acts.133 Yet while we may not be able
to fully resolve this paradoxical problem, how we culturally respond to dishonesty in
business by publicly vilifying such acts, by trying to protect whistle-blowers who expose
corporate dishonesty from unfair retaliation, and by creating and enforcing laws or
regulations against dishonest business practices shows that, even though dishonesty
occurs in business and acting dishonestly can be quite profitable, culturally we continue
repudiate dishonesty in business as unethical.
D. Honesty as an Ethical Limit of Health Care Markets
We can now begin to tease out what it means for honesty to be an ethical limit of
health care markets. Based on the foregoing arguments for why we should be honest, the
limits of honesty, and for how honesty is an essential feature of both health care and
business relationships, honesty should be regarded as an ethical limit on actors in health
care markets in at least two ways. First, honesty should be an ethical limit of health care
markets with respect to either establishing and maintaining fiduciary health care
relationships between health care professionals and patients or, at the least, being able to
provide honest disclosures about medically relevant information necessary to provide
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patients appropriate care in treating their medical needs. Second, honesty should be
considered an ethical limit of health care markets because it is a necessary component for
establishing efficient and effective markets in commodified health care goods or services.
From the arguments I made in this section, it appears that for health care markets to
operate within this limit there must be an expectation (likely backed by enforceable
guidelines) for all participants to provide honest disclosures about pertinent medical
information that could impact the care provided to patients, or could have a potential
negative effect on the ability of those markets to efficaciously or efficiently provide
health care goods or services to patients. Concomitantly, health care markets can be
thought of as violating this limit if participants are pervasively permitted to engage in
intentionally dishonest or deceptive behavior regarding medically relevant information
that is either not meant to serve patients’ best interests or could potentially cause harm to
patients by providing them with inappropriate or unnecessary health care goods or
services – either because those markets have no regulations against intentionally
dishonest or deceptive behavior, or that regulations within those markets against such
behavior are, for whatever reason, un-enforced.
2. Respect for Autonomy134
Like with the principle of honesty, arguing for why the principle of respect for
autonomy should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets first requires
giving an account of autonomy as a framework. There are two accounts of autonomy that
I provide here. The first is Dworkin’s in Theory and Practice of Autonomy. I provide
134

Parts of this section, namely Dworkin’s account of autonomy, derive primarily from my work on
autonomy with respect mandatory organ conscription. See; Harter, “Overcoming the Organ Shortage:
Failing Means and Radical Reform,” 157-158.

101

Dworkin’s account of autonomy because it is widely used in ethical debates regarding the
ability and right of individuals to govern their actions. Taylor, for example, uses
Dworkin’s account of autonomy to justify his arguments for a legal organ market – which
I reference throughout chapter 5. However, because of their criticism against Dworkin’s
view, as well as how they apply their view to health care relationships, the account of
autonomy I use when defending respect for autonomy as an ethical limit of health care
markets is that of Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
In philosophical and moral discussions, the concept of autonomy generally
denotes a type of self-governing or –rule free from authoritative influences. However,
Dworkin argues that there is a problem with understanding and using the concept of
autonomy in this way. For Dworkin, understanding autonomy only as a type of selfgoverning or –rule free from authoritative influences tends to wrongly depict autonomy
as being equivalent to the concept of liberty, while at the same time failing to clarify that
autonomy seemingly requires more than just acting in accord with one’s wishes or
desires.135
Dworkin argues that for individuals to be autonomous, they must be able to
develop and act upon preferences for how they want to identify themselves in relation to
their wishes or desires. This means that in addition to being free of another’s control,
acting autonomously requires, “a second-order capacity to reflect critically upon one’s
first-order preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify with these or to
change them in light of higher-order preferences and values.”136 In other words, acting
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autonomously is not just the ability for individuals to freely choose the things they want
and desire (i.e. first-order preferences), but to also freely choose how they identify with
those wants and desires (i.e. second-order preferences).137 Moreover, Dworkin is clear
that limiting choices is still compatible with an individual’s ability to exercise his or her
autonomy.138
Beauchamp and Childress give a two-headed critique of this view. First, they
argue that simply identifying and acting in accord with a second-order preference does
not necessarily make the act autonomous.139 This is because there is no clear
understanding for how second-order preferences are unique from first-order preferences –
that is, this account of autonomy does not clarify how second-order preferences either
develop independently of, or are not influenced by, the same sorts of things that affect
our first-order preferences such as one’s addictions, beliefs, or values. As Beauchamp
and Childress further explain, “If second-order desires (decisions, violations, etc.) are
generated by prior desires or commitments, then the process of identifying with one
desire rather than another does not distinguish autonomy from nonautonomy. The
second-order desires would not significantly differ from first-order desires.”140
Second, Beauchamp and Childress argue that this account of autonomy is too
idealistic to be practical because it takes reflective deliberation as the benchmark by
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which our choices are autonomous or not. In this regard, the problem Beauchamp and
Childress see is that this account of autonomy needs, but does not have,
[A] way for ordinary persons to qualify as deserving respect for their
autonomy even when they have not reflected on their preferences at a
higher level. Few choosers and few choices would be autonomous if held
to the standards of higher order reflection in this theory, which presents an
aspirational ideal of autonomy . . . No theory of autonomy is acceptable if
it presents an ideal beyond the reach of normal agents and choosers.141
As an alternative to this view, Beauchamp and Childress provide an account of
autonomy that focuses on the nonideal conditions that, as we shall see, fit with they
consider are the moral requirements of “respect for autonomy.” According to Beauchamp
and Childress, individuals are autonomous if they: 1) act intentionally, 2) act of their own
free accord, and 3) act with understanding (which they claim is having pertinent
information that allows individuals to form relevant beliefs about the nature and
consequences of their choices142).143 They note that while the first condition is not a
matter of degree (acts are either intentional or not), to act with understanding and without
undue constraints are matters of degree. Consequently, it is not only possible that
individuals may be more or less autonomous at different times, but also that at any one
time, a particular choice could be more or less autonomous than another depending on
one’s understanding and the influence others have on that choice.
Beauchamp and Childress then argue that for an action to be autonomous on this
account, “it needs only a substantial degree of understanding and freedom from

141

Ibid.
Ibid., 127.
143
Ibid., 101
142

104

constraint, not a full understanding or a complete absence of influence.”144 This is
because to require a complete understanding or total freedom from influence would set
the bar so high for acting autonomously that no person could reasonably or practically
meet it. To assert that individuals could even have complete understanding or total
freedom from influence is, Beauchamp and Childress claim, a mythical ideal.145
This understanding of autonomy makes the concept appear somewhat arbitrary
because it places the ability to act autonomously on a continuously sliding scale that
involves varying degrees of understanding and influence. Beauchamp and Childress
acknowledge this. However, they further contend that even though the ability act
autonomously depends on one’s understanding and freedom from undue constraint, it is
possible to have standards that help determine the degree to which a choice or action is
autonomous. As they claim, “thresholds marking substantially autonomous decisions can
be carefully fixed in light of specific objectives such as meaningful decision making . . .
The appropriate criteria for substantial autonomy are best addressed in a particular
context.”146
Next I show how respect for autonomy is a guiding principle of both the
interactions between health care professionals and patients and of market transactions,
and argue for why, therefore, is should be considered an ethical limit of health care
markets.
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A. Respect for Autonomy as a Principle of Health Care Relationships
Within health care, respect for autonomy has been increasingly emphasized over
approximately the last fifty years. Traditionally, health care relationships have been
characterized in terms of medical paternalism – that is, patients being given little or no
opportunity to provide input regarding their treatment and overall medical care, while
trusting health care professionals to know and act in patients’ best interests. Now,
however, the nature of health care relationships have shifted to allow patients more
freedom to choose medical practices and treatments that better accord with their values
and lifestyles.147 For example, patients can now refuse what are otherwise considered
standard medical treatments, such as a Jehovah’s Witness refusing non-artificial blood
products because he or she believes using these products violates important religious
doctrines of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.
From this it appears as though respect for autonomy in health care relationships is
really a principle of noninterference toward patients’ treatment decisions. While
noninterference regarding (many) patient choices is certainly an aspect of showing proper
respect for autonomy, understanding respect for autonomy as a principle of health care
relationships requires more than just noninterference. Respect for autonomy as a principle
of health care relationships also involves acting in ways to empower persons to make
choices that best accord with their values and lifestyles. As Beauchamp and Childress
note, respect for autonomy includes,
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building up or maintaining others’ capacities for autonomous choice while
helping to ally fears and other conditions that destroy or disrupt
autonomous action. Respect, in this account, involves acknowledging the
value and decision-making rights of persons and enabling them to act
autonomously, whereas disrespect for autonomy involves attitudes and
actions that ignore, insult, demean, or are inattentive to others’ rights of
autonomous action.148
Often discussions of respect for autonomy in health care relationships focus on
patient autonomy. This is likely because patients’ needs leave them particularly
vulnerable to having their autonomy usurped throughout the course of treatment, as they
are the ones who, in most cases, must rely on health care professionals to help them make
treatment decisions that best accord with their values and lifestyles. But what Beauchamp
and Childress are implying here is that the principle of respect for autonomy requires
mutual respect in both attitude and action for the meaningful contributions of both
patients and health care professionals in the treatment decision-making process. It would
be contradictory to this principle if either party in a health care relationship was unduly
pressured by the other to provide or accept treatment decisions that did not accord with
their values or lifestyles; although in order to meet this principle it may still be necessary
in certain cases for health care professionals to at least inform patients of various
treatment options, even if they are unwilling to directly provide them. Regarding this
latter point, for example, obstetricians opposed to abortion have the right not to provide
them in non-emergency situations, but are also required as a matter of respect for
autonomy not to impede the right of patients to get accurate information about the
procedure or take steps to prevent patients from having the procedure done elsewhere.
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Furthermore, like with the principle of honesty in health care relationships, the
principle of respect for autonomy is not absolute. As Beauchamp and Childress also note,
“Respect for autonomy has only prima facie standing, and competing moral
considerations sometimes can override this principle.”149 For example, basic tenets of the
medical profession would disallow health care professionals from honoring a patient’s
request to sell his or her heart to a transplant patient, even if the request appears
autonomous. However, clarifying which moral considerations could override this
principle, and whether or not such moral considerations should be permitted to override
this principle in all instances are concerns beyond the scope of this particular project.
B. Respect for Autonomy in Business
In business, respect for autonomy is the core of economic life. As both Freeman
and Donaldson and Dunfee discuss, respect for autonomy is necessary for individuals to
freely enter into, fulfill, and exit from contracts with one another.150 Yet, while it is
generally recognized that there should be respect for autonomy in most aspects of
business, there is a debate over whether or not the commonly accepted practice of directto-consumer advertising violates respect for autonomy.
Direct-to-consumer advertising tells consumers of different products on the
market. On one hand, this form of advertising could therefore be autonomy enhancing by
possibly helping consumers become more aware of the set of product choices available to
them. At the very least, direct-to-consumer advertising does not violate autonomy per se
149
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because it cannot force individuals to purchase products against their wills. However
many direct-to-consumer advertisements either fail to clearly present product information
or use misinformation in ways that potentially create misunderstanding for consumers
about the advertised products. So on the other hand, much direct-to-consumer advertising
seems to hinder autonomous action by frustrating the ability of consumers to make
informed product choices.
With respect to health care, this debate is most frequently associated with the
direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs. While this is an issue I
thoroughly address in the next chapter, we already see with the example of Claritin how
direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs can deceive patients into
believing they are better informed about a drug than they really are. As I argue in the next
chapter, direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs actually weakens patient
autonomy in ways that violate this principle.
C. Respect for Autonomy as an Ethical Limit of Health Care Markets
From what I have shown here about how respect for autonomy applies to both
health care relationships and business, there are at least two ways that this principle
should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets. First, respect for autonomy
should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets in that persons must have
access to whatever information they need in order to make autonomous choices regarding
the sale or purchase of health care goods or services. In the sense that Beauchamp and
Childress discuss respect for autonomy, this requirement can be thought of as including
an obligation for health care professionals or institutions (such as hospitals or insurance
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companies) not only to provide to the best of their abilities the information patients need
to properly exercise their autonomy, but to also provide means to help patients
understand that information (even if those health care professionals or institutions are
unwilling or unable to directly provide the goods or services patients may want). This
obligation on the part of health care professionals or institutions is perhaps especially
strong when health care relationships are contrived due to things like insurance or health
care policy restrictions – restrictions that in some ways pose barriers to respect for
autonomy in health care relationships because the relationships that result from such
restrictions may not have a solid enough foundation of communication or trust to
generate the kind of understanding expected for patients to autonomously engage in the
treatment-decision making process.
Second, respect for autonomy should be considered an ethical limit of health care
markets in that persons must be free of undue influence to make autonomous choices
regarding the sale or purchase of health care goods or services. This does not mean,
though, that making autonomous choices regarding the sale or purchase of health care
goods or services requires total freedom from influence. Not only is it impractical to try
to maintain that autonomous health care or market-based choices can be free from
influence, but, particularly with respect to health care markets, there could also be times
when not trying to influence patients’ choices seemingly contradicts the principle of
respect for autonomy. For example, many patients rely on the advice of health care
professionals about certain health care goods or services to make better-informed choices.
Respect for autonomy also seems to require influencing patients’ health care choices
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when they have not fully considered the consequences of those choice(s), such as, for
example, if insured patients are unaware that the health care goods or services they want
are not covered by their insurance – in such cases, appropriately expressing respect for
autonomy would, at the very least, involve informing patients of what goods and services
could meet their needs that are also covered by their insurance. The difference between
when influence adheres to the principle of respect for autonomy and when influence
violates this principle is that the former attempts to enable persons to make better
informed decisions, while the latter constrains or pressures persons in ways that
intentionally prevent or hinder their abilities to make autonomous decisions.
These two ways for how respect for autonomy shold be considered an ethical
limit of health care markets also indicate at least two ways that health care markets could
violate this limit. First, health care markets could violate this limit by not having
provisions to provide participants the information they need to make well-informed
treatment decisions. Second, health care markets could violate this limit by failing to
have regulations that aim to prevent participants from making decisions about the sale or
purchase of health care goods or services that result from undue constraint or influence.
3. Conclusion
Properly valuing health care goods and services requires properly valuing the
primary relationships by which they are acquired. This is why ethically treating health
care goods and services as commodities cannot rest just upon the principle of increased
access. Throughout this chapter I have argued that ethically treating health care goods
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and services as commodities also requires limiting health care markets according to at
least the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.
Over the next two chapters I apply my argument for the ethical limits of health
care markets to both the pharmaceutical industry and a hypothetical legal organ market in
the United States. The general reason why I focus on these two markets is because of the
public and academic interest both have recently garnered: the pharmaceutical industry
because of its high profitability and the ethically contentious ways it generates those
profits; a potential legal organ market because it represents an alternative means of organ
procurement that could help lessen the growing gap between the numbers of needed
transplant organs and organ donors, and because organ selling is currently illegal in the
United States. As we shall see next, the current modus operandi of the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States violates each of the ethical limits of health care markets for
which I have argued.
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Chapter Four: Analyzing the Ethical Limits of the Pharmaceutical
Industry
This chapter applies my argument for ethically treating health care goods and
services as commodities to the pharmaceutical industry in the United States. I focus on
the pharmaceutical industry for two primary reasons. First, as Callahan and Wasunna
note, the pharmaceutical industry plays a crucial role in health care and so warrants
serious moral and ethical scrutiny.151 Second, unlike most other industrialized nations, the
United States government takes a laissez-faire approach to drug pricing. One result of this
is that approximately half of the industry’s global sales of pharmaceutical drugs come
from the United States alone.152
My aim in this chapter is to analyze five industry practices according to what I
argue should be considered the base ethical limits of health care markets. In my analysis I
show how each practice violates one or more of these limits. With respect to how
pharmaceutical companies interact with physicians, I analyze: the use of pharmaceutical
representatives to promote “medical education,” the use of industry-sponsored research to
market to physicians, and gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians. Next
I analyze the practice of direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs. Lastly, I
analyze the industry pricing of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States. I conclude by
providing several suggestions for how the pharmaceutical industry can reform itself in
order to ethically treat pharmaceutical drugs as commodities.
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1. Analyzing the Industry’s Interaction with Physicians
Physicians play a key role in prescription drug sales. Convince them that a
prescription drug is valuable to patients, and they are more likely to prescribe that drug.
Fail to convince them that a prescription drug is valuable to patients, and a
pharmaceutical company may not only lose out on profits from lost prescription drug
sales, but also runs the risk of a physician prescribing a competitor’s drug.
Pharmaceutical companies know this, and do what they can to convince physicians to
prescribe their drugs over those of their competitors.
It is not inherently unethical for pharmaceutical companies to try and convince
physicians that their drugs are better than those of their competitors. For example, if there
is supporting data that shows how a particular prescription drug is more effective at
treating a certain condition than another drug, and the pharmaceutical company attempts
to present this data in a clear, unbiased way, then it is difficult to see how this type of
action is unethical. Assuming that a particular prescription drug is more effective at
treating a certain condition than another drug, than it may actually be unethical not to try
to convince physicians that this drug should be the one they prescribe to patients. What
makes the interactions between pharmaceutical companies and physicians ethically
problematic, though, is not that pharmaceutical companies try to convince physicians
their drugs are better than their competitors, but how pharmaceutical companies attempt
to influence the prescribing practices of physicians.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America (PhRMA), who
represent the leading pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies in the United
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States, claim that a critical part of their mission is having ethical relationships with
healthcare professionals.153 However, the primary practices used by pharmaceutical
companies when interacting with physicians do not appear to exemplify attempts at
having ethical relationships with them. These practices are: A) using pharmaceutical
representatives to promote “medical education,” B) the use of industry-sponsored
research to market to physicians, and C) gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to
physicians. In what follows, I first provide and description of each practice, then after
each description I address how that practice violates the principles of honesty and respect
for autonomy.
A. Pharmaceutical Representatives and “medical education”
As Brody discusses in Hooked, drug wholesalers began employing drug salesmen
as early as the 1850s. Between 1900 and 1945, the role of drug salesmen expanded to
include “detailing” – drug salesmen were no longer expected just to pitch the drugs they
were selling, but to also provide all the details of a medication for physicians who wrote
prescriptions instead of directly making drug purchases. Then in the years between 1945
and 1955, there were three events that resulted in the special role that pharmaceutical
representatives now play within health care: “[1] The explosion in new drugs. [2] The
failure of medical education to address the drug explosion. [3] The retreat of the
[American Medical Association] from objective drug assessment.”154 These events,
153
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Brody shows, established the platform for using pharmaceutical representatives to market
prescription drugs to physicians in terms of “medical education.”155
The problem with characterizing drug presentations by pharmaceutical
representatives as “medical education” is that they are not. The term “education”
typically denotes a form of systematic instruction that many believe should be unbiased
and objective. However, pharmaceutical representatives often give presentations that are
mixed with varying degrees of fact and bias, and that are one-sided in favor of the drug
being pitched.156 As Carl Elliott discusses, the distinction between pharmaceutical
medical education and pharmaceutical public relations is now so slender that
pharmaceutical representatives even have trouble distinguishing between the two. Citing
Neil Kendle, chief executive officer of Lowe Fusion Healthcare, Elliott writes, “[T]he
broad distinction between healthcare PR and medical education is becoming obsolete . . .
Sometimes I describe Lowe Fusion as a ‘PR consultancy’, sometimes as a ‘healthcare
communications agency’, sometimes I just cop out and list the things we do.”157
Evidence suggests a pervasive use of pharmaceutical representatives providing
drug presentations to physicians. As Blumenthal notes, in 2001, the number of
pharmaceutical representative employed by the industry topped 90,000 in the United
States – approximately 1 representative for every 5 office-based physicians.158 Moreover,
according to a 1995 survey conducted by the Department of Medicine at the University of
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California at San Diego School of Medicine, from 106 drug statements made during 13
presentations by pharmaceutical representatives to physicians, only 12 (11%) were
inaccurate or false. Yet all 12 statements favored the drugs being pitched, while no
statement made during the presentations favored competitors drugs. What is perhaps also
troubling about these findings is that of the 27 physicians who attended these
presentations, only 7 of them (26%) recognized the false statements, while 10 of the
physicians (37%) said the information provided influenced their prescribing practices.159
However, given that latter survey is relatively small, and the lack of results regarding
what sort of relevance these misleading statements had on the physicians’ prescribing
practices, it is difficult to draw any solid conclusions about the overall effects of drug
presentations to physicians.
a. How Pharmaceutical Drug Presentations Violate the Principle of Honesty
As I discuss in chapter 3, the principle of honesty is violated when health care
markets permit market participants to engage in dishonest or deceptive behavior not
intended to serve patients’ best interests, or that could potentially harm patients. This
practice of using pharmaceutical representatives to give drug presentations under the
guise of “medical education” seemingly fails to be forthright and truthful because they
include some inaccurate or false information. However, giving drug presentations that
include some inaccurate or false information does not necessarily mean that this practice
violates the principle of honesty. It may be possible that the inaccurate or false
information is somehow derived accidentally in a way that neither a pharmaceutical
company nor a representative recognizes as inaccurate or false. If this is the case, then
159
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even though pharmaceutical representatives are presenting some bad information to
physicians, this practice may not violate the principle of honesty because neither a
pharmaceutical company nor a representative could be charged with intentionally trying
to deceive physicians in a way that would be unethical regarding the patient-physician
relationship. Yet, as Elliott tells us, pharmaceutical representatives understanding that the
goal of drug presentations is to generate good public relations as much as it is to
“educate” physicians. So there is good reason to think that, because drug presentations
are intentionally slanted, the possibility of deriving some bad drug information by
accident is likely false.
This leads us to two possible conclusions regarding how this practice relates to
the principle of honesty. First, at the least, this practice may violate the principle of
honesty because some of the drug information may accidentally be inaccurate or false,
while still being presented with the intent of favoring the drug being pitched. Second, at
the worst, this practice explicitly violates the principle of honesty because the
presentations use inaccurate or false information to bias physicians prescribing practices
in ways not necessarily intended to serve patients’ best interests and that could
potentially harm patients.
b. How Pharmaceutical Drug Presentations Violate Respect for Autonomy
In chapter 3 I argue that respect for autonomy as an ethical limit of health care
markets requires providing patients with information that helps them make treatment
choices that best accord with their values and lifestyles. I also note how respect for
autonomy is violated when a lack of information hinders the ability of patients to exercise
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their autonomy in the treatment decision-making process. When pharmaceutical
companies have representatives give drug presentations to physicians that include some
inaccurate or false information, they violate the principle of respect for autonomy by
impeding the accurate transfer of information between physicians and patients, thereby
limiting the ability of patients to work with physicians to make well-informed treatment
decisions. There are two reasons how this is the case. First, as we have already seen,
pharmaceutical representatives can influence the prescribing practices of some physicians
despite presenting them with some inaccurate or false drug information. When this
occurs, pharmaceutical representatives effectively manipulate the ability of physicians to
provide information patients may need to make well-informed treatment decisions.
Second, as Hubbard argues, patients lack the proper medical training and knowledge to
make treatment decisions on their own, and so rely on the expertise of physicians to help
them make treatment decisions that are in their best interests.160 When pharmaceutical
representatives present inaccurate or false drug information to physicians, they also
effectively constrain the ability of patients to have access to information in a way
seemingly hinders their abilities to more freely participate in the treatment decisionmaking process.
B. Industry-Sponsored Research
Pharmaceutical companies will also use industry-sponsored research to market
prescription drugs to physicians. Similar to how we typically understand the term
“education,” the term “research” denotes information that we typically assume has been
obtained and presented in an objectively unbiased way. Yet there are numerous reasons to
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question the objectivity and bias of industry-sponsored research. Brody, for example,
discusses how some industry-sponsored research papers will use the abstract, contrary to
its intended purpose as a brief summary of key research findings, to highlight only the
positives of a study while leaving out any undesirable findings. In particularly egregious
examples, some of these research papers will even use the abstract to audaciously suggest
that physicians prescribe the researched drug as their first-choice. Pharmaceutical
companies do this because they know many physicians will read just the abstract instead
of the entire study.161
Physicians, however, are getting better at recognizing the one-sidedness of
industry-sponsored research. As Brody states,
Many physicians are starting to get the message that research conducted
by drug firms may be biased in favor of the company’s drugs. Numerous
reviews have shown that the likelihood of an industry-sponsored study
showing the superiority of the drug in question is substantially greater than
in studies paid for by neutral sources.162
Brody further suggests that pharmaceutical companies therefore attempt to conceal
themselves as research sponsors by simultaneously conducting multiple drug trials at
different universities and medical institutions, and by using several intermediaries to
administer the studies.163 This works to hide which studies are funded by pharmaceutical
companies while still allowing them to control the flow of information being presented to
physicians.
Pharmaceutical companies will also attempt to influence physicians by paying
their colleagues to take part in presenting industry-sponsored research. Brody and Elliott
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give several examples in which pharmaceutical companies will pay physicians large sums
of money, anywhere from $1,500 to $300,000, to attach their names to ghostwritten
research papers, give prewritten lectures to colleagues at medical conferences that tout
the virtues of a particular drug over others, or even write textbooks about diseases for
which the sponsoring company has just created a drug treatment.164
a. How Industry-Sponsored Research Violates the Principle of Honesty
Each of these examples shows how using industry-sponsored research to market
to physicians violates the principle of honesty by being intentionally deceitful. These
examples show that pharmaceutical companies attempt to influence the prescribing
practices of physicians by either presenting only favorable research data for the drug in
question, by hiding themselves as the sources of research funding knowing that some
physicians are aware that the data may be biased, or by paying physicians to market
industry-sponsored research to other physicians in ways that seemingly violate the
collegial trust that typically exists between members of a profession. While some kinds of
deceit can be ethically permissible, this is not the case here. Attempting to manipulate
research data so that physicians favor particular prescription drugs over others is a selfserving act that could consequently prevent physicians from being able to honestly
disclose information to patients that patients presumably have a right to know given its
relevancy to their medical care. Using industry-sponsored research to market to
physicians can also be considered to violate the principle of honesty because of how
attempts to suppress unfavorable research data may otherwise cause physicians not to
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prescribe the drug in question, especially if the missing research data shows that the drug
in question is potentially harmful to patients.
One example of this is GlaxoSmithKline’s suppression of research data regarding
the use of the anti-depressant drug, Paxil, in children and adolescents. Studies on Paxil
and other similar anti-depressant drugs show how using those drugs to treat childhood
depression can have serious adverse effects on children and adolescents, including
worsening their depression, increasing their hostility and aggressiveness, and increasing
thoughts or attempts of suicide.165 The evidence from these studies is strong enough that
on June 10th, 2003, Gordon Duff, chairman of the Committee on Safety in Medicines in
Great Britain, ruled that Paxil should not be used to treat childhood depression because
cases of suicide were more frequent in patients under 18, and that on October 27th, 2003,
the United States Food and Drug Administration made a similar recommendation.166
However, as Brody notes, GlaxoSmithKline quickly published and has given
considerable publicity to a research study that apparently shows how Paxil is effective in
treating childhood depression, while doing its best to conceal the contrary data from the
medical community.167 These actions not only appear to be unethically deceptive and
fraudulent, but have also prompted legal ramifications. In June 2004, then-Attorney
General of the State of New York, Eliot Spitzer, filed legal charges of fraud against
GlaxoSmithKline for, “withholding negative information and misrepresenting data on
prescribing its antidepressant Paxil to children . . . [and that] an internal 1999 Glaxo
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document showed that the company intended to “manage the dissemination of data in
order to minimize any potential negative commercial impact.””168
b. How Industry-Sponsored Research Violates Respect for Autonomy
These examples regarding the use and promotion of industry-sponsored research
also show how this practice violates the principle of respect for autonomy. Similar to
pharmaceutical representatives giving drug presentations under the guise of “medical
education,” the current use and promotion of industry-sponsored research disrupts the
medical decision making process between patients and physicians and effectively
manipulates the ability of physicians to fully act in their patients’ best interests. This is
for two reasons. First, physicians who accept money to be voiceboxes for industrysponsored research may fail to act fully autonomously because they may feel pressured to
make treatment assessments and decisions that concur with the research findings they
have been paid to promote. Second, pharmaceutical companies that promote only
favorable research data while suppressing unfavorable research data, can be considered
an undue influence that constrains the abilities of patients and physicians from being
aware of information that might otherwise cause them to make different treatment
decisions.
C. Gift Giving
Another way pharmaceutical companies try influence the prescribing practices of
physicians is to provide them and their staffs with gifts. Standard gifts include branded
office items like pens and notepads that are inscribed with the company’s logo, free
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lunches for physicians and staffs, and drug samples. The latter is particularly convenient
for physicians and patients, as patients get to try brand name drugs that they may not
otherwise be able to afford, and without physicians having to write prescriptions that
patients must then spend extra time getting filled.
Pharmaceutical companies also give physicians what can be deemed
“entertainment gifts.” These include items such as free dinners, bottles of alcohol, cigars,
or golf outings (and perhaps for a particularly good client, a new set of golf clubs). While
$100 is typically the upper limit for a gift, the type of gift and the actual amount spent is
often times arbitrarily left to discretion of a pharmaceutical representative. As Brody
notes, so long as sales in a particular territory are good, money is not an issue.169
Gift giving is often a way of expressing one’s valued appreciation for another, and
so is not typically considered unethical. Furthermore, many medical professionals –
namely medical residents and physicians – do not consider accepting pharmaceutical gifts
to be very ethically problematic. For example a survey conducted in 2003 by Drs. Allen
Brett, Wayne Burr, and Jamaluddin Moloo of the Department of Medicine at the
University of South Carolina School of Medicine, asked 37 of 42 faculty physicians
(73%) and 39 of 42 medical residents (93%) with at least three years of training to judge
the ethical appropriateness of 18 different pharmaceutical gifts. On a scale of 0-3 – in
which 0 indicates “not problematic,” 1 is “mildly problematic,” 2 is “moderately
problematic,” and 3 is “very problematic” – no gift was rated at 2 or higher.170 Gift giving
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from pharmaceutical companies to physicians, though, does violate the principles of
honesty and respect for autonomy.
a. How Gift Giving Violates the Principle of Honesty
Initially one might try to argue that gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to
physicians violates the principle of honesty either because patients are unaware of the
practice, or because patients are unaware of the influence pharmaceutical gifts can have
on physicians’ prescribing practices. In both cases, the influence of gift giving on the
prescribing practices of physicians could be seen as undermining the essence of trust that,
as I argue in chapter 3, ought to exist between patients and physicians. There is some
justification for this argument. According to a 1994 survey conducted by Dr. Robert
Blake and Elizabeth Early of the University of Missouri at Columbia, patient awareness
of certain kinds of gifts from pharmaceutical companies to physicians is low. For
example, of the 486 participants, just 22.4% and 13.8% respectively were aware that gifts
to physicians include free dinners and coffee makers. Moreover, nearly half of the
participants did not approve of these gifts (48.4% and 40.7% respectively).171
However this argument ultimately fails for two reasons. First, the study by Blake
and Early also shows that 87% and 55.3% of participants respectively were aware that
physicians receive free drug samples and office supplies from pharmaceutical companies.
Moreover, 82.1% of participants approved of physicians receiving drug samples, while
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67.3% approved of physicians and their staffs receiving office supplies. Second, 70% of
participants in this study believe that pharmaceutical gifts to physicians sometimes or
frequently influence a physician’s prescribing practices.172 So, on one hand, it is true that
a majority of patients are unaware of the full range of gifts pharmaceutical companies
give to physicians. But, on the other hand, it is not the case that a majority of patients are
completely unaware that physicians receive gifts from pharmaceutical companies, or that
they unaware about the influence of these gifts have on physicians’ prescribing practices.
Still it is possible to show that gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to
physicians violates the principle of honesty because, in this case, it is a deceitful practice
that intends to unethically influence physicians’ prescribing practices. Part of our general
understanding of gift giving is that the gift is intended to benefit the recipient in some
way. Certainly many pharmaceutical gifts like notepads, pens, and free drug samples, can
benefit physicians, their staffs, and patients. One can even argue that gifts like free
lunches with an accompanying drug presentation, trips to a resort for a drug conference,
or paid-for golf outings with pharmaceutical representatives, professionally benefit
physicians by providing them with a relaxing break in their daily routines while still
getting drug information in the process. Yet we have good reason to believe that the
intent of pharmaceutical gifts is not necessarily to benefit physicians, their staffs, or
patients, but to solely help pharmaceutical companies boost their profits by successfully
market their products to physicians.
In 1955, a group calling itself the Pharmaceutical Advertising Club sponsored and
published a study conducted by the Institute of Motivational Research titled, A Research
172
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Study on Pharmaceutical Advertising. Also known as the “Dichter study,” after head
researcher Ernest Dichter, the study examined the influence of pharmaceutical
advertising on physicians. As Brody notes,
The Dichter study broke new ground by identifying how important the
process of rationalization was in successful pharmaceutical marketing.
The company had to treat the physician in one way yet be perceived as if
they were treating him in a very different way . . . For example, a visit
from the rep might really be a break in a busy afternoon of seeing patients,
a chance to talk with an old buddy about a hobby, or an exchange of
gossip about other physicians in town. But just enough scientific
information had to be exchanged – even a brochure that would never be
read – so that the physician could rationalize the visit as “education.”173
The Dichter study indicates why gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to
physicians is deceiving in a way that seemingly violates the principle of honesty.
Pharmaceutical gifts are primarily used as tools by the industry to get physicians to
rationalize their exposure to pharmaceutical marketing as something that personally or
professionally benefits them instead of as something that is really designed just to benefit
a company’s drug sales. The problem is that by giving these gifts, pharmaceutical
companies are inviting physicians to trust that they have the physicians’ best interests in
mind while using that trust to manipulate physicians’ prescribing practices for the sake of
economic gain (something, again, that Strudler argues is an unethical use of deception).
b. How Gift Giving Violates the Principle of Respect for Autonomy
Before examining how gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians
prima facie violates the principle of respect for autonomy, it is interesting to note another
173
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finding of the Dichter study. According to the study, physicians will attempt to portray
themselves as independent thinkers who are not influenced by pharmaceutical
marketing.174 This still seems to be the case today. In the study by Brett, Burr, and
Moloo, for example, the average response by faculty physicians about how influential
free drug samples are on their prescribing practices was 1.54, or “mildly influential.” This
again is on a scale of 0-3, in which 0 indicates “not influential,” and 3 indicates “very
influential.”175 The reason this is interesting is because it indicates how well the process
of rationalization has worked in pharmaceutical marketing. If physicians were to believe
that pharmaceutical gifts were largely influential on their prescribing practices, they may
be unwilling to accept them. But because physicians often believe that they are not and
cannot be influenced by these gifts, they willingly accept them without much ethical
concern. The problem with rationalizing pharmaceutical gifts in this way, and the reason
for why this practice violates the principle of respect for autonomy, is that gift giving is
psychologically tied to the rule for reciprocation.
According to Robert Cialdini, a psychologist at Arizona State University and
author of Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, humans are conditioned to react to
receiving gifts with a sense of obligation because of the rule for reciprocation.176 The rule
says that, “we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.”177 As
Cialdini further notes, the rule for reciprocation and the sense of obligation associated

174

Ibid., 147.
Brett, Burr, and Moloo, “Are Gifts From Pharmaceutical Companies Ethically Problematic?,” 2216.
Medical residents, however, had an average response to this question of 2.04, or “moderately
influential,” with 31 of 39 scoring this question in the 2-3 range, or “moderately” to “very” influential.
176
Cialdini, Influence, 17-18.
177
Ibid., 17.
175

128

with it is so pervasive that, “[A]fter intensive study, sociologists such as Alvin Gouldner
can report that there is no human society that does not subscribe to the rule. And within
each society it seems pervasive also; it permeates exchanges of every kind.”178 A common
explanation for why this rule is so pervasive, and why it is psychologically tied to gift
giving, is that a fundamental component of social survival for individuals and societies is
the ability to share resources in a cooperative manner. As Brody further explains, it is
important to the social system that, “the person who initiates a gift exchange can be
confident that his cooperative gesture will be replied to with a similarly cooperative
gesture.”179
The rule for reciprocation tells us that the act of receiving a gift is itself
influential, and explains why gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians
unethically violates the principle of respect for autonomy. This is because gift giving
from pharmaceutical companies to physicians creates a potential undue influence on the
ability of physicians to act on their patients’ behalf. Even if pharmaceutical gifts are not
intended to influence the prescribing practices of physicians, we can, in this case, view
the psychological response for reciprocation to receiving a gift as a manipulative force
that leaves physicians vulnerable to making biased prescription choices that may not be
the best or most appropriate way to help patients meet their medical needs.
2. Analyzing the Industry’s use of Direct-to-Consumer-Advertising
Although physicians play a key role in prescription drug sales, it is the continuous
needs and wants of patients for prescription drugs that sustain the pharmaceutical
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industry’s profits. It makes sense, then, for pharmaceutical companies to also want to
market prescription drugs directly to consumers. Often pharmaceutical direct-toconsumer advertising (DTCA) takes the form of television commercials, Internet
advertisements, printed advertisements, and general public advertisements such as
billboards and flyers.180
Pharmaceutical DTCA can be separated into two kinds: branded and non-branded.
Branded DTCA market particular pharmaceutical drugs by naming them in the
advertisement.

Non-branded

DTCA

does

not

attempt

to

market

particular

pharmaceuticals drugs and do not mention specific drugs by name.181 As Arnold notes,
distinguishing between branded and non-branded DTCA is necessary because the
arguments for and against pharmaceutical DTCA do not apply equally to both kinds.182
Branded DTCA, because it aims to market specific drugs to consumers, is typically
considered more ethically controversial than non-branded. For example, Arnold argues
that the branded DTCA is unethical, while non-branded DTCA is not. Since this chapter
addresses how the pharmaceutical industry violates the ethical limits of health care
markets in the United States, this section focuses exclusively on branded DTCA.
The pharmaceutical industry promotes the practice of DTCA as a valuable service
to consumers. In 2005, PhRMA’s Chief Medical Officer, Paul Antony, submitted a
written testimony to Congress about the industry’s use of DTCA. According to Antony’s
testimony,
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DTC advertising has been proven beneficial to American patients. And,
continuing regulatory oversight by the FDA helps ensure that the content
of DTC advertising informs and educates consumers about medical
conditions and treatment options . . . DTC advertising can be a powerful
tool in educating millions of people and improving health. Because of
DTC advertising, large numbers of Americans are prompted to discuss
illness with their doctors for the first time. Because of DTC advertising,
patients become more involved in their own health care decisions, and are
proactive in their patient – doctor dialogue. Because of DTC advertising,
patients are more likely to take their prescribed medications.183
Although DTCA may have this effect on American patients, Antony’s testimony
provides no empirical data justifying these claims. Moreover, the degree to which the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) actually provides effective
regulatory oversight of DTCA is questionable. As Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal
show, from 1996 to 2005 the industry’s expenditures on DTCA have increased 330%,
from $985 million to $4.2 billion. This increase also represents an increase in the
percentage of total promotional spending used on DTCA during that time, from
approximately 9% to 14%. However from 1997 to 2006, while the number of noted
problems of DTCA complying with FDA regulations increased from 15.5% to 33.3%, the
number of letters sent by the FDA to pharmaceutical companies informing them they had
violated DTCA regulations went from 142 in 1997 to approximately 160 in 1998, but
steadily decreased each year since to a low of 21 in 2006.184 This data shows that
pharmaceutical companies are increasing their use of DTCA, that pharmaceutical
companies are increasingly violating the FDA’s regulations for DTCA, and that the FDA
is effectively failing to communicate those violations back to the offending
183
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pharmaceutical company(-ies). Yet it is the ways DTCA violates FDA regulations that
highlight how DTCA also violates the base ethical principles of health care markets for
which I argue. As Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal also note, from 1997 to 2006, 84%
of DTCA that violated FDA regulations was, “for either minimizing risks (e.g.,
minimizing or omitting information on side effects), exaggerating effectiveness (e.g.,
portraying the indication too broadly or making unsubstantiated claims of superiority
over other drugs), or both.”185
A. How DTCA Violates the Principle of Honesty
There are three ways I show that DTCA violates the principle of honesty: 1) in
how DTCA is promoted by PhRMA, 2) in how broadcasted pharmaceutical
advertisements have been deregulated by the FDA, and 3) with respect to the perceived
accuracy of the information in DTCA. The underlying concern with each of these ways is
that the transmission of false, inaccurate, or incomplete information may cause some
persons to seek drug prescriptions that may be medically inappropriate for them, or that
they simply do not need. I do not, however, attempt to argue that DTCA is unethical
based on the idea that, similar to other kinds of non-pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer
advertisements, it may contain clearly false images. Clearly false images are those that
show an advertised product doing impossible things, like a vehicle vertically scaling a
building unassisted. The reason I do not argue this point is that it is difficult to show how
using false images in advertisements violates the principle of honesty, as most rational
persons do not accept clearly false images as being true in the first place.
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One way that DTCA violates the principle of honesty is because of how PhRMA
promotes the practice as a service that helps inform and educate consumers. We know
from the example of Schering-Plough using dual claims to dubiously market Claritin to
consumers as an effective, non-drowsy antihistamine, that PhRMA’s claim about DTCA
informing and educating consumers is not true in all cases. Moreover, as John Abramson
perceptively notes in Overdosed America, assuming the purpose of DTCA is to inform
and educate consumers, it is disingenuous to use ad agencies instead of health educators
to create pharmaceutical advertisements that heavily rely on emotional appeals instead of
clearly stated facts.186
Another way DTCA is unethically deceptive is because, despite PhRMA’s claim
that DTCA aims to inform consumers, broadcasted pharmaceutical advertisements,
namely television commercials, are not required to disclose detailed risk information.
Detailed risk information, however, is something most persons consider medically
relevant information to know prior to taking a prescription drug. Prior to 1997, the FDA
required all broadcasted pharmaceutical advertisements to have a brief summary of risk
information that included the drug’s effectiveness, side effects, major risks, and
contraindications.187 According to Rosenthal and Donohue, “These rules served as a de
facto barrier to broadcast advertisements . . . because it was costly to air the entire brief
summary on television.”188
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In August 1997, the FDA clarified and subsequently loosened its restrictions on
DTCA. The FDA’s new requirements allow broadcasted pharmaceutical advertisements
to simply include information referrals for risk disclosure. That is, instead of being
required to summarize risk information in the advertisement itself, pharmaceutical
companies could now adequately fulfill their obligation of risk disclosure by providing
consumers with a toll-free number, a Website address, or by suggesting that individuals
speak with a physician if they have questions about the advertised drug.189 However the
force behind this objection is not just that pharmaceutical companies no longer have to
disclose risk information in their broadcasted advertisements, but also that since the
FDA’s policy change, television commercials have gone from not playing a major role in
DTCA to becoming the primary source it.
As Rosenthal and Donohue show, pharmaceutical companies spent almost no
money on television commercials in 1994 and 1995, while industry expenditures on
DTCA for television commercials in 1996 and 1997 was approximately $250 million
(about 25% of total DTCA expenditures). In 1998, just after the FDA’s deregulation of
broadcasted DTCA, industry expenditures on DTCA for television commercials rose to
approximately $600 million (about 50% of total DTCA expenditures). In 2001, just four
years after the FDA’s policy change, industry expenditures on DTCA for television
commercials jumped to approximately $1.75 billion (about 64% of total DTCA
expenditures).190
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DTCA can also be considered to violate the principle of honesty because of how
the information presented in DTCA often causes patients to misperceive the accuracy of
the advertisements, while largely believing they are educational and informative. In April
2008, the Kaiser Family Foundation published a report on public and physician
perceptions of DTCA. According to this report, 91% of the sample population from the
general public claimed to have seen a drug advertisement in 2008, with 67% believing
that DTCA is educational, and 52% claiming to at least somewhat rely on DTCA for
information about prescription drugs.191
However, according to a 2002 FDA sponsored survey, the accuracy of the
information patients receive from DTCA is questionable. The survey asked 500
physicians – 250 general practioners, and 250 specialists – to evaluate the effects of
DTCA on patient-physician relationships. According to the results, 65% of physicians
surveyed believe that DTCA either somewhat or greatly confuses patients about the risks
and benefits of the advertised drug. Moreover, 75% of physicians somewhat or greatly
believe that DTCA causes patients to overestimate the benefits of the advertised drug.192
B. How DTCA Violates the Principle of Respect for Autonomy
On one hand, DTCA appears to promote patient autonomy. There are two primary
reasons for this. First, despite its accuracy, DTCA informs consumers of various
prescription drugs for particular medical conditions that they might not have known about
otherwise. Second, DTCA encourages patients to actively participate in treatment
discussions with physicians; thus seemingly help curb paternalistic prescribing
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practices.193 Moreover, as Rosenthal and Donohue also show, consumer surveys suggest
DTCA makes patients more compliant with medication therapy, while physician surveys
suggest that, “DTCA encourages patients to follow the treatments recommended by their
physicians.”194 Assuming this latter point is correct, DTCA also appears to help promote
patient autonomy by encouraging patients to be more responsible in adhering to their
drug treatments.
On the other hand, despite how it may appear to potentially promote patient
autonomy, DTCA violates the principle of respect for autonomy in at least two ways.
First, DTCA manipulates the ability of physicians to act autonomously in their treatment
of patients. Second, because it gives insufficient information about the risk-benefit ratio
of the advertised drugs, DTCA actually weakens patient autonomy by causing patients to
believe they are better informed about advertised drugs than they actually are, and by
potentially increasing medical paternalism.195
Regarding the first reason, Rosenthal and Donohue state that in a 2002 survey on
DTCA and consumer drug choices, 32% of consumers who saw a drug advertisement
asked their physicians about it. Of those consumers, 27% asked for a prescription.196
However nothing in my argument about the principle of respect for autonomy shows how
creating or expressing a want or desire for a product violates one’s autonomy. The
193
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problem, though, is that many physicians feel pressured to comply with patients’ requests
for advertised drugs they do not need. As Rosenthal and Donohue further note, “four out
of five physicians think DTCA encourages patients to seek treatments they do not need,”
and that approximately 70% of patient requests for advertised drugs are honored.197 This
influence of DTCA over physicians’ prescribing practices is unethical in light of the
principle of respect for autonomy because of how it manipulates their prescribing
practices in ways they recognize are not necessarily in the best interests of their patients.
I already discussed how the quality of the information in DTCA violates the
principle of honesty. Again this is because of how DTCA does not require risk
disclosures in the ads, while presenting information to patients that can be confusing and
cause them to overestimate the benefit of the advertised drugs. These points also show
how DTCA violates the principle of respect for autonomy by weakening patient
autonomy.
The quality of information in DTCA weakens patient autonomy in two ways.
First, DTCA may cause patients to believe they are better informed about the advertised
drugs then they really are. When consumers request and press for advertised drugs based
on this information, they not only fail act autonomously because they are acting based on
misinformation, but they also devalue their physicians’ professional abilities to make
knowledgeable treatment decisions. Second, the lack of forthright and truthful
information in DTCA about the risks and benefits of the advertised drugs seems to have
the opposite effect of their original intent. Instead of promoting patient autonomy, DTCA
appears to cause retrogression toward medical paternalism. This is because when patients
197
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request and press for advertised drugs based on the information in DTCA, physicians
may feel obligated to deny these requests, as directed by their professional obligation to
act in their patients’ best interests, which may again lead consumers and patients to
believe these physicians are acting overly and unjustly paternalistic.
Before turning to analyze the ethics the industry’s pricing of life-saving
pharmaceutical drugs, I first briefly explain why I do not argue that the use of DTCA
violates the desire to increase access to essential goods and services.
C. Why DTCA does not appear to Violate the Principle of Increased Access to Essential
Health Goods and Services
There is a general concern that DTCA raises the costs of pharmaceutical drugs
within the United States, and thus raises the overall costs of health care. This might
appear to be the case given that from 1996 to 2005, total expenditures on pharmaceutical
marketing to physicians and consumers increased from approximately $11.5 billion to
nearly $30 billion. This represents a 4% increase in the percentage of annual
pharmaceutical sales used on marketing (from 14.2% to 18.2%).198 At the same time, the
average price of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States is approximately one-third to a
half more than other countries with national health care systems.199
However, in order to show how DTCA violates the principle of increased access
to essential health care goods and services, there would need to be clear evidence
showing how this practice actually prevents people from receiving needed
pharmaceutical drugs. While high drug prices prevent some people from accessing
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needed drugs – a point I discuss more in the next section – there is no substantial
evidence that these high prices result directly from DTCA. As PhRMA representative
Alan Holmer claims, “Direct-to-consumer advertising does not affect the prices of drugs:
price increases of drugs are the least important factor contributing to the increase in
pharmaceutical spending.”200 Being a representative of the pharmaceutical industry,
Holmer’s statement is likely biased. However Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal echo
this view in their analysis of the data on DTCA expenditures. They claim:
Driven by increases in direct-to-consumer advertising, total promotion as a
percentage of sales has increased substantially . . . leading some observers
to worry that consumers must bear these increased costs in the form of
higher prices. Economic theory and evidence suggest that changes in
marketing costs are unlikely to have a direct effect on pharmaceutical
prices.201
At most any evidence linking DTCA expenditures to prohibitive increases in drug costs
are mixed.202 Brody also acknowledges the lack of evidence linking DTCA expenditures
to higher drug costs. According to Brody, “The fact is that we do not know very much
about the impact of DTC ads, for good or ill. The question of whether DTC ads lead to
increased costs of drugs as more consumers demand a high-priced product, or as
consumers seek drug therapy for a condition they previously willing to live with, is very
difficult to determine.”203
It may be that DTCA violates the principle of increased access to essential health
care goods and services because it prompts individuals without genuine medical needs to
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seek medical consultations, thereby possibly delaying access to essential health care
goods and services for those with genuine medical needs. In addition to the findings of
Rosenthal and Donohue, a national survey conducted by Weissman, et. al., found that of
the 643 physicians who responded, 78.6% either somewhat agree or strongly agree that
DTCA encourages patients to seek unneeded treatments.204 However, even though DTCA
could be responsible for causing delays in treatment for persons with genuine medical
needs, there is no quantifying data that allows us to claim with any certainty that DTCA
actually prevents persons with genuine medical needs from gaining access to essential
treatment.
3. Analyzing the Industry’s Pricing of Pharmaceutical Drugs
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently
concluded a study of pharmaceutical pricing policies among member nations.205 The
study aimed to create a framework for comparing international drug pricing policies, and
analyze the impacts of differing drug prices on OECD nations and on pharmaceutical
research and development.206 Two results of this project with respect to pharmaceutical
drug pricing in the United States are clear. First, the United States has the highest per
capita spending on pharmaceutical drugs than any other OECD nation. In 2005, the per
capita spending on pharmaceutical drugs in the United States was $792. This is $203
more than second ranked Canada, and $388 more than the OECD average.207 Second, of

204

Weissman, et. al., “Physicians Report on Patient Encounters Involving Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising,” W4.224.
205
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy Project.”
206
Ibid.
207
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Figure 1.2. Per Capita Spending on
Pharmaceuticals, 2005.”

140

OECD member nations, the United States accounts for 45% of global pharmaceutical
drug sales.208 These two statistics imply that the United States both pays a higher price
for and purchases a higher quantity of pharmaceutical drugs than any other OECD nation.
There are two general explanations for why the United States annually spends so
much on pharmaceutical drugs: research and development, and the free market. First, the
pharmaceutical industry often claims that drug spending in the United States is justified
because it fuels future research and development. As Brody further explains,
Most other nations have a national health system and negotiate discounted
drug prices, paying usually half or two-thirds what American’s typically
pay. According to spokespersons for the industry, Americans’ willingness
to pay top dollar for drugs is subsidizing the rest of the world’s
pharmaceutical research. If the United States . . . [ever brought] the cost of
drugs down to the average level in other developed countries, the bottom
would fall out of research on new pharmaceuticals.209
Whether or not the industry is correct to link drug spending in the United States to
funding for research and development is a debatable point that I return to momentarily.
Second, pharmaceutical drug spending in the United States is also the result of the
free market. One conclusion of the OECD’s pharmaceutical pricing project is that drug
prices are often defined by a willingness to pay for a particular drug and not based on the
medicinal value of the drug.210 Free market systems that allow pharmaceutical companies
to set the prices of drugs based on the willingness to pay is particularly effective in the
United States for three reasons. First, the United States employs a patent system that is
meant to generate innovation by protecting proprietary knowledge. Consequently this
system allows pharmaceutical companies to earn exclusive profits on the drugs (and the
208
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composite chemical combinations of those drugs) for 17 years after the initial patent
approval.211 Second, United States law prohibits drug reseal. This prevents individuals
from buying and re-importing drugs that were produced in the United States from foreign
countries where those drugs may be available at a cheaper cost.212 Lastly, as discussed in
the previous section, the pervasive use of DTCA has increased the number of people in
the United States seeking and receiving pharmaceutical drug prescriptions.
A. How Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing in the United States Violates the Principle of
Honesty
There are two ways that pharmaceutical drug pricing in the United States violates
the principle of honesty: by pharmaceutical companies deceptively masking how drug
prices are set, and by pharmaceutical companies making a false connection between drug
prices and the funding of future research and development. Regarding the first point,
consider the example of world’s first anti-HIV drug, Azidothymidine (AZT). In the late
1980s the FDA approved AZT, which at the time was also the only available anti-HIV
drug. Although the company that produced the drug, Burroughs Wellcome, had
substantial support from government funding and university scientists, they retained the
rights to sell AZT. Using various market mechanisms, Burroughs Wellcome priced AZT
at $10,000 for a year’s treatment (approximately $833 per month). While many argued
this price was too expensive for many persons infected with HIV, Burroughs Wellcome
211
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attempted to justify their pricing of AZT by claiming that they had invested about $86
million into the drug’s development and, as Brody notes, “feared either that the epidemic
would wane or that competing drugs would soon eat into their market share.”213 As
Brody further notes, Burroughs Wellcome “made one hundred million dollars on the drug
in its first year of sales . . . [and] recouped their investment many times over within a few
years.”214
The case of Burroughs Wellcome’s and AZT exemplifies a standard criticism of
pharmaceutical drug pricing. Specifically, pharmaceutical companies are criticized for
failing to detail or disclose how they determine drug prices, keeping the process closed
from external evaluation. Like Burroughs Wellcome, many pharmaceutical companies
claim that a drug’s price reflects, or should reflect, the monies spent developing the drug.
In his detailed examination of the relationship between AIDS activism and the
pharmaceutical industry, Martin Delaney discusses how this claim is dubious. According
to Delaney,
The actual cost [of drug development] is difficult, if not impossible, to
calculate because there is no agreed-upon standard of accounting for the
determining cost . . . At the very least, the manufacturers believe that the
cost of every successful drug must also reflect a portion of the costs of all
the drugs that failed during development. Just how much was spent on
failed drugs is impossible to calculate without complete access to a
company’s books and a complex auditing process . . . The real cost of drug
development largely remains a “black box” of indeterminate proportions .
. .215
Whether or not pharmaceutical companies correctly assess the cost of drug
development as reflected in the drug’s price is not at issue. It is possible that
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pharmaceutical companies determine drug prices in ways that are both accurate and fair.
My particular criticism with respect to how drug pricing violates the principle of honesty
is that, by being unwilling to openly justify drug prices with empirical support,
pharmaceutical companies act deceptively in a way that does seemingly intend to serve
patients’ best interests.
One could try to refute this criticism by noting that within free market systems,
there seems to be no reason for companies to disclose how they determine product prices.
This is because, as I discussed toward the beginning of chapter 2, the ideal goal of the
market is for supply and demand to exist in equilibrium. Product prices will therefore
partly adjust in accord with demand for that product. So for example, if the cost of a drug
prevents patients from purchasing it, thereby causing a drop in demand, the price of the
drug will come down to try to increase sales, thereby helping to reestablish demand.
Whether or not this is a fair way to determine drug prices is not a question of honesty, but
rather a question of whether or not this accords with the principle of increased access to
essential health care goods and services.
This refutation may work for some non-heath care commodities, but fails with
respect to pharmaceutical drugs. To claim that it is unnecessary for pharmaceutical
companies to show how they set drug prices because drug prices will adjust according to
market demand is to claim that they can be valued merely as commodities. However,
despite the fact that some patients seek and receive prescriptions for drugs they do not
need, pharmaceutical drugs are often necessary for people to combat or prevent disease or
illness. As such, based on my arguments for why health care goods and services are not
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properly valued merely as commodities, this refutation fails because it attempts to
characterize the value of pharmaceutical drugs as properly being subject to market forces.
Pharmaceutical companies in the United States will also attempt to set drug prices
based on the argument that pharmaceutical profits are necessary to fund future drug
research and development.216 Yet this argument falsely equates revenue with profit. We
can think of the difference between revenue and profit as a difference in total income
versus excess monetary or financial gain after paying for all other operating costs.
Revenue is necessary to fund future research and development. Excess financial gain,
however, is not. Brody helps clarify this point by comparing the 2002 financial data of
the top-ten performing pharmaceutical companies to that of the average Fortune 500
company. Although all pharmaceutical companies in the Fortune 500 for that year
reported profit increases that were higher than the average for all Fortune 500 companies,
the top-ten performers earned profits that, on the most conservative scale, were 2.7 times
higher than this average (equaling a total profit of $35.9 billion). What Brody shows is
that if the top-ten pharmaceutical performers for 2002 were to maintain the same revenue
but allocate 26% of their profits to research and development, they would still have been
twice as profitable as the average Fortune 500 company and would have been able to
increase their research and development funding by 32% - from $30.7 billion to $40.3
billion.217
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This argument does not necessarily justify decreasing pharmaceutical prices. It is
possible that decreasing drug prices could result in lost revenue that would prevent a
pharmaceutical company from meeting its operating costs while still being profitable and
able to fund research and development. What this argument shows, however, is that it is
pharmaceutical companies trying to justify high pharmaceutical prices on the grounds
that future research and development exclusively relies on the industry’s profitability is
deceptive in a way that appears to violate the principle of honesty. By keeping the
process for how drug prices are determined secretive, the pharmaceutical industry has
authorized itself as the primary source of information we have about how they set drug
prices. This is tantamount to a solicitation of trust that is therefore breeched when
pharmaceutical companies provide consumers false information about drug pricing for
the purpose of ensuring their continue financial gains.
B. How Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing in the United States Violates the Principle of
Respect for Autonomy
When pharmaceutical drugs are first introduced to the market, they provide
patients a new treatment option that did not previously exist. So even when
pharmaceutical drugs are too expensive for patients to afford, simply introducing them to
the market seems to accord with respect for autonomy by adding to the overall number of
available treatment options. Although this seems to be a plausible conclusion, it is
incorrect for two reasons. First, when pharmaceutical drugs are too expensive for patients
to afford, they cannot be considered bona fide treatment options because their purchase is
impractical. Second, as I discuss in chapter 3, it is not the range of choices available that
make a choice autonomous or not, and so it is false to claim that simply bringing a drug
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to the market accords with respect for autonomy by increasing treatment options for those
who can afford them.
However, it is possible that pharmaceutical drug pricing can violate the principle
of respect for autonomy. Pharmaceutical drug pricing violates this principle when the
costs of pharmaceutical drugs manipulates or influences patients’ treatment choices in
ways that do not adequately meet their health care needs. For example, when AZT was
first introduced to the market, many HIV infected persons had to choose between either
paying the high cost of AZT or forgo treatment. The former choice was impractical for
many HIV infected persons because they could not afford AZT, while the latter choice
was, perhaps except for cases in which HIV infected persons accepted the consequences
of forgoing treatment, contrary to the aims of health care.
C. How Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing in the United States Violates the Principle of
Increased Access to Essential Health Care Goods and Services
It is not enough to claim that because the United States has the highest per capita
spending on pharmaceutical drugs than any other OECD nation, and that because the
United States accounts for nearly half of global pharmaceutical sales, that drug pricing in
the United States therefore violates the principle of increased access to essential health
care goods and services. This is because, as I argue in chapter 2, violations of this
principle occur in health care markets when individuals are prevented from attaining
access to health care goods or services necessary to effectively treat their medical needs.
Assuming patients in the United States are able and willing to pay the out-of-pocket
expenses for needed pharmaceutical drugs, no violation of this principle seems to occur.
When, however, the cost of needed pharmaceutical drugs is more than what patients can
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afford out-of-pocket, and they are thusly forced to forgo drug treatment as a result, we
can conclude that in those particular cases drug pricing has violated the principle of
increased access to essential health care goods and services. For example, when AZT was
first introduced to the market, it was the only drug available to help treat HIV, but cost
too much for many HIV infected persons to afford. In this case the pricing of AZT
violated the principle of increased access because, while some HIV infected persons were
likely able and willing to pay for the drug, the cost prevented many others from having
access to the drug. There are, though, two possible refutations to this argument.
One refutation is that the pharmaceutical industry relies on the willingness of the
United States to pay top dollar for pharmaceutical drugs to maintain funding for research
and development of new drugs. The inference is that as the industry develops more
market-ready drugs for particular conditions, the cost of drugs for those conditions will
drop as a matter of competition, thereby helping to increase rather than prohibit
affordable access to drug treatment. Moreover, as Burroughs Wellcome claimed
regarding the initial market price of AZT, a drug’s price partly aims to recover the
company’s investment costs before generic versions of that drug cut into the market
share. Regarding this latter point, even if the costs of an essential drug initially prevent
some persons from having access to it, presumably cheaper versions of that drug will
soon be available, thereby ultimately increasing access to needed drug treatment.
A second possible refutation is that because the United States allows
pharmaceutical companies to operate under its free market system, drug prices are set via
market mechanisms. As a result, the price of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States
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should account for the demand for those drugs. This idea reflects the other reason given
for the cost of AZT. In addition to their concern about generic versions of AZT cutting
into their profits, Burroughs Wellcome was also concerned that new AIDS and HIV drug
research would soon make AZT obsolete, cutting demand for the drug. Further justifying
this point is the fact that the price of AZT has dropped since it was first introduced to the
market. Data from the World Bank shows that less than decade after AZT was introduced
to the market, the yearly cost of AZT fell to $2,738 (approximately $288 per month).218
So drug pricing in the United States should never actually prevent access to needed drugs
as their prices are partly determined by demand, and should reflect what patients are
willing to pay for those drugs. Still, while these two refutations seem to debunk the
notion that pharmaceutical drug pricing in the United States sometimes violates the
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services, there are several
reasons why we ought to reject them.
First, as we have already seen, there is no necessary connection between the
industry’s profitability and the funding for research and development of new drugs. So it
is possible that decreasing costs for needed drugs as a means of increasing access to them
for those who cannot afford their costs could result in lost profits, but not necessarily
resulting in cuts to funding for future research and development.
Second, the concern that companies must set drug prices to help them recover
their investment costs before other “me-too” drugs cut into the market share is
unsubstantiated. This is for two reasons. First, as I already noted from Delaney, there is
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no clearly agreed to way for determining a company’s actual investment costs for
introducing a new drug to the market. Second, there is no way to determine the actual
effect of “me-too” drugs on the market. For example, in the three and half years from
March, 1987 – when the FDA first approved AZT for market sale – until December 1990,
there were only two other anti-HIV drugs approved by the FDA: Dideoxyinosine and
Retrovir. Dideoxyinosine is a milder form of AZT and is for patients who cannot tolerate
the latter, while Retrovir is a syrup form of AZT. Both were approved on the same day,
September 28th, 1989, and were developed by Burroughs Wellcome. So not only was
Burroughs Wellcome wrong about the “me-too” drug effect on their profits from AZT,
through the production of Dideoxyinosine and Retrovir they were able to increase their
market share of anti-HIV drug treatments.219
Third, as we see with both the current patent system and the government
regulations banning drug re-sale, the United States protects the financial interests of
pharmaceutical companies. This has two major effects on drug pricing in the United
States. Again it allows pharmaceutical companies to earn exclusive profits on patented
materials for a substantial period of time. Second, it slows the process of cheaper, generic
drugs from being introduced to the market. Both points seemingly counter the idea that
pharmaceutical companies must set higher drug prices to reflect potential market
overcrowding.
Fourth, setting and adjusting drug prices according to market mechanisms can be
inappropriate for patients needing drug treatment. This is for two reasons. Again, this
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practice inaccurately assumes that pharmaceutical drugs can be properly valued merely as
commodities, while failing to account for the non-commodifiable value(s) drug treatment
has in helping persons regain or sustain their health. Second, setting and adjusting
pharmaceutical drug prices according to market mechanisms can be too slow for patients
needing those drugs. This is because the process requires gathering market data and
analyzing the correlations between prices, demand, and profits. So even if a drug’s price
affects demand for that drug, adjusting the price accordingly will only occur after a
pharmaceutical company knows the effect this has on its profits. The problem is that this
can be a timely process that does account for patients who may initially be denied access
to a drug treatment because of its cost.
4. Conclusion and Suggestions for Reforming the Pharmaceutical Industry in the
United States
Throughout this chapter I have shown many ways that the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States violates what I argue are the base ethical limits of health
care markets. From these arguments, it appears that in order to ethically treat
pharmaceutical drugs as commodities, the pharmaceutical industry in the United States
requires reform. I conclude this chapter by offering six suggestions that the
pharmaceutical industry should adopt to help resolve the ways it violates these limits
regarding its interactions with physicians, its use of DTCA, and drug pricing.
Suggesting reforms that the pharmaceutical industry ought to adopt is not the only
means to help the industry comply with these ethical limits of health care markets.
Arguing for government enforced regulatory reforms is also a fairly common strategy for
those who criticize the current status quo of the pharmaceutical industry in the United
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States. The primary reason I employ the former over the latter strategy is because I wish
to place the onus of responsibility and accountability on the pharmaceutical industry for
its own actions in violating these ethical limits of health care markets.
-

Suggestion #1: Ban all industry-sponsored gift giving and financial
support to health care professionals and medical institutions.
Effective as of January 1st, 2009, PhRMA’s updated Code on Interactions with

Health Care Professionals is a semi-detailed guide that attempts to address the frequent
criticisms directed at the industry’s interactions with physicians. It appears to be a step in
the right direction by banning what PhRMA sees as either extravagant or non-essential
forms of compensation to all health care professionals or medical institutions. Still, the
Code permits pharmaceutical companies to provide physicians and medical students with
gifts that they consider educational for either patients or health care professionals, such as
medical textbooks or subscriptions to scientific journals.220 The Code also allows
pharmaceutical companies to help fund educational events so long as they do not direct
how those funds are used and do not promote the events for their own financial gain.221
However even this level of industry-sponsored gift giving and financial support
for health care professionals and medical institutions can be ethically problematic. This is
because any gift or financial support from a pharmaceutical company, regardless of
whether or not the industry considers it modest or fair, still leaves open the possibility
that health care professionals or medical institutions, via the rule for reciprocation, may
feel obliged to speak or act favorably on behalf of that company in ways that do not serve
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the best interests of patients. A total ban on industry-sponsored gift giving or financial
support to physicians or medical institutions may therefore be necessary to avoid the
potential ways this can violate the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.
-

Suggestion #2: Ensure the promotion of all industry-sponsored research
complies with professional standards.
The main problem with industry-sponsored research comes from the intentional

bias that is often present in the promotion of that research. Paying physicians to publish
articles or textbooks that advertise or unfairly favor particular drugs over others,
suppressing contradictory research data, or disguising the source of funding for a research
program are all ways that industry-sponsored research violates the principles of honesty
and respect for autonomy. To avoid this, pharmaceutical companies ought to comply with
professional standards for promoting research. For example: authors should not be paid
simply to attach their names to ghostwritten articles, all research data that can affect a
health care professional’s understanding of the effectiveness and side-effects of a drug
ought to be completely and clearly presented, and all published research ought to fully
and clearly disclose the primary sources of financial funding for a research program.
-

Suggestion #3: Discontinue employing pharmaceutical representatives to
provide drug presentations.
Whether or not we should consider pharmaceutical representatives “educators” or

public relation officers, they can unduly influence a physician’s prescribing practices in
ways that violate the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. Yet the industry
maintains that pharmaceutical representatives help inform health care professionals about
new pharmaceutical products. However it is possible to educate and promote new
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pharmaceutical products to health care professionals without using pharmaceutical
representatives. A pharmaceutical company could, for example, create and send a
promotional video and supplemental information sheet to medical offices and hospitals
that health care professionals could watch during their lunch breaks. This would result in
at least two foreseeable benefits. First, physicians could still avoid having to spend time
researching new pharmaceutical products while still getting the same type of information
they could get from a pharmaceutical representative. Second, a promotional video would
presumably be checked for accuracy prior to mass distribution, and so could help
minimize possibly communicating any inaccurate or false information.
There is at least one problem with this suggestion. The industry uses
pharmaceutical representatives because they are successful at helping increase
pharmaceutical sales. Using some other means, like videos, to educate health care
professionals may not be as successful. So discontinuing the use of pharmaceutical
representatives could decrease pharmaceutical sales, while potentially driving up the cost
of pharmaceutical drugs. However, there really is no way to know for certain how
pharmaceutical sales would be affected by discontinuing the use of pharmaceutical
representatives. For example, we know that physicians often feel inclined to write
prescriptions for drugs that patients’ request while believing the prescription is
unnecessary. So it is possible that, because of consumer demand, pharmaceutical sales
would not diminish at all. Yet even if pharmaceutical sales were to diminish as a result of
discontinuing the use of pharmaceutical representatives, this would not necessarily drive
up the costs of pharmaceutical drugs. A decline in pharmaceutical sales would result in
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lost profits. But, as we have seen, the concern over lost profits does not by itself justify
increasing drug costs.
-

Suggestion #4: Require all DTCA to provide sources of objective
information about the advertised diseases or conditions, the risks and
benefits of the advertised drugs, proven alternate therapies to advertised
diseases or conditions, while refraining from directing individuals seek
this information from health care professionals.
Effective as of March 2nd, 2009, the updated PhRMA Guiding Principles: Direct

to Consumer Advertisements About Prescription Medicines outlines the information
pharmaceutical companies ought to include in DTCA.222 The Guiding Principles
maintain the industry’s stance that DTCA aids public health by providing accurate and
balanced information about diseases and different therapeutic options.223 Furthermore,
the Guiding Principles urge pharmaceutical companies to work with the FDA, health care
professionals, and patients to obtain feedback about the content of a DTCA and, when
changes need to be made to a specific piece of DTCA, either alter or discontinue it.
Assuming pharmaceutical companies follow these recommendations, it seems likely that
DTCA could avoid some of the problems that cause it to be unethically deceitful, while
helping patients and health care professionals make better informed, and thus more
autonomous, treatment decisions.
However, despite the information the Guiding Principles state DTCA ought to
include, they actually exacerbate one of the more serious ethical problems with DTCA. A
common theme in all pharmaceutical DTCA – and one that is encouraged in the Guiding
Principles – is that individuals wanting information about the advertised drug should
222
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consult with health care professionals (namely physicians). Yet, as we have seen, when
individuals seek information about advertised drugs from physicians, this can increase
medical paternalism, thereby weakening patient autonomy in ways that can violate the
principle of respect for autonomy.
One may counter that in addition to health care professionals, the Guiding
Principles also encourage DTCA to include the website and toll-free phone number for
the FDA’s MedWatch, and for DTCA to direct individuals to print advertisements and
websites where they can find additional risk-benefit information about the specific drug
in question. The problem with FDA’s MedWatch is that it is only for obtaining safety
information and medical reporting of safety concerns. It does not provide individuals
with detailed information about pharmaceutical drugs.
Directing individuals to print advertisements and drug websites are also
problematic. Print advertisements are often placed in specialized magazines that require
subscriptions and whose audience tends to be affluent (e.g., Golf Digest). So directing
individuals to print advertisements limits who will see that information to those who
pharmaceutical companies believe will likely purchase the advertised drug. Drug
websites are typically created by the drug manufacturer and so frequently conceal factual
claims amid biased marketing messages. Moreover, both print advertisements and drug
websites will claim that persons wanting more information should consult with health
care professionals.
Those who want an advertised drug as a result of DTCA will still have to consult
a physician prior to getting a prescription for it. Physicians, having a professional
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obligation to act in patients’ best interests, should help determine the appropriateness of
patient requests for advertised drugs. So the purpose of this suggestion is not to remove
health care professionals from being a source of information for patients who request
advertised drugs. Instead the purpose of this suggestion to prevent health care
professionals from being the one’s who are primarily responsible for providing drug
information to patients, and place that responsibility directly on drug manufactures.
-

Suggestion 5: Create an agreed upon, empirically based industry standard
for determining drug prices that is easily open to public scrutiny.
Pharmaceutical companies operating in the United States should retain some right

to price drugs in accord with free market principles. However, as we have seen, the
argument that drug prices must reflect the costs of development is deceiving because
there is no way to account for all such costs. Creating an agreed to industry standard for
determining drug prices that is empirically based and open to public scrutiny would
remove questions about how drug prices are set with respect to the development costs for
those drugs, while still allowing pharmaceutical companies to price drugs according to
what patients are willing to pay.
-

Suggestion 6: Assume responsibility for when free market pricing limits or
prevents access to needed drug treatment, and work toward developing
industry-orientated solutions for increasing access to needed drug
treatment.
Using the market to set drug prices can limit or prevent patients from accessing

needed drug treatment in ways that violate the principles of respect for autonomy and
increased access to essential health care goods and services. However, because the
industry believes that drug prices are justified to recoup drug development costs and help
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fund new drugs, the industry-wide attitude is that improving access to drug treatment
requires improving access to affordable health care coverage, and not to lower the cost of
pharmaceutical drugs per se. PhRMA, for example, has issued a platform urging health
care coverage for all United States citizens through private insurers.224 PhRMA has also
founded the Partnership for Prescription Assistance – a cooperative between PhRMA,
health care providers, and patient advocacy and community organizations that helps lowincome patients search for public and private programs to subsidize some or all of their
drug treatment costs.
Not many people will deny that trying to improve access to affordable health care
coverage is a good thing. Still it is frustrating that the industry presses for affordable
health care coverage as the solution to some patients being prohibited from access to
needed drug treatment because of its cost. This is for two reasons. First, the industry’s
drug pricing policies is a primary reason why some patients in the United States lack
affordable access to needed drug treatment. Second, this solution shifts the focus of
responsibility for providing affordable access to drug treatment from the pharmaceutical
industry to patients and policy-makers. What this suggestion implies, therefore, is that
because the industry is the primary party responsible for producing and pricing
pharmaceutical drugs, it ought to adjust its own pricing policies to ensure that all persons
can have appropriate access to needed drug treatment.
Next I apply my argument to a hypothetical legal organ market in the United
States. Since the United States currently does not have a legal organ market, this analysis
faces the challenge of being without the kind of empirical data I examined in this chapter.
224
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Chapter Five: Is An Ethical Organ Market Possible?
In this chapter I apply my argument for ethically treating health care goods and
services as commodities to a hypothetical legal organ market in the United States. There
are two primary reasons why I address this market. First, as I discuss in “Overcoming the
Organ Shortage,” organ donation has been consistently failing to meet the demand for
transplant organs in the United States.225 This continues to be the case. Recent data from
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) shows that the current
number of people in the United States on organ transplant waiting lists is approximately
105,000, while the total number of transplants performed from January to November
2009 is 26,082; 20,139 from deceased donors, 5,943 from living donors.226 Furthermore,
from 1995-2009, 97,235 persons died while waiting for transplant organs (6,344 in
2009).227 A legal organ market would theoretically assuage this problem by providing
those needing transplant organs with an additional means to procure them.
Second, the practice of organ selling is morally controversial and is illegal in the
United States.228 On one hand, some, like James Taylor, argue that respect for personal
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autonomy and concern for human well-being support the view that organ selling is moral
and should be legal.229 On the other hand there appears to be, as Cherry notes, a global
consensus regarding public policies that transplant organs should be treated as gifts, not
commodities, and that they ought to be viewed as public-interest resources, not as goods
for private profit or gain.230
My aim in this chapter is to analyze five practical concerns that would likely
accompany the establishment of a legal organ market to see the extent to which this kind
of market may violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care
markets. However, as I previously noted, I do not intend to argue about the morality of a
hypothetical legal organ market. This is because we can still imagine a legal organ
market existing even if it is immoral – much in the same way that there continues to be a
substantial market in pornography despite a variety of arguments for why it is immoral.
Moreover, my arguments in this chapter only focus on a legal organ market in which
“would-be sellers” are living persons, and in which the organs removed could be taken
without killing the seller. My reason for this is so that I can narrow the arguments in this
chapter to would-be sellers who are the decision makers regarding their willingness to
sell an organ, and who are the primary beneficiaries of the sale, without having to also
consider the role of surrogates or alternative beneficiaries (such as family members). The
two reasons. First, the wording implies that the intent of prohibiting organ sales is to prevent the
creation of large-scale organ markets. Second, organ sales that do not affect interstate commerce are
presumably permitted. However as Taylor notes regarding this second point, “interstate commerce”
has, “very broad construal after the United States Supreme Court ruling in the 1942 case Wickard v.
Filburn (317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82) that a farmer growing wheat on his own land for use by his own
family was affecting interstate commerce” (Taylor, States and Kidneys, 26, n.45).
See; United States Congress, National Organ Transplant Act, 98th Congress, 1st session, October 19, 1984
42 USC 274e, http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL98-507.pdf (accessed October 24, 2009).
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five concerns I analyze in this chapter are: 1) that would-be sellers may lie about their
health status to avoid jeopardizing an organ sale, 2) that a legal organ market would pose
a health-risk to sellers, 3) that economically desperate sellers are only willing to sell their
organs because of their economic desperation, 4) that economically desperate sellers may
not receive a fair price for their organs, and 5) that a legal organ market would decrease
organ donation rates. I conclude that while the occurrence of these concerns would make
a legal organ market unethical, it is questionable whether or not the United States should
continue to ban organ sales.
I now turn to analyze each of these concerns to assess the ethics of a legal organ
market in the United States.
1. Lying to Secure an Organ Sale
One concern of a legal organ market is that the promise of profit could tempt
some would-be sellers whose organs are of questionable health, to lie about their health
status to avoid jeopardizing the sale. This concern is based on a point by Titmuss in The
Gift Relationship, in which he argues that voluntary donation is superior to markets for
procuring transfusable blood.231 As Titmuss notes, tainted or diseased transfusable blood
can be lethal to the recipient and so requires those giving blood to provide truthful health
and social histories. He further argues that markets for procuring transfusable blood have
much higher rates than voluntary donation systems of persons with potentially tainted or
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diseased blood attempting to deceptively mask their poor health. Titmuss concludes that
markets in transfusable blood are less desirable than voluntary blood donation because
the former fails to maximize the conditions that encourage persons to be honest about
their health and social histories.232
Tainted or diseased transplant organs can severely damage the health of the
recipient. It is also possible that tainted or diseased transplant organs may go undetected
by those who assess the quality of the organ(s) or those who perform the transplant
operation(s). For example, a recent article in The Journal of the American Medical
Association detailed how Viral Encephalitis – a disease causing inflammation of the brain
– was transmitted from a single, deceased donor to four transplant patients, eventually
causing their deaths. The diseased organs were the result of the donor being bitten by a
rabid bat (which was later determined to have caused the donor’s death, but was initially
misdiagnosed).233 What this shows is that despite the apparent health of transplant organs,
tainted or diseased organs can go undetected, and so it is crucial to the health of would-be
organ buyers that would-be sellers be as honest as possible about their health.
Another aspect of this concern – one that I discuss in more detail later in the
chapter – is the presumption that individuals willing to sell their organs are likely to be
economically impoverished. Within the United States, empirical data demonstrates a
correlation between one’s economic status and one’s health. According to a recent report
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, in conjunction with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Center for Health Statistics,
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those who are economically impoverished suffer worse physical health compared to those
who are not economically impoverished.234 For example, those who live in poverty are
more limited in their physical activity as a result of chronic health conditions, and less
often engage in leisurely physical activity (the latter being a factor typically considered to
promote good physical health).235 Those who live in poverty also suffer from
hypertension and elevated blood levels more often than those who do not live in
poverty.236 Young children between the ages of 19-35 months who live in impoverished
homes are also not vaccinated from standard diseases as often as young children who do
not live in impoverished homes, making the former more susceptible to conditions that
can negatively impact their health as they age.237
A. How Might lying to secure an Organ Sale Violate the Ethical Limits of Health Care
Markets?
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There are two ways in which would-be organ sellers lying about their health
status to secure an organ sale could result in a legal organ market violating what I argue
should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. First, lying to secure an organ
sale may violate the principle of respect for autonomy, particularly toward would-be
organ buyers. This is because the ability of would-be organ buyers to autonomously
choose whether or not to engage in an organ sale would partly depend on the extent, and
their understanding, of the information they have about the health of the organ(s) they
receive. So, if we assume that would-be organ buyers had to solely rely on the
truthfulness of would-be sellers who lie about their health status, would-be buyers would
therefore be prevented from having access to information that would have a foreseeable
impact on their choice to continue with the sale.
Second, lying to secure an organ sale may also violate the principle of honesty.
There are two ways in which this violation might occur based on my argument for why
the principle of honesty should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets.
First, would-be organ sellers who lie about their health status to secure an organ sale pass
along false information that could result in would-be buyers making decisions about the
organ sale, and subsequent transplant operation, that either fail to be in their best interest
(presuming they are trying to procure the best quality organ possible), or could
potentially increase the risk of harm to them in ways they did not initially understand or
agree to. Presumably, because the health of would-be buyers relies on the information
they get from would-be sellers, they have a right to expect would-be sellers provide
honest disclosures about their health status.
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Another way that would-be organ sellers lying to secure an organ sale could
violate the principle of honesty is by having a foreseeable negative impact on the
functionality of the organ market. As I argue in chapter 3, honesty is a necessary
component for markets to function efficaciously and efficiently. When organ sellers try to
lie about their health status, the organ market, which is already considered to be morally
contentious, becomes more susceptible to a tarnished reputation for involving dishonesty
and deception. This idea, coupled with the health risks to persons who receive unhealthy
transplant organs, could ultimately cause potential would-be buyers to forgo using an
organ market as a means to procure transplant organs.
Whether or not would-be organ sellers lying about their health status to secure an
organ sale would violate the principle of increased access to essential health care goods
and services depends on both the effect lying about one’s health status may have on
market demand for transplant organs, and the market response to a potential change in
demand. If, on one hand, lying to secure an organ sale resulted in fewer persons willing
to purchase transplant organs, and the market failed to respond, thereby ultimately
decreasing the profitability of the market, then lying to secure an organ sale could be
thought of as violating the principle of increased access, since this would presumably
decrease access rather than be a viable means of helping increase access to transplant
organs. On the other hand, if the market were to avoid any potential loss in demand
resulting from would-be sellers lying about their health status due to a drop in the cost of
transplant organs (which may also have the effect of helping to increase demand), then,
so long as the market were able to maintain profitability, lying to secure an organ sale
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would not violate this principle, since the market would still be effectively functioning to
increase access to transplant organs.
Despite these potential ways in which would-be sellers lying about their health
status to secure an organ sale could violate the principles I have argued for, I am skeptical
about the degree to which this would be a concern of legal organ markets. This concern
seems more applicable to black markets in transplant organs, in which there are no laws
or regulations to either help ensure the quality of transplant organs or to prevent lying
about one’s health from becoming a pervasive problem. Yet the essence of a legal organ
market is the idea that the market would be regulated to try to prevent concerns such as
lying to secure an organ sale from becoming a pervasive problem, and to prevent wouldbe buyers from purchasing unhealthy transplant organs. This is not to say that lying to
secure an organ sale would never occur within a legal organ market. However, as I
discussed in chapter 3, even though lying occurs in regulated markets, the overall culture
of markets – at least those within the United States – remain committed to the view that
lying is generally unethical and ought to be repudiated.
2. A Legal Organ Market Poses a Health-risk to Would-be Organ Sellers
Another concern of a legal organ market is that it would pose a health-risk to
organ sellers. This concern primarily stems from the debate over whether or not kidney
sales constitute an immoral form of dangerous employment. In Stakes and Kidneys,
Taylor, who argues for the moral permissibility of regulated markets in human organs,
extensively addresses both the anti-market and pro-market sides of this debate. On one
hand, some argue that kidney sales exhibit unique characteristics that make them morally
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distinct (and thus immoral) from other kinds of (morally permissible) dangerous
employment, like firefighting or military service. On the other hand, some argue that
kidney sales are not morally distinct from other kinds of dangerous employment, and that
a commitment to respect for autonomy justifies allowing persons to sell their kidneys in a
regulated kidney market (some take this view even farther by arguing that a commitment
to respect for autonomy also justifies unregulated kidney sales). Since I do not aim to
discuss the morality of a legal organ market, further elaborating on the particular points
of this debate is unnecessary. It is important to note, though, that Taylor does not attempt
to defend regulated kidney sales by trying to refute claims that they are dangerous to the
health would-be sellers. Instead, Taylor tries to show how kidney sales are of comparable
danger to other kinds of morally permissible dangerous employment.238
Presuming a legal organ market would be regulated to try to minimize known
health-risks to both sellers and buyers, a legal organ market would pose a similar level of
health-risk to sellers as organ donation does to living donors. Particularly with respect to
kidneys, there does not appear to be any correlating long-term health risks for persons
with one functioning kidney compared to persons with two functioning kidneys. For
example, Taylor argues that there is no difference in long-term mortality rates as a result
of having one functioning kidney as opposed to having two functioning kidneys.239
Moreover, while kidney functioning typically declines with age, this age-related decline
is consistent between persons with one functioning kidney and those with two
functioning kidneys (although a small population of kidney donors (56 of more than
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50,000) ultimately require transplants themselves).240 However, there are several shortterm health risks to living organ donors of all types. These include: a morality rate of
approximately .03 percent (similar to most operations involving general anesthesia);
bleeding during or after the operation; and potential for post-operative infection.241
Although these potential health-risks of organ transplantation are similar to the risks that
accompany other kinds of medical operations, my concern is not a question of the degree
of severity these risk pose for would-be organ sellers, but what the existence of these
kinds of health-risks may mean for a legal organ market to operate with respect to what I
argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets.
A. Would the Health-risks to Would-be Organ Sellers Violate the Ethical Limits of Health
Care Markets?
Whether or not the health-risks to would-be organ sellers would violate the
principles I have argued for depends on the information given to would-be sellers about
those risks, and how well they understand that information. There are two cases I
consider here: a) would-be organ sellers who are not given information about the known
health-risks of organ transplantation, and b) would-be organ sellers who are informed of
the known health-risks of organ transplantation but are not provided the means to help
them understand this information.242
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a. Failure to Inform Would-be Sellers of Known Health-risks of Organ
Transplantation
If would-be sellers within a legal organ market were not informed of the known
risks associated with organ transplantation, then the market would violate both the
principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. Failure to inform would-be sellers of the
known health-risks associated with organ transplantation would violate the principle of
honesty for two reasons. First, failure to provide information to those undergoing a
medical operation about the known risks of that operation deprives them of information
they have a legitimate right to know as the individuals being operated on by those whom
they have entrusted to perform the operation. Second, from how I argue for honesty as an
ethical limit of health care markets, the failure to provide would-be sellers information
about the health-risks associated with organ transplantation may also violate the principle
of honesty because of the potential harm that could befall would-sellers if those risks
were to occur. This is because even though they are the seller of a health care good, they
are also patients during the operation who entrust those performing the operation with
their well being.

unique about this case, and why I say it is one that we may need to consider further, is that not having a
legal organ market seemingly violates the principle of respect for autonomy because would-be sellers
who know of and understand the risks of organ transplantation would therefore paternalistically be
prevented from selling their organs. The reason I do not fully discuss this case here is because it is still
unclear to me whether or not the absence of a legal organ market that has provisions to inform and help
persons understand the health-risks of organ transplantation would violate the principle of respect for
autonomy. Simply having and understanding the health-risks of organ transplantation does not by itself
guarantee persons who sell their organs are therefore acting autonomously. For example, I may fully
understand the risks of organ transplantation, but am otherwise coerced to sell my organs. In such a
case, my understanding of the health-risks of organ transplantation is not sufficient to claim I am
thusly acting autonomously because I am selling my organs against my will. However, if would-be
sellers are un-coerced, informed of the health-risks of organ transplantation, and have the means
available to help them understand that information, yet are still prevented from being allowed to sell
their organs via a legal organ market, then the absence of a legal organ market would likely constitute
a violation of respect for autonomy.

169

Failing to provide would-be sellers information about the known health-risks of
organ transplantation would also violate the principle of respect for autonomy. In chapter
3 I argue how respect for autonomy requires persons to have appropriate access and
understanding of information regarding the purchase of health care goods and services.
Although I discuss this limit with respect to the purchase and not the sale of health care
goods or services because, in the case of a legal organ market, sellers are also undergoing
a medical procedure (and are thus also under the care of those performing the transplant),
it is appropriate to include would-be sellers under the scope of this limit. If would-be
organ sellers are not given information about the health-risks associated with organ
transplantation, then the sale does not accord with the principle of respect for autonomy
because would-be organ sellers would be missing information that could significantly
impact their willingness to continue with the organ sale.
It is also possible that failing to inform would-be sellers about the known healthrisks associated with organ transplantation could violate the principles of increased
access to essential health care goods and services. This would be the case if, as a result of
consistently failing to inform would-be sellers about the known health-risks of organ
transplantation, fewer persons were willing to sell their organs, which then led to an
overall decline in the numbers of organs being sold. However, if persons were to still
willing to sell their organs despite not being fully informed about the health-risks of
organ transplantation, and the market was able to meet the demand for transplant organs,
then a legal organ market would not seem to violate this principle.
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b. Informed but Lack Aid for Understanding
From how I argue that honesty is an ethical limit of health care markets, merely
providing honest information to would-be organ sellers about the potential health-risks of
organ transplantation is sufficient to meet this principle. This does not mean, though, that
by informing would-be sellers of the risks of organ transplantation, a legal organ market
therefore absolutely avoids violating the principle of honesty. It is certainly possible that,
even though a legal organ market may be within the limit of honesty regarding the
information provided to would-be sellers about the health-risks of organ transplantation, a
legal organ market could still violate the limit of honesty because of some other feature
present in the market such as not having provisions to help curb the potential for wouldbe sellers to lie about their health status, that ultimately would allow would-be buyers or
sellers to deceive one another about information relevant to the sale of the transplant
organ.
If, however, would-be organ sellers were informed of the known health-risks of
organ transplantation but were not provided additional means to help them understand
this information, a legal organ market would violate the principle of respect for
autonomy. As I noted in chapter 3, one’s ability to properly exercise his or her autonomy
does not just depend the information one has about the choice-at-hand, but also on one’s
ability to understand and incorporate that information into one’s decision-making
process. A legal organ market that did not provide the means to help would-be organ
sellers understand the health-risks of organ transplantation, or one that allowed persons to
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sell their organs when they have not considered this information, would fail to actualize
this necessary element for would-be sellers to act autonomously.
3. Economic Desperation as the Motive for Selling an Organ
A third concern about the creation of a legal organ market is that economically
desperate sellers would only be willing to sell their organs because of their economic
desperation. This concern stems from the moral debate over whether or not economic
desperation coerces persons to sell their organs. It is typically agreed that coercion is
immoral in most cases because of how it is considered to unfairly usurp one’s autonomy.
On one hand, those opposed to organ selling commonly argue that, all things considered,
organ sellers who are economically desperate are willing to sell their organs only because
they are trying to assuage the bad effects of their economic desperation, but otherwise
genuinely oppose selling their organs. Often they conclude that because would-be organ
sellers do not really want to sell their organs, economic desperation is therefore coercive
as the primary motivator of the sale.243 Taylor, on the hand, argues in Stakes and Kidneys
that economic desperation cannot coerce individuals to sell their organs because it is not
an intentionally acting agent capable of controlling the actions of others. He concludes
that because economic desperation is not coercive, those who are motivated to sell their
organs because of their economic desperation still act autonomously.244
Since my analysis is on a hypothetical organ market, there is no empirical data
within the United States showing how far reaching this concern might be. Yet we can
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glimpse the probable socioeconomic breakdown of would-be organ sellers by examining
statistical data from Iran. In 1988, Iran developed a government-funded, government–
regulated, and government–compensated program for paying living unrelated organ
donors (LUDs). A recent study of this program shows that of 500 randomly chosen
LUDs, 84% were poor, 16% were middle class, and none were wealthy. According to the
study, those who could afford only average housing, food, and college training for their
children were included in the “middle class.” Those who could afford less or more than
those things were respectively classified “poor” and “wealthy.”245 Although we do not
know how these numbers might vary for a legal organ market in the United States, the
overwhelming percentage of paid LUDs in Iran who are poor versus those who are
middle class and wealthy gives us a reason to assume that the majority of organ sellers
within the United States would also be economically poor.
A. How Would Selling an Organ from Economic Desperation Violate the Ethical Limits
of Health Care Markets?
This concern is farther reaching than just a legal organ market. Since the basis of
this concern is that economic desperation may force some persons to sell their organs,
and not that a legal organ market would force them to sell, it applies to any type of organ
sale. However, presuming the motive of economic desperation violates any of the ethical
limits I argue for, a legal organ market would be culpable for cases in which persons
motivated by their economic desperation were to sell an organ within that market.
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If economic desperation were the only reason why some persons may be willing
to sell their organs in a legal organ market, this would violate the principle of respect for
autonomy. Furthermore, presuming this concern is true, it would violate this principle
even if Taylor is correct and we reject the view that economic desperation is coercive.
This is because of how I argue in chapter 3 that the principle of respect for autonomy is
violated when market participants are subjected to undue influence or constraint in the
purchase or sale of health care goods or services. So if it is correct that economic
desperation would motivate some persons to sell their organs while, at the same time,
they genuinely oppose selling their organs, “economic desperation” can be considered to
be an undue influence because of how it appears to manipulate the choice of would-be
organ sellers in a way that they do not fully endorse.
Prima facie this concern shows that a legal organ market is unethical on my view.
This is because even in a regulated organ market, there can be cases in which would-be
organ sellers are strictly motivated by their economic desperation while otherwise being
genuinely opposed to selling their organs. However, a legal organ market could
successfully address this concern if were to implement a vetting procedure capable of
consistently differentiating between would-be organ sellers who are strictly motivated by
their economic desperation but who otherwise oppose selling their organs, and those who,
regardless of their motive, are not genuinely opposed to selling their organs.
4. Economically Desperate Sellers may not receive a Fair Price for their Organs
A fourth concern of a legal organ market is that economically desperate sellers
may fail to receive a fair price for their organs. Again, while we do not know how many
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would-be sellers in the United States may be affected by this concern, we have reason to
assume from statistics of the Iranian model of paid organ donation that most would-be
sellers are likely to be economically poor. There are two primary bases of this concern.
First is the idea that the economic desperation of organ sellers creates an underlying
imbalance of power in the organ sale that disproportionately favors would-be buyers.246
Second, as Cherry notes, economically desperate sellers may be willing to sell their
organs for a relatively small amount of money because even a small amount of money
would be relatively advantageous for them.247
A. How Would Failing to Receive a Fair Price for One’s Organs Violate the Ethical
Limits of Health Care Markets?
There are two ways in which economically desperate sellers failing to receive a
fair price for their organs could violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of
health care markets. First, failing to receive a fair price for one’s organs could violate the
principle of honesty. This would happen if would-be organ sellers were intentionally kept
from receiving a fair value for their organs by whoever was paying for them.248 This is
because violations of the principle of honest occur when participants in health care
markets are permitted to engage in intentional deception or lying in ways not meant to
serve patients’ best interests. All would-be organ sellers, like would-be buyers, can
rightly be thought of as patients during the process of the organ sale because, as I
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mentioned earlier, they are also undergoing a medical procedure that places them under
the care of those performing the transplant. By intentionally failing to provide would-be
sellers a fair price for their organs, their interests are not only treated as secondary to
those of the buyer(s), but the would-be sellers’ interests are also not served to the same
degree that they would be if were to receive a fair price for their organs. While this
reasoning applies to all would-be organ sellers, this is a particularly crucial point for
economically desperate sellers who are thought to be more vulnerable because of their
economic desperation.
Second, failing to provide economically desperate sellers a fair price for their
organs could violate the principle of respect for autonomy. There are two ways this
would seemingly occur. First, a violation of the principle of respect for autonomy would
occur if the market were to determine organ prices via negotiation. Economically
desperate sellers, because of their economic desperation, would seemingly lack
bargaining power in this negotiation process. Moreover, while it makes sense that organ
buyers would not want to jeopardize the organ sale by offering too low a price for the
organ they wish to purchase, a negotiation process provides would-be buyers the leeway
to offer just enough money to secure an organ sale irrespective of whether or not this
price is “fair.” Specifically, a negotiation process over the price of organs would violate
the principle of respect for autonomy for economically desperate sellers because of how
their economic desperation and presumed lack of bargaining power could unfairly
manipulate their decision-making process.
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It is possible that a violation of the principle of respect for autonomy could also
occur in a market in which organs prices are not negotiated. This would occur if wouldbe organ sellers did not have access to and were not provided information about what
constitutes a “fair” price for their organs. In this case, the lack of information provided to
would-be organ sellers would be a direct violation of the principle of respect for
autonomy because of the foreseeable impact this would have on organ sellers,
particularly those who are economically desperate, to make a well-informed decision
about whether or not to continue with the organ sale.
However it is also important to recognize that a “fair” price for transplant organs
is not necessarily the same thing as a price equal to the maximal commodified value of
those organs. While it would be appropriate to provide would-be sellers a price for their
organs that shows sensitivity to their economic needs and circumstances, it would be also
be unfair if, conversely, the price of transplant organs was so high that would-be buyers
relying on the market could not practically afford them. In this latter case, organ buyers
would be exploited on the basis of their medical needs. Moreover, such exploitation in a
legal organ market could result in a violation of the principle of increased access to
essential health care goods and services if buyers relying on the organ market were
unable to sufficiently meet their medical needs in some other way. What it would mean to
determine a “fair” price for transplant organs, however, is beyond the scope of this
project. Yet what constitutes a “fair” price for transplant organs will presumably
minimize the potential exploitation of both sellers and buyers on the basis of economic
desperation or medical need.
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5. A Legal Organ Market Would Decrease Organ Donation Rates
The last concern I address in this chapter is that a legal organ market would
decrease organ donation rates. Part of the value of organ donation is its cultural and social
significance as one of the highest forms of individual altruistic expression. Often, organ
donation is metaphorically described as a “gift of life” to organ recipients. This concern
is primarily based on the moral argument against organ selling that, by placing a
commodified value on organs, the purely altruistic motive to donate will be supplanted in
some cases by a monetary motive, thereby limiting the number of opportunities
individuals have to donate their organs, and causing some individuals who were willing
to donate their organs to no longer be willing to donate.249
There is some justification for this concern. One study, cited by Taylor, examines
how a small monetary incentive alters the willingness of individuals to donate blood.
Blood donors were broken up into two groups: A) those who regularly donate blood, and
B) those who occasionally donate blood. Both groups were then offered $10 to donate a
pint of blood. The $10 incentive substantially decreased the donation rate of A while
slightly increasing the donation rate of B. According to Taylor, this result, “seems to bear
out the anti-market view that commercial incentives will crowd out altruistic motives.”250
In The Gift Relationship, Titmuss also provides a variety of statistical data from within
the United States that, although now outdated, show when there are monetary incentives
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the numbers paid blood donors far exceed the numbers of non-paid, altruistic blood
donors.251
A. How Might a Decrease in Organ Donation Rates Violate the Ethical Limits of Health
Care Markets?
For wealthy patients who would be willing use a legal organ market to buy
transplant organs, this is not a very relevant concern. It is mostly applicable to patients
who either could not, or who are morally opposed, to purchasing transplant organs. There
are two ways, then, this concern could result in a legal organ market violating what I
argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. First, this concern could
result in a legal organ market violating the principle of increased access to essential
health care goods and services. This would be the case if a legal organ market decreased
donation rates, and persons who were either unable or morally opposed to purchasing
transplant organs were consequently prevented from getting them via some form of
voluntary donation. The reason why this case would result in a legal organ market
violating this principle is because, again, this limit is violated when patients are prevented
or denied access to needed health care goods or services.
Second, this same scenario for a legal organ market could also result in a violation
of the principle of respect for autonomy. I argue that meeting the principle of respect for
autonomy within health care markets requires treatment decisions neither be forced nor
the result of undue influence or constraint. So by causing a decrease in donation rates, a
legal organ market could reasonably be thought of as unduly constraining the abilities of
some patients to best meet their medical needs if those patients were morally opposed to
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purchasing transplant organs on the market and were also unable to procure a transplant
organ via donation.
However, even if a legal organ market resulted in diminishing donation rates, we
cannot conclude that it would thusly fail to meet organ demands. Conversely, it may be
possible that even with diminishing donation rates, a legal organ market could
sufficiently meet the demand for transplant organs. While there is no evidence to support
the former claim, there is some to support the latter. One of the successes of the Iranian
model of paid organ donation is that within 11 years, from 1988 to 1999, Iran was able to
completely eliminate their national renal transplant waiting list.252 Moreover, the study of
the Iranian model shows that of 500 randomly chosen organ recipients, 50.4% were poor
(using the same socioeconomic criteria as for LUDs).253
We must be careful, though, how we regard these results from the Iranian model.
The Iranian model is a government-run and government-funded program that is not based
on free market principles. However my argument about the ethical limits of health care
markets has consistently regarded health care markets as well-regulated free markets. So
there is still plenty of room to remain skeptical about whether or not a legal organ market
in the United States could sufficiently address this concern about diminishing organ
donation rates, especially since recent health care reform debates in the United States
have shown how divided its citizens are regarding government involvement with health
care. Yet, what we can still see from these results of the Iranian model is that it is
possible to meet the demand for transplant organs even when organ recipients cannot
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afford to pay for them and without the need for altruistic donation. A legal organ market
in the United States could theoretically accomplish similar success if it were to employ
various market tools such as coupons, government-funded vouchers, governmentenforced price controls, addendums to current health insurance coverages, or special
medical loans. Ultimately, though, if a legal organ market is to successfully address this
concern while being within the limit of increased access, it will need to be regulated such
that whatever supply an organ market could generate to meet organ demands, the
distribution of those organs will need to be fair.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have analyzed five concerns with respect to my argument for the
base ethical limits of health care markets to a hypothetical legal organ market in the
United States. I have shown how each concern could or would violate one or more of
those limits. Although it may be possible for a legal organ market to address each
concern to prevent it from violating the limits I argue for, a legal organ market that
allowed any one of these concerns to come to fruition would be unethical. It would be
odd, for example, to claim that a legal organ market is ethical when measures have not
been taken to either minimize the possibility of would-be sellers lying about their health
status, or to minimize the potential health-risks to would-be sellers and buyers, or to try
to prevent would-be sellers and buyers from being coerced or exploited, or to try to
prevent a potential decrease in organ donation rates from limiting access to transplant
organs for those in need.
At this point, though, the moral concerns about organ selling continue to block the
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establishment of a legal organ market. Some, however, have chosen not to accept the
illegality of organ selling as a deterrent to purchasing transplant organs. Recent news
stories show that persons within the United States are engaging in publicly veiled organ
sales.254 Coupled with the current organ shortage in the United States, whether the
willingness of some United States citizens to engage in unregulated organ sales justifies
the partial decommodification of organs, as Radin and Satz would likely say it does, or
whether this means we should continue to work within the paradigm of organ donation
while remaining committed to a ban on organ sales is still a question for further debate.
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Conclusion
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that we ought to impose ethical limits
on health care markets. When applying the views of Anderson, Radin, and Satz to health
care goods and services we see that, because of how health care goods and services can
affect an individual’s overall well being in ways that most other commodities do not,
properly valuing health care goods and services requires a wider set of qualifications and
considerations beyond their mere commodification. While it is improper to value health
care goods and services merely as commodities, we also see, with particular respect to
Satz, why banning the sale of health care goods and services might also be inappropriate,
because of how bans on needed goods can lead to worse outcomes, like the creation of
black markets in those goods. I then argued that in order to ethically treat health care
goods and services as commodities, their sale should be limited according to the
principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care
goods and services. I argued for these three limits because of how each appears to respect
the noncommodified ways persons can value health care goods and services and because
of the role each plays in ideal interactions between health care professionals and patients
and market transactions between buyers and sellers. I then applied this argument to two
health care markets: the pharmaceutical industry and a hypothetical legal organ market.
For the former, I showed how many of the practices of the pharmaceutical industry
violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. For the
latter, I showed the extent to which a legal organ market in the United States could or
would violate these limits.
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There is, however, a further question about my view that I have yet to address.
What might be an appropriate response when the sale of health care goods or services
violates one or more of the limits for which I argue? The rest of this chapter briefly
discusses three possible answers to this question, and lays the foundation for future
research on this topic.
1. Three Responses for Dealing with Violations to the Ethical Limits of Health Care
Markets
I have argued that when health care markets violate one of more of the limits for
which I argue, they should be considered unethical. But it would be both foolish and
inaccurate to think that all health care markets that violate one or more of these limits can
or should be regarded in the same way. One possible response to when the sale of health
care goods or services violates one or more of the limits for which I argue is that the
goods or services in question should be decommodified – that is, removed from market
sale. Anderson’s view might justify this response because of how, when applied to health
care goods and services, her view shows that the noncommodifiable value(s) of health
care goods and services is undermined when the production of those goods and services
is controlled by market norms. Yet it is doubtful that Anderson’s view could be used to
totally justify this response, because her view also justifies the continued use of health
care markets based on the idea that persons must be free to commodify goods they either
own or that are embodied in their persons. We have also seen how neither the views of
Radin nor Satz would justify this response. Furthermore, based on the suggestions I
discuss for how the pharmaceutical industry might reform itself to comply with the limits
for which I argue, my view also implies that violations of these limits should not result in
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market bans of those goods and services. Not only might Satz be correct that market bans
on needed goods could lead to the creation of black markets in those goods, but market
bans on the sale of health care goods and services in the United States would be
impractical because of both the wide use of the free market in the production and
distribution of health care goods and services, and the foreseeable likelihood that a large
number of United States citizens would be opposed to removing health care goods and
services from the free market (as is perhaps evident by the discursive reaction to the
recent attempts by the United States government to reform the distribution of health care
goods and services).
Another possible response to when the sale of health care goods and services
would violate the limits for which I argue is to partially decommodify the health care
goods or services in question. This is the suggestion Satz gives when markets in needed
goods are noxious. Given how Radin argues that commodified goods that traditionally
have not been commodified can be characterized in terms of incomplete
commodification, she too may endorse this response (although Satz claims that Radin
actually endorses removing health care goods and services from the market altogether,
which I believe is an incorrect interpretation of Radin’s view).255
Yet I am not sure about the degree to which partial decommodification is an
appropriate response. As Satz employs the concept, “partial decommodification” involves
regulating a good a means to provide minimum provisions of that good to all. If,
however, we broaden the scope of the term “health care goods or services” from my
original limit of things persons use to meet their health care needs, to include goods or
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services that do not meet a medical need but are still considered to fall within the realm
of health care, then the use of partial decommodification to deal with violations of the
limits for which I argue would be too narrow. Consider, for example, the market in
cosmetic plastic surgery. Cosmetic plastic surgery is a procedure provided by medically
trained surgeons to patients who do not often times have an underlying medical need for
it. If the cosmetic plastic surgery market were to violate any of the ethical limits of health
care markets for which I argue (although, again, the principle of increased access to
essential health care goods and services would not likely be applicable to this market,
except for cases in which we are dealing with reconstructive plastic surgery as opposed to
cosmetic plastic surgery), partial decommodification seems to be inappropriate in this
case since it is unlikely the goal would be to ensure some minimal access of cosmetic
plastic surgery to all.
These two responses are also seemingly inadequate for another reason. Assume,
for example, that the pharmaceutical industry at-large were to reform itself so that it no
longer pervasively violates the ethical limits for which I argue, but it was still the case
either that a small number of pharmaceutical companies continued to consistently violate
one or more of these limits, or that a pharmaceutical company might have (perhaps
unintentionally) violated these limits on one or some occasions, but otherwise has
complied with them. For pharmaceutical drugs, or other health care goods and services in
which the market is subject to similar circumstances, decommodification or partial
decommodification seems inefficient so long as the overall culture of the health care
market does not violate the limits for which I argue. The problem with these two
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responses is that both only work toward addressing how to deal with these violations at
the macro-level of health care markets, but are not particularly helpful for addressing
violations that occur at the micro-level of individual health care providers.
A third response for when the sale of health care goods or services would violate
one or more of the limits for which I argue is to implement a system of warnings, fines,
and sanctions against the entities culpable for the violation(s). There are three apparent
advantages of this response, with the latter two showing how it is seemingly preferable to
either total or partial decommodification of the health care goods or services in question.
First, although it does not suggest any sort of decommodification of health care goods
and services, this response recognizes and is sensitive to the idea that health care goods
and services are not properly valued merely as commodities, and that in treating them as
commodities the focus remains on ethically meeting patients’ medical needs. Second, by
allowing for the health care goods or services in question to continue being treated as
commodities, this response helps avoid any possibly disruptions in their (efficient)
production or distribution that might occur as a result of removing them, either totally or
partially, from the free market. Third, the use of warnings, fines, and sanctions is more
flexible than either total or partial decommodification in that they can be applied at both
the macro-level of heath care markets and the micro-level of individual health care
providers. For this response to work in practice, though, it would be necessary to ensure
that whatever warnings, fines, and sanctions were implemented, that they be severe
enough to sufficiently dissuade actions within health care markets that would clearly or
intentionally violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets.
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2. Possibilities for Future Research on this Topic
There are several possibilities for future research on this topic stemming from the
arguments I have made throughout this dissertation. First, from what I have said here in
the conclusion, more work needs to be done regarding what the appropriate response(s)
should be for when the sale of health care goods or services would violate the ethical
limits of health care markets for which I argue. For example, while I argue that partial
decommodification would be too narrow – applying only to health care markets in which
goods or services are necessary to meet medical needs – this does not necessarily
disqualify partial decommodification from being an appropriate response for health care
markets in goods and services that are necessary for individuals to meet their medical
needs. Also, there remain questions with respect to the third suggestion such as: what sort
of warning, fines, or sanctions would produce the desired outcome of consistently getting
the sale of health care goods and services to conform to the ethical limits for which I
argue; and how would these warnings, fines, and sanctions be enforced – by some
regulatory agency like Food and Drug Administration, by the industries responsible for
producing the goods or services, or by some other means like a collaboration between
regulatory agencies and associations such as the Food and Drug Administration, the
American Medical Association, and the Securities Exchange Commission?
Second, stemming from the initial concern about the ends of health care being
incommensurable with the ends of the market, there is a question about whether or not
there are some health care goods or services that should never be for sale. Addressing this
question appears to require at least two foci. One focus would need to address the idea
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that there may be some health care goods or services that are valued to such a degree that
it would impossible to ethically commodify them. In the previous chapter I abstained
from arguing about the morality of organ selling. Still, the debate continues about
whether or not organ commodification should be considered moral or legal. Another
focus of this question may need to address current markets in health care goods or
services that are legal but that are also ethically contentious. I noted in the last section
how cosmetic plastic surgery falls within the realm of health care, but often does not
medically benefit patients. The pharmaceutical industry is also criticized for sometimes
producing and marketing drugs that have questionable medicinal value, such as drugs like
Viagra for erectile dysfunction (a condition that does not necessarily impede a man’s
ability to live a healthy life). Here, instead of arguing that the good or service in question
is too valuable to commodify, the concern is that the good or service in question should
not be commodified because its application does not actually serve to meet a bona fide
medical need.
In chapter 2 I argue that the principle of increased access to essential health care
goods and services is based, in part, on a right to health care. Ethicists, like Daniels, who
write extensively on questions concerning a right to health care, have tried to show why
such a right exists, and what sorts of health care goods or services qualify as something
that persons have a right to. However there still appears to be room within this large body
of work to address nuanced questions regarding a right to health care and what constitutes
“fair” or “equitable” access to health care goods or services. One such question is: what
might be the appropriate ethical limit(s) of a right to health care? Addressing this
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particular question will likely require categorizing health care goods and services
according to things such as their cost(s) and the range and degree of medical necessity
they serve. Then, once we have a clearer idea of the different kinds of ways to categorize
health care goods and services, we can then begin to argue for specific limits to right to
health care that help us discern which health care goods and services ought to be included
under this right, and to what degree.
Also in chapter 2, I briefly mentioned how the principle of increased access could
possibly apply to markets in needed goods other than health care. Whether or not this
means that my view regarding the base ethical limits of health care markets has broader
application than just health care is an open question. The ways that I have argued for
honesty, respect for autonomy, and the principle of increased access to essential health
care goods and services have focused exclusively on their application to health care
markets. Another possible topic for future research, then, is trying to see if, how, and
what changes to my arguments might be necessary to apply my view of the base ethical
limits of health care markets to other kinds of markets in non-medical needed goods.
The last possibility for future research that I discuss here is the applicability of my
view to the international production or delivery of health care goods and services. From
the onset, I narrowed the scope of my research and arguments to the United States. But
economic, cultural, and governmental differences make it unclear what sort of impact
these arguments might, or could, have on an international scale. There are some places in
which the principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential
health care goods and services might not translate well as ethical limits of health care
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markets. For example, while medical paternalism is not nearly as present in Italian health
care relationships as it once was, Italian-trained doctors traditionally have placed a
greater importance on protecting patients from “frightening” information than on
providing them detailed information about their health (as the latter is believed to impede
patient-treatment by causing patients to feel overwhelmed and isolated).256 In other
places, economic underdevelopment seems to cause the opposite effect of what health
care markets intend by preventing the efficient and efficacious provision of health care
goods and services to persons in need.257 My intuition is that applying my view to the
international production or delivery of health care goods and services will be most
successful in economically developed nations, but that regardless of where the
international focus would be, substantial alterations to my arguments will be necessary to
account for whatever differences may exist between health care relationships in the
United States and elsewhere.
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Appendix 1: PhRMA’s Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals
1. Basis of Interactions
Our relationships with healthcare professionals are regulated by multiple entities and are
intended to benefit patients and to enhance the practice of medicine. Interactions should
be focused on informing healthcare professionals about products, providing scientific and
educational information, and supporting medical education.
Promotional materials provided to healthcare professionals by or on behalf of a company
should: (a) be accurate and not misleading; (b) make claims about a product only when
properly substantiated; (c) reflect the balance between risks and benefits; and (d) be
consistent with all other Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements governing
such communications.
2. Informational Presentations by Pharmaceutical Company Representatives and
Accompanying Meals
Informational presentations and discussions by industry representatives and others
speaking on behalf of a company provide healthcare providers with valuable scientific
and clinical information about medicines that may lead to improved patient care.
In order to provide important scientific information and to respect healthcare
professionals’ abilities to manage their schedules and provide patient care, company
representatives may take the opportunity to present information during healthcare
professionals’ working day, including mealtimes. In connection with such presentations
or discussions, it is appropriate for occasional meals to be offered as a business courtesy
to the healthcare professionals as well as members of their staff attending presentations,
so long as the presentations provide scientific or educational value and the meals (a) are
modest as judged by local standards; (b) are not part of an entertainment or recreational
event; and (c) are provided in a manner conducive to informational communication.
Any such meals offered in connection with informational presentations made by field
sales representatives or their immediate managers should also be limited to in-office or
in-hospital settings.
Inclusion of a healthcare professional’s spouse or other guest in a meal accompanying an
informational presentation made by or on behalf of a company is not appropriate.
Offering “take-out” meals or meals to be eaten without a company representative being
present (such as “dine & dash” programs) is not appropriate.
3. Prohibition on Entertainment and Recreation
Company interactions with healthcare professionals are professional in nature and are
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intended to facilitate the exchange of medical or scientific information that will benefit
patient care. To ensure the appropriate focus on education and informational exchange
and to avoid the appearance of impropriety, companies should not provide any
entertainment or recreational items, such as tickets to the theater or sporting events,
sporting equipment, or leisure or vacation trips, to any healthcare professional who is not
a salaried employee of the company. Such entertainment or recreational benefits should
not be offered, regardless of (1) the value of the tems; (2) whether the company engages
the healthcare professional as a speaker or consultant, or (3) whether the entertainment or
recreation is secondary to an educational purpose.
Modest, occasional meals are permitted as long as they are offered in the appropriate
circumstances and venues as described in relevant sections of this Code.
4. Pharmaceutical Company Support for Continuing Medical Education
Continuing medical education (CME), also known as independent medical education
(IME), helps physicians and other medical professionals to obtain information and
insights that can contribute to the improvement of patient care, and therefore, financial
support from companies is appropriate. Such financial support for CME is intended to
support education on a full range of treatment options and not to promote a particular
medicine. Accordingly, a company should separate its CME grant-making functions from
its sales and marketing departments. In addition, a company should develop objective
criteria for making CME grant decisions to ensure that the program funded by the
company is a bona fide educational program and that the financial support Is not an
inducement to prescribe or recommend a particular medicine or course of treatment.
Since the giving of any subsidy directly to a healthcare professional by a company may
be viewed as an inappropriate cash gift, any financial support should be given to the
CME provider, which, in turn, can use the money to reduce the overall CME registration
fee for all participants. The company should respect the independent judgment of the
CME provider and should follow standards for commercial support established by the
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) or other entity that
may accredit the CME. When companies underwrite CME, responsibility for and control
over the selection of content, faculty, educational methods, materials, and venue belongs
to the organizers of the conferences or meetings in accordance with their guidelines. The
company should not provide any advice or guidance to the CME provider, even if asked
by the provider, regarding the content or faculty for a particular CME program funded by
the company.
Financial support should not be offered for the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal
expenses of non-faculty healthcare professionals attending CME, either directly to the
individuals participating in the event or indirectly to the event’s sponsor (except as set out
in Section 9 below). Similarly, funding should not be offered to compensate for the time
spent by healthcare professionals participating in the CME event.
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A company should not provide meals directly at CME events, except that a CME
provider at its own discretion may apply the financial support provided by a company for
a CME event to provide meals for all participants.
5. Pharmaceutical Company Support for Third-Party Educational or Professional
Meetings
Third-party scientific and educational conferences or professional meetings can
contribute to the improvement of patient care, and therefore, financial support from
companies is appropriate. A conference or meeting is any activity, held at an appropriate
location, where (a) the gathering is primarily dedicated, in both time and effort, to
promoting objective scientific and educational activities and discourse (one or more
educational presentation(s) should be the highlight of the gathering), and (b) the main
incentive for bringing attendees together is to further their knowledge on the topic(s)
being presented.
Since the giving of any subsidy directly to a healthcare professional by a company may
be viewed is an inappropriate cash gift, any financial support should be given to the
conference’s sponsor, which, in turn, can use the money to reduce the overall conference
registration fee for all attendees. When companies underwrite medical conferences or
meetings other than their own, responsibility for and control over the selection of content,
faculty, educational methods, materials, and venue belongs to the organizers of the
conferences or meetings in accordance with their guidelines.
Financial support should not be offered for the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal
expenses of non-faculty healthcare professionals attending third-party scientific or
educational conferences or professional meetings, either directly to the individuals
attending the conference or indirectly to the conference’s sponsor (except as set out in
Section 9 below). Similarly, funding should not be offered to compensate for the time
spent by healthcare professionals attending the conference or meeting.
6. Consultants
Consulting arrangements with healthcare professionals allow companies to obtain
information or advice from medical experts on such topics as the marketplace, products,
therapeutic areas and the needs of patients. Companies use this advice to inform their
efforts to ensure that the medicines they produce and market are meeting the needs of
patients. Decisions regarding the selection or retention of healthcare professionals as
consultants should be made based on defined criteria such as general medical expertise
and reputation, or knowledge and experience regarding a particular therapeutic area.
Companies should continue to ensure that consultant arrangements are neither
inducements nor rewards for prescribing or recommending a particular medicine or
course of treatment.
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It is appropriate for consultants who provide advisory services to be offered reasonable
compensation for those services and reimbursement for reasonable travel, lodging, and
meal expenses incurred as part of providing those services. Any compensation or
reimbursement made in conjunction with a consulting arrangement should be reasonable
and based on fair market value.
Token consulting or advisory arrangements should not be used to justify compensating
healthcare professionals for their time or their travel, lodging, and other out-of-pocket
expenses. The following factors support the existence of a bona fide consulting
arrangement (not all factors may be relevant to any particular arrangement):
• a written contract specifies the nature of the consulting services to be provided
and the basis for payment of those services;
• a legitimate need for the consulting services has been clearly identified in
advance of requesting the services and entering into arrangements with the prospective
consultants;
• the criteria for selecting consultants are directly related to the identified purpose
and the persons responsible for selecting the consultants have the expertise necessary to
evaluate whether the particular health- care professionals meet those criteria;
• the number of healthcare professionals retained is not greater than the number
reasonably necessary to achieve the identified purpose;
• the retaining company maintains records concerning and makes appropriate use
of the services provided by consultants;
• the venue and circumstances of any meeting with consultants are conducive to
the consulting services and activities related to the services are the primary focus of the
meeting; specifically, resorts are not appropriate venues.
While modest meals or receptions may be appropriate during company-sponsored
meetings with healthcare professional commercial consultants, companies should not
provide recreational or entertainment events in conjunction with these meetings.
It is not appropriate to pay honoraria or travel or lodging expenses to non-faculty and
non-consultant healthcare professional attendees at company-sponsored meetings,
including attendees who participate in interactive sessions.
7. Speaker Programs and Speaker Training Meetings
Healthcare professionals participate in company-sponsored speaker programs in order to
help educate and inform other healthcare professionals about the benefits, risks and
appropriate uses of company medicines. Any healthcare professional engaged by a
company to participate in such external promotional programs on behalf of the company
will be deemed a speaker for purposes of this Code, and the requirements of Section 7
apply to company interactions with that healthcare professional in his or her capacity as a
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speaker. Company decisions regarding the selection or retention of healthcare
professionals as speakers should be made based on defined criteria such as general
medical expertise and reputation, knowledge and experience regarding a particular
therapeutic area, and communications skills. Companies should continue to ensure that
speaking arrangements are neither inducements nor rewards for prescribing a particular
medicine or course of treatment.
Speaker training is an essential activity because the FDA holds companies accountable
for the presentations of their speakers. It is appropriate for healthcare professionals who
participate in programs intended to train speakers for company-sponsored speaker
programs to be offered reasonable compensation for their time, considering the value of
the type of services provided, and to be offered reimbursement for reasonable travel,
lodging, and meal expenses. Such compensation and reimbursement should only be
offered when (1) the participants receive extensive training on the company’s drug
products or other specific topic to be presented and on compliance with FDA regulatory
requirements for communications; (2) this training will result in the participants
providing a valuable service to the company; and (3) the participants meet the general
criteria for bona fide consulting arrangements (as discussed in Section 6 above). Speaker
training sessions shoul be held in venues that are appropriate and conducive to
informational communication and training about medical information; specifically,
resorts are not appropriate venues.
Any compensation or reimbursement made to a healthcare professional in conjunction
with a speaking arrangement should be reasonable and based on fair market value. Each
company should, individually and independently, cap the total amount of annual
compensation it will pay to an individual healthcare professional in connection with all
speaking arrangements. Each company also should develop policies addressing the
appropriate use of speakers, including utilization of speakers after training and the
appropriate number of engagements for any particular speaker over time.
Speaker programs may include modest meals offered to attendees and should occur in a
venue and manner conducive to informational communication.
While speaker programs offer important educational opportunities to healthcare
professionals, they are distinct from CME programs, and companies and speakers should
be clear about this distinction. For example, speakers and their materials should clearly
identify the company that is sponsoring the presentation, the fact that the speaker is
presenting on behalf of the company, and that the speaker is presenting information that
is consistent with FDA guidelines. Beyond providing all speakers with appropriate
training, companies should periodically monitor speaker programs for compliance with
FDA regulatory requirements for communications on behalf of the company about its
medicines.
8. Healthcare Professionals Who Are Members of Committees That Set
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Formularies or Develop Clinical Practice Guidelines
Healthcare professionals who are members of committees that set formularies of covered
medicines or develop clinical practice guidelines that may influence the prescribing of
medicines often have significant experience in their fields. That experience can be of
great benefit to companies and ultimately to patients if these individuals choose to serve
as speakers or commercial consultants for companies. To avoid even the appearance of
impropriety, companies should require any healthcare professional who is a member of a
committee that sets formularies or develops clinical guidelines and also serves as a
speaker or commercial consultant for the company to disclose to the committee the
existence and nature of his or her relationship with the company. This disclosure
requirement should extend for at least two years beyond the termination of any speaker or
consultant arrangement.
Upon disclosure, healthcare professionals who serve as speakers or consultants for
companies should be required to follow the procedures set forth by the committee of
which they are a member, which may include recusing themselves from decisions
relating to the medicine for which they have provided speaking or consulting services.
9. Scholarships and Educational Funds
Financial assistance for scholarships or other educational funds to permit medical
students, residents, fellows, and other healthcare professionals in training to attend
carefully selected educational conferences may be offered so long as the selection of
individuals who will receive the funds is made by the academic or training institution.
“Carefully selected educational conferences” are generally defined as the major
educational, scientific, or policy-making meetings of national, regional, or specialty
medical associations.
10. Prohibition of Non-Educational and Practice-Related Items
Providing items for healthcare professionals’ use that do not advance disease or treatment
education — even if they are practice-related items of minimal value (such as pens, note
pads, mugs and similar “reminder” items with company or product logos) — may foster
misperceptions that company interactions with healthcare professionals are not based on
informing them about medical and scientific issues. Such non-educational items should
not be offered to healthcare professionals or members of their staff, even if they are
accompanied by patient or physician educational materials.
Items intended for the personal benefit of healthcare professionals (such as floral
arrangements, artwork, music CDs or tickets to a sporting event) likewise should not be
offered.
Payments in cash or cash equivalents (such as gift certificates) should not be offered to
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healthcare professionals either directly or indirectly, except as compensation for bona
fide services (as described in Sections 6 and 7). Cash or equivalent payments of any kind
create a potential appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest.
It is appropriate to provide product samples for patient use in accordance with the
Prescription Drug Marketing Act.
11. Educational Items
It is appropriate for companies, where permitted by law, to offer items designed primarily
for the education of patients or healthcare professionals if the items are not of substantial
value ($100 or less) and do not have value to healthcare professionals outside of his or
her professional responsibilities. For example, an anatomical model for use in an
examination room is intended for the education of the patients and is therefore
appropriate, whereas a DVD or CD player may have independent value to a healthcare
professional outside of his or her professional responsibilities, even if it could also be
used to provide education to patients, and therefore is not appropriate.
Items designed primarily for the education of patients or healthcare professionals should
not be offered on more than an occasional basis, even if each individual item is
appropriate.
12. Prescriber Data
Companies use non-patient identified prescriber data to facilitate the efficient flow of
information to healthcare professionals. Such prescriber data, which does not identify
individual patients, may serve many purposes, including enabling companies to: (a)
impart important safety and risk information to prescribers of a particular drug; (b)
conduct research; (c) comply with FDA mandated risk management plans that require
drug companies to identify and interact with physicians who prescribe certain drugs; (d)
track adverse events of marketed prescriptions drugs; and (e) focus marketing activities
on those healthcare professionals who would most likely benefit from information about
a particular drug.
Companies that choose to use non-patient identified prescriber data to facilitate
communications with healthcare professionals should use this data responsibly. For
example, companies should (a) respect the confidential nature of prescriber data; (b)
develop policies regarding the use of the data; (c) educate employees and agents about
those policies; (d) maintain an internal contact person to handle inquiries regarding the
use of the data; and (e) identify appropriate disciplinary actions for misuse of this data.
In addition, companies should respect and abide by the wishes of any healthcare
professional who asks that his or her prescriber data not be made available to company
sales representatives. Companies may demonstrate this respect by following the rules of
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voluntary programs that facilitate prescribers’ ability to make this choice.
13. Independence and Decision Making
No grants, scholarships, subsidies, support, consulting contracts, or educational or
practice related items should be provided or offered to a healthcare professional in
exchange for prescribing products or for a commitment to continue prescribing products.
Nothing should be offered or provided in a manner or on conditions that would interfere
with the independence of a healthcare professional’s prescribing practices.
14. Training and Conduct of Company Representatives
Pharmaceutical company representatives play an important role in delivering accurate,
up-to-date information to healthcare professionals about the approved indications,
benefits and risks of pharmaceutical therapies. These representatives often serve as the
primary point of contact between the companies who research, develop, manufacture and
market life-saving and life-enhancing medicines and the healthcare professionals who
prescribe them. As such, the company representatives must act with the highest degree of
professionalism and integrity.
Companies should ensure that all representatives who are employed by or acting on
behalf of the companies and who visit healthcare professionals receive training about the
applicable laws, regulations and industry codes of practice, including this Code, that
govern the representatives’ interactions with healthcare professionals. In addition,
companies should train their representatives to ensure that they have sufficient
knowledge of general science and product- specific information to provide accurate, upto-date information, consistent with FDA requirements.
Companies should provide updated or additional training in all of these areas as needed
for their representatives who visit healthcare professionals.
Companies should also assess their representatives periodically to ensure that they
comply with relevant company policies and standards of conduct. Companies should take
appropriate action when representatives fail to comply.
15. Adherence to Code
All companies that interact with healthcare professionals about pharmaceuticals should
adopt procedures to assure adherence to this Code.
Companies that publicly announce their commitment to abide by the Code and who
complete an annual certification that they have policies and procedures in place to foster
compliance with the Code will be identified by PhRMA on a public web site. The
certification must be signed by the company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief
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Compliance Officer. The website will identify the companies who commit to abide by the
Code; provide contact information for their Chief Compliance Officers; and, at the
appropriate time, publish the status of each company’s annual certification.
Any comments received by PhRMA relating to a company’s observance of the Code or
conduct that is addressed by the Code will be referred by PhRMA to the relevant
company’s Chief Compliance Officer.
In addition, companies are encouraged to seek external verification periodically, meaning
at least once every three years, that the company has policies and procedures in place to
foster compliance with the Code. PhRMA will prepare general guidance for such external
verification and will identify on its web site if a company has sought and obtained
verification of its compliance policies and procedures from an external source.
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Appendix 2: PhRMA Guiding Principles: Direct to Consumer Advertisements About
Prescription Medicines
1. These Principles are premised on the recognition that DTC advertising of prescription
medicines can benefit the public health by increasing awareness about diseases, educating
patients about treatment options, motivating patients to contact their physicians and
engage in a dialogue about heal the concerns, increasing the likelihood that patients will
receive appropriate care for conditions that are frequently under-diagnosed and undertreated, and encouraging compliance with prescription drug treatment regimens.
2. In accordance with FDA regulations, all DTC information should be accurate and not
misleading, should make claims only when supported by substantial evidence, should
reflect balance between risks and benefits, and should be consistent with FDA approved
labeling. Accordingly, companies should continue to base promotional claims on FDA
approved labeling and not promote medicines for off-label uses, including in DTC
advertisements.
3. DTC television and print advertising which is designed to market a prescription drug
should also be designed to responsibly educate the consumer about that medicine and,
where appropriate, the condition for which it may be prescribed. During the development
of new DTC television advertising campaigns, companies should seek and consider
feedback from appropriate audiences, such as health care professionals and patients, to
gauge the educational impact for patients and consumers.
4. DTC television and print advertising of prescription drugs should clearly indicate that
the medicine is a prescription drug to distinguish such advertising from other advertising
for non-prescription products.
5. DTC television and print advertising should foster responsible communications
between patients and health care professionals to help patients achieve better health and a
more complete appreciation of both the health benefits and the known risks associated
with the medicine being advertised.
6. In order to foster responsible communication between patients and health care
professionals, companies should spend an appropriate amount of time to educate health
professionals about a new medicine or a new therapeutic indication and to alert them to
the upcoming advertising campaign before commencing the first DTC advertising
campaign. In determining what constitutes an appropriate time, companies should take
into account the relative importance of informing patients of the availability of a new
medicine, the complexity of the risk-benefit profile of that new medicine and health care
professionals’ knowledge of the condition being treated. Companies are encouraged to
consider individually setting specific periods of time, with or without exceptions, to
educate health care professionals before launching a branded DTC television or print
advertising campaign. Companies should continue to educate health care professionals as
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additional valid information about a new medicine is obtained from all reliable sources.
7. Working with the FDA, companies should continue to responsibly alter or discontinue
a DTC advertising campaign should new and reliable information indicate a serious
previously unknown safety risk.
8. Companies should submit all new DTC television advertisements to the FDA before
releasing these advertisements for broadcast.
9. DTC print advertisements for prescription medicines should include FDA’s toll-free
MedWatch telephone number and website for reporting potential adverse events. DTC
television advertisements for prescription medicines should direct patients to a print
advertisement containing FDA’s toll-free MedWatch telephone number and website,
and/or should provide the company’s toll-free telephone number.
10. Companies that choose to feature actors in the roles of health care professionals in a
DTC television or print advertisement that identifies a particular product should
acknowledge in the advertisement that actors are being used. Likewise, if actual health
care professionals appear in such advertisements, the advertisement should include an
acknowledgement if the health care professional is compensated for the appearance.
11. Where a DTC television or print advertisement features a celebrity endorser, the
endorsements should accurately reflect the opinions, findings, beliefs or experience of the
endorser. Companies should maintain verification of the basis of any actual or implied
endorsements made by the celebrity endorser in the DTC advertisement, including
whether the endorser is or has been a user of the product if applicable.
12. DTC television and print advertising should include information about the availability
of other options such as diet and lifestyle changes where appropriate for the advertised
condition.
13. DTC television advertising that identifies a product by name should clearly state the
health conditions for which the medicine is approved and the major risks associated with
the medicine being advertised.
14. DTC television and print advertising should be designed to achieve a balanced
presentation of both the benefits and the risks associated with the advertised prescription
medicine. Specifically, risks and safety information, including the substance of relevant
boxed warnings, should be presented with reasonably comparable prominence to the
benefit information, in a clear, conspicuous and neutral manner, and without distraction
from the content. In addition, DTC television advertisements should support responsible
patient education by directing patients to health care professionals as well as to print
advertisements and/or websites where additional benefit and risk information is available.
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15. All DTC advertising should respect the seriousness of the health conditions and the
medicine being advertised.

16. In terms of content and placement, DTC television and print advertisements should be
targeted to avoid audiences that are not age appropriate for the messages involved. In
particular, DTC television and print advertisements containing content that may be
inappropriate for children should be placed in programs or publications that are
reasonably expected to draw an audience of approximately 90 percent adults (18 years or
older).
17. Companies are encouraged to promote health and disease awareness as part of their
DTC advertising.
18. Companies should include information in all DTC advertising, where
appropriate, about help for the uninsured and underinsured.
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